THE

MODERN CHURCHMAN

By identifying the new learning with heresy, you make orthodoxy synonymous with ignorance.—*Erasmus.*

A State without the means of change is without the means of its conservation.—*Edmund Burke.*

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SIGNS OF THE TIMES

The Peace Policy of President and Premier.

What in the piping times of peace used to be called the 'silly season,' when the sea-serpent made his annual appearance, has this year been marked by the publication of a number of highly significant manifestos. The first in importance of these is the joint declaration made by President Roosevelt and Mr. Churchill proclaiming certain 'common principles in the national policies of their respective countries on which they base their hopes for a better future for the world.' These principles are eight in number :

First, their countries seek no aggrandisement, territorial or other.

Second, they desire to see no territorial changes that do not accord with the freely expressed wishes of the peoples concerned.

Third, they respect the right of all peoples to choose the form of Government under which they will live; and they wish to see sovereign rights and self-government restored to those who have been forcibly deprived of them.

Fourth, they will endeavour, with due respect for their existing obligations, to further enjoyment by all States, great or small, victor or vanquished, of access, on equal terms, to the trade and to the raw materials of the world which are needed for their economic prosperity.

Fifth, they desire to bring about the fullest collaboration between all nations in the economic field, with the object of securing for all improved labour standards, economic advancement, and social security.

> Sixth, after the final destruction of Nazi tyranny, they hope to see established a peace which will afford to all nations the means of dwelling in safety within their own boundaries, and which will afford assurance that all the men in all the lands may live out their lives in freedom from fear and want.
>
> Seventh, such a peace should enable all men to traverse the high seas and oceans without hindrance.
>
> Eighth, they believe all of the nations of the world, for realistic as well as spiritual reasons, must come to the abandonment of the use of force. Since no future peace can be maintained if land, sea, or air armaments continue to be employed by nations which threaten, or may threaten, aggression outside of their frontiers, they believe, pending the establishment of a wider and permanent system of general security, that the disarmament of such nations is essential. They will likewise aid and encourage all other practicable measures which will lighten for peace-loving peoples the crushing burden of armament.

This is undoubtedly the right word spoken at the right time, and in contrast to many other well-meaning pronouncements made on the same theme, the word is with power. It is with power, not simply because it is soundly based on principles of freedom, justice and humanity, but because it promises a reasonable prospect of the realization of such principles in practice.

The two dominating personalities, representing the two great States whose policies they very largely determine, augur by their combination of good-will and good sense the practical fulfilment of the programme presented in their joint declaration. This programme promises not only for democracy, but also for every form of good government, a world made safe by practical loyalty to basic Christian principles.

Of course, the political, economic, and social policies outlined in this declaration will not abolish either fear or many other ills from this planet :

> Of all the ills that human life attend
> How few that Kings and Laws can end or mend.

Nevertheless, good governments can do much to alleviate human ills : modern science can do more : and Christian education can do most : and it is this combination of forces of which our present-day civilization or semi-barbarism stands in such grievous need. We are very glad therefore that the declaration in its survey refers to ' spiritual reasons,' for without the recognition of these unseen foundations of society, and the determination to build upon them, there can be no hope of ultimately

securing a world civilization possessed of both stability and the power of true progress. For it is these 'spiritual reasons' practically interpreted which alone can provide 'the promise of the life that now is as well as of that which is to come.' The Earthly Paradise ideal has to be united to that of the Veil of Soul-making, and the process of Soul-making is, we believe, carried on more successfully in the creation of a free civilization than in the bondage of a barbaric and servile state.

Parliament and Christian Education.

The second in importance of recent manifestos is that presented to the President of the Board of Education on the subject of Christian Education in the Schools, signed by 224 members of Parliament (72 Peers and 152 Commoners). The text of the Declaration is as follows:

> Out of the sufferings of war, there are emerging many subjects of profound importance to the life and future of the nation, the Empire and the world. Not the least of these is the position of Christian education in our schools.
>
> On all sides wide interest in this question is being made clear to Members of Parliament, and we would desire to examine the matter afresh and, if possible, take such action in regard thereto as shall assist in bringing into being a new and better social order. The struggle in which we are engaged is clearly one between a régime embracing a crude and reactionary paganism, finding expression in material force and destroying truth, freedom and justice wherever its impact is felt, and ourselves and those who have the declared purpose of establishing these more firmly in the common life of the world as the foundation of that new and better social order.
>
> Rightly understood, these are the elemental principles of the Christian philosophy of life and it would seem, therefore, that the future citizen should be moulded in character by Christian education that his citizenship shall become the expression of these principles in action.
>
> The problem for Parliament, then, is how this is to be accomplished. It cannot be done by lessons in class only. Indeed it is not a problem whose solution is to be sought in elementary schools alone. What is required is a pervading spiritual influence which shall permeate the whole range of education and far beyond it.
>
> We are mindful of the great denominational controversies of the past in regard to education, but we also know that the experiences which have come to us in recent years have largely removed their causes, and have given the opportunity of a new Christian unity for a great purpose. Leaders in all religious denominations, members of all sections of the teaching profession, responsible local administrators of educational services and private citizens unite in asking that action be taken without delay.

Great services have been rendered to the cause of religious education by the teachers in the past, and any new settlement must recognize this and secure to them their rights. Indeed it is essential that the teachers should be consulted in regard to any settlement, and the benefit of their experience gained for the schools.

We suggest, then, that the Government take such action either by administration or by legislation as shall:

(1) Make it possible for every school to have upon its staff teachers capable and willing to give instruction in religious knowledge, and supervise and lead religious exercises, securing at the same time that freedom of conscience for teachers, parents and children which is at present their right.

(2) Provide that religious knowledge be made an optional subject in training colleges, and in the examination for the teacher's certificate.

(3) Secure that every day the work of the school shall include a service of united worship.

(4) Provide that text-books or syllabuses of Christian education shall be prepared by a united and representative body for use in schools wherever acceptable.

(5) Provide that H.M. Inspectors shall be authorized to inspect the religious education in any schools where this is desired by the Local Education Authority or by the Managers or Governors of the School.

A week later, the President of the Board of Education received a deputation headed by the Archbishops of Canterbury, York, and Wales and the leaders of the Free Churches, in support of the weighty declaration of members of Parliament cited above. The deputation's demand that their agreed proposals should be implemented by the Government at the earliest possible opportunity was received with sympathy but also with extreme caution by Mr. Butler, the new President of the Board of Education.

The President's position, although greatly eased by the united front of the Christian bodies in this country, is not without difficulty. Besides the united front of the Christian denominations in support of Christian education in the schools, it is absolutely necessary to secure the whole-hearted support of the N.U.T. and of the teaching profession generally. Plainly this cannot be done unless the whole programme of Christian education in the schools is put on the broadest basis and presented in a most attractive light. First and foremost the imparting of Christian education by individual teachers must be entirely voluntary on their part, the only test exacted being the test of

competency: the spirit of dogmatism, ecclesiasticism and clericalism must be exorcised. The aim of such Christian education must not be the strengthening either of this denomination or of that denomination, but the promotion of a Christian civilization.

Such a Christian civilization is not going to be secured by teaching Christian dogmas on the one hand, nor by giving biblical instruction of the 'Muppim, Huppim and Ard' type on the other. The Bible certainly must be the text-book of such education, and above all, the Gospels; the Bible must be taught and studied in the light of our best modern knowledge about it; but the teaching must not be restricted either to hard facts or critical theories. Its object must be intensely practical, the whole-hearted presentation of the Christian ideal of life, and the attractive inculcation of Christian morals and manners. Arresting illustrations from Christian Art and Christian History should be used particularly where such examples are furnished by the locality of the school.

The teacher has to possess on the one hand a sound scientific view of the universe and a true picture of human history, but his foreground has to be dominated by what Châteaubriand sought to present in *Le Génie du Christianisme*, an enthralling realization of what the Christian Religion has done and can do to 'work out the brute' and develop man's spiritual, moral and aesthetic nature. Enthusiasm for Christian civilization and Christian culture must form the practical basis for such a system of national education.

From such an education the Christian cultus may not be excluded. Not only must the practice of private prayer be taught, but also the uplifting value for our social and national life of Public Worship — finely set forth in S. T. Coleridge's *Ancient Mariner*:

> O Wedding-Guest! this soul hath been
> Alone on a wide wide sea:
> So lonely 'twas, that God Himself
> Scarce seemèd there to be.
>
> O sweeter than the marriage-feast,
> 'Tis sweeter far to me,
> To walk together to the kirk
> With a goodly company!—

> To walk together to the kirk,
> And all together pray,
> While each to his great Father bends,
> Old men, and babes, and loving friends
> And youths and maidens gay!

For this purpose, the Church of England, whilst essentially universal in its principles, relationships and outlook, must also be truly nationalized : the whole basis of the establishment must be broadened and rendered not only theoretically but practically comprehensive. Our noble shrines, the heritage of our glorious national history must become again the centres of Divine Worship by all our citizens.

A Christian system of education, if it is to be really effective, must demand from our Church Authorities much more than the implementing of religious teaching in all our schools by the President of the Board of Education. It will demand a national Church forgetful of itself, of its rights and privileges, its exclusiveness and prejudices — a national Church prepared to lose itself for Christ's sake in the higher and better life of the English people. A Church chained in dogmatic shackles in which conclusions are prescribed and so research is precluded, must fail to secure the loyalty of the teaching profession as a whole and that leadership in the nation's religious life which the national need of an enlightened religion demands. Life and liberty are needful for the national Church — life and liberty secured, not by the separation of State and Church, but by the deliverance of the Church from restrictions imposed on her by herself, when in loyalty — as she believes — to Christian tradition she rejects the Freedom of the Spirit and the powers of influence which the Spirit grants.

And last but not least, school and Church can do little unless the ideal of the Christian home be realized in the life of the English people. Unless the work of the teachers of the Christian religion in the schools is to receive the whole-hearted self-denying co-operation of clergy and parents in their different spheres, this much-needed effort to promote Christian education in our schools will have little effect.

THE MESSAGE OF THE BISHOPS TO THE NATION.

As the result of their recent deliberations in Oxford, the Bishops of England, Wales, and Scotland have been moved to issue a message* to the people of Great Britain. The Message is divided into five sections: (1) A Manifestation of Evil. (2) The Supremacy of God.' (3) Our Duty and Service. (4) Church and People. (5) Freedom and Worship.

We recognize that this Message is inspired by a sincere desire to better the religious situation and to win the people of Great Britain back to Christian faith and duty; but the Message follows conventional lines, and must fail, we fear, to influence effectively those to whom it is addressed. Unfortunately the impression which the Message must leave on the mind of many readers is that the Bishops recognize the need for reform in every sphere, economic, social, political, and are prepared to advise how to secure it in these spheres; but that they do not recognize the need for reform in that sphere in which they themselves have been appointed Overseers.

The Bishops recognize the Church is partly to blame for the indifference of the nation, not to the primal demands of noble heroic self-sacrificing service, but to the demands of Public Christian Worship and practising Church membership; but in their Message the Bishops promise no specific reforms nor any courageous policy of reformation which might be expected to win back the nation in affectionate loyalty to the Church as its true spiritual home — the temporal treasury of those eternal values in the possession of which nations as well as individuals find their true life.

Really what we need to-day is a message from the people of Great Britain to the Bishops of England, Wales, and Scotland. But who is to compose this message? Not the members of the Lower Houses of the Convocations of both Provinces, for they only represent the clergy of the Established Church: not the members of the House of Laity, for this small body of select Churchmen and Churchwomen represent so minute a proportion of the people of England as to be unable to express the voice of the people at large. No doubt the House of Commons would be

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the right body to do it, but that is to ask the impossible. Other messages of no little value could be delivered to the Bishops by the Great Labour Unions, the N.U.T., the British Association, the Royal Society, the British Academy, the Universities of Oxford and Cambridge, Scotland and Wales, London and the Provinces, not to mention our Chambers of Commerce and our great municipal corporations.

Although we might imagine the contents of such messages to the Bishops, we can never hope that those messages will be delivered. Yet, if our Bishops ever have any leisure moments or ever take any holidays, it might not be unprofitable for them to consider whether those imaginary messages might not contain much to which they ought to give attention when examining the relations at present existing between Church and Nation, and in formulating a Church policy which is to win back the nation to Christian faith and practice and possible active Church membership.

What are the points which such messages, presumably very brief and direct, would be likely to stress?

(1) The need for unity and co-operation among all Christians in this land, and the obligation of the Bishops as great Christian leaders to be ready to sacrifice all but the barest Christian essentials to secure such unity and co-operation.

(2) The need of the Christian Church to put far more weight upon the obligations of Christian practice and far less weight upon correct theological beliefs and ecclesiastical duties than is done at present.

(3) The need for extreme simplicity in the formulation of necessary Christian faith. The more learned the body addressing the Bishops, the more we are sure they would stress the need for this extreme simplicity and the substitution of plain modern statements for archaic formularies — in short, the need for a more sensitive recognition of the claims of Truth as against Tradition and the need of revising many Church dogmas in the light of modern criticism and research.

(4) The need for a noble simplicity in Christian worship in which creative freedom combined with a due regard for reverence and beauty are expressed with an entire naturalness characteristic of our national ideal, and from which all artificiality

and ecclesiastical mannerisms are excluded.

(5) The need for a much greater control of the Church and its policy by laymen and laywomen of goodwill whose primary concern is the moral and spiritual welfare of the nation.

(6) The need for basing Christian morality not upon the *ipsissima verba* of Scripture and the precedents of the Canon Law, but upon the principle of love to man and upon the expanding claims of human welfare, physical, social, and spiritual.

(7) The need for the Christian religion to exercise its influence in our national life as an enlightening, uplifting, attractive, friendly, persuasive force, manifested in the character and conduct of its leaders, teachers and adherents, rather than by claims to doctrinal infallibility and ecclesiastical authority.

These points, we believe, would constitute the tenour of the national messages to the Bishops, if many of our alienated but by no means hostile laity felt they could do any good by delivering such messages.

At any rate, of this we are certain — that when our Bishops courageously, wisely, and lovingly reform our Church policy and practice in response to the nation's need, they will find the laity ready to pay increasing attention to their episcopal messages; but until such reforms are seriously taken in hand by the episcopate, their exhortations will seem to the public to be little more than the expressions of pious hopes.

We recognize, however, that the Church policy contained in the seven points outlined above demands clear vision, steady courage and prolonged effort for its realization, since it requires as a preliminary to its accomplishment the re-education of many of the clergy on modern lines. What needs to be recognized by our leaders to-day is that we seem to be further, in many ways, from our objective than was the case twenty-five years ago.

The Sword of the Spirit Sheathed.

The movement known as 'the Sword of the Spirit,' founded a year ago by Cardinal Hinsley to unite all Christian men and women of good-will against the challenge offered by the Totalitarian Systems and for the purpose of securing co-operation in support of the war as just and Christian, has lost its primal radiance.

At the outset, the movement which secured the warm support of the Archbishop of Canterbury, the Archbishop of York, and the leaders of the Free Churches who were glad to co-operate with Cardinal Hinsley and British Roman Catholics in their effort to present a united Christian front against the reactionary paganism of Germany and her allies, has unfortunately become narrowed down to an English Roman Catholic movement. The announcement of the acceptance of this restrictive policy was made by Cardinal Hinsley with many explanations at the first annual meeting of the movement on Saturday, August 9.

The Cardinal declared that the Roman hierarchy in this country had felt compelled in accordance with their Catholic convictions to restrict full membership in the Sword of the Spirit movement to Roman Catholics. Adherents of other Christian communions, it is true, might become 'associate members,' but were to possess neither voting power nor control.

This announcement had naturally caused much disappointment amongst those non-Roman Catholic supporters of the movement who had so warmly welcomed it at the outset as promising a really united Christian effort in this land on behalf of the cause of Christian civilization — a movement in which Roman Catholic and Anglican, Presbyterian and Quaker, Baptist and Congregationalist, Methodist and Unitarian, were resolved not to allow their theological and ecclesiastical differences to prevent them from uniting under the leadership of the Holy Spirit in a war pledged to the overthrow of all anti-Christian aggression, tyranny, injustice, and inhumanity.

Surely no basis could have been broader, simpler, more practical, more truly Christian than this movement professed itself to be at the outset: but once again the forces of ecclesiastical tradition and dogmatic fanaticism have proved too strong and the Sword of the Spirit has become identified with the exclusive claims of the Roman Pontiff.

The verdict delivered in the leading article of *The Church Times* of August 15, 1941, is one with which we are compelled to agree:

> 'The hopes engendered by the launching a year ago of the Sword of the Spirit Movement have not been fulfilled . . . So far as Churchmen and Nonconformists are concerned, the Sword of the Spirit Movement, despite renewed allusions at the annual meeting to co-operation

with "the other Christian bodies," has now, alas! no more title to be considered in the light of a brave experiment in Christian collaboration than any other exclusively Roman Catholic organization. The support of other Christians is accepted, almost as it were on sufferance, but neither corporately nor individually have they any *locus standi*, any say in the direction of policy. A great opportunity has been lost.'

Our 'quasi-peculiars.'

Many years ago an influential deputation, including many M.P.'s, called the attention of Archbishop Davidson to the unsatisfactory state of the Church of England. One of their complaints dealt with the Theological Colleges. 'Look,' said they, 'at the men the theological colleges are turning out.' The Primate replied: 'It is true the men coming forth from the theological colleges are not all that could be wished: but you should see those men when they go in!'

The Editor of *Crockford's Clerical Directory* in his Preface to the 1941 edition has coined a new phrase 'quasi-peculiars' to describe, not the products of the theological colleges, but the theological colleges themselves. 'Peculiar' is a technical ecclesiastical term denoting a Corporation which is self-governing under the terms of its constitution. Westminster Abbey is 'a royal peculiar.' It is not subject to the control of the Bishop of London but governs itself in accordance with its own constitution under the sole authority of the Crown. In this respect it is the heir of the great mediaeval abbeys which were exempt from episcopal control but where the Pope took the place of the Sovereign. *Crockford* holds that if the present theological college system is to continue,

> 'the colleges must surrender their position as quasi-peculiars and be incorporated in the ordinary system of the Church. This would make it possible to supervise them more closely and continuously. At present their position is too much like that of the exempt monasteries' (p. ix).

Those who undertake to reform institutions ought, before doing so, to make a close study of their origin and history. The origin and history of our English theological colleges is characteristically English. They are the creations neither of the State nor of the Church. Individual Churchmen, impressed with the inadequacy of the training for Holy Orders provided by Oxford and Cambridge, supplemented by the subsequent efforts of notable Incumbents famous for their powers as 'breakers-in

of wild curates,' resolved at their own cost with the assistance of those who shared their conscientious concern to found seminaries for the training of ordinands. This movement began a century ago.

In May, 1940, Wells Theological College celebrated its centenary, having completed an honourable continuous existence of one hundred years. Chichester Theological College, whose 'principal begetter' was Archdeacon (afterwards Cardinal) Manning, with the 'unqualified approval' of John Henry Newman, was founded about a year earlier but cannot claim a similar continuity of existence. References to the early days of Chichester occur in the pleasant ecclesiastical romances of Victor Whitechurch, a Rural Dean who beguiled his leisure in concocting clerical nightmares. When we compare our modern theological college with primal Chichester and its curriculum — *Quantum mutatur ab illo*! Altogether some thirty-five theological colleges have been founded since then in England and Wales. Twenty-eight are in existence at the present time, but it is quite possible that the stress and strain of the War will reduce this number.

The earliest theological colleges were Tractarian in spirit and ideal. Then the Evangelicals, noting the growing influence of the Tractarian seminaries, founded a powerful group of Evangelical theological colleges. Then a number of Missionary theological colleges were founded, almost entirely non-graduate. Then last, but not least, Churchmen, who were neither Anglo-Catholic nor Evangelical, founded colleges intended to serve the needs of non-party ordinands. This was rendered necessary when it was becoming the custom of the bishops to insist that all candidates for Holy Orders, with rare exceptions, must reside for a period in a theological college before Ordination. Many of these institutions have had a hard struggle for existence. The founding and maintaining of such colleges where neither grants from State nor Church are available and where fees have to be kept on a low scale (especially if the sons of the clergy are to constitute a considerable proportion of their members) has demanded great generosity and even self-sacrifice on the part of their founders and supporters. The proposal of *Crockford* that these colleges should now be

deprived of their powers of self-government seems to us to be lacking in that sense of wisdom and justice which characterizes this well-informed and judicious 'periodical.'

If it be right that he who pays the piper calls the tune, then it is not just that the theological colleges, mainly on the ground that they are Church party institutions, should be deprived of their powers of self-government. There are other and better remedies than that. And here we venture on several general observations.

The creation of Church institutions by individuals or groups of individuals at their own initiative and expense and as a consequence the subsequent right to possess a controlling interest in the government of each institution so founded, has been characteristic of our English Church life from the earliest times. Indeed our patronage system in our parishes, our Cathedral Chapters, our Colleges in Oxford and Cambridge, our Public Schools are all products of this system, as are also all our great missionary societies. These are the creations of the English spirit of initiative, enterprise, public service, generosity and devotion. How poor and mean and feeble our Church life would have been without the existence of this spirit and the encouragement of it.

At the present time, in the interests of a centralising bureaucratic lust for power, as detrimental to the proper freedom of the individual as it is to the vigour, enrichment and variety of institutions, persistent efforts are being made to deprive these self-governing or semi-self-governing institutions of their hard-earned rights and vital freedom. Such a movement is not easily resisted in the case of a bureaucratic State, and Church people are beginning to discover that it is hardly less easy to resist it in the case of a National Church which is exchanging its ancient constitution consisting of an aggregation of self-governing or partly self-governing Corporations for the absolutist uniformity of a bureaucracy. The Party feeling which exists in the Church renders it more easily the prey of this policy of bureaucratic victimization than would otherwise be the case. We are convinced that this bureaucratic centralizing policy is as detrimental to the vitality of the Church as it is to those self-governing institutions and to the influence which the enrichment, variety

and initiative arising from their freedom, enable them to exert on the life of the nation.

It ought here to be observed that the English episcopate already possesses a very large measure of control, direct and indirect, over the Theological Colleges. Every theological college must receive the recognition of the Upper Houses of the Convocations and must be prepared to submit to a quinquennial inspection of a very comprehensive and searching character conducted by inspectors appointed by the Upper Houses of the Convocations. Every theological college has on its governing body one or more of the English Bishops. The course of studies in the Theological Colleges is very largely determined by the Bishops who authorise the General Ordination Examination or its equivalent demanded from all ordinands. Last but not least, no member of any theological college can be admitted to the Ministry of the Church of England without being examined, accepted, and ordained by one of the Bishops.

It seems to us therefore that in the existing arrangements we have a judicious combination of episcopal control on the one hand and institutional freedom on the other, and we strongly deprecate any alteration in this balance of power. Of course, Evangelical Churchmen would like to see the Anglo-Catholic Colleges more Evangelical, and Anglo-Catholic Churchmen would like to see the Evangelical Colleges more Anglo-Catholic, and Liberal or Modernist Churchmen would like to see all the Theological Colleges more Liberal; but a wise, sympathetic and far-sighted episcopate will undoubtedly so seek to direct the training of ordinands that while standing firmly for loyalty to the essential principles and practice of the Church of England, they will also leave to the Theological Colleges a charitable, reasonable, and comprehensive freedom. Moreover, in view of the hard financial times ahead of the Church, we would point out that to deprive the Theological Colleges of their existing powers of self-government must inevitably result in depriving them of the financial contributions at present provided by their supporters who share their ideals and recognize the self-governing Theological Colleges as important factors in the realization of those ideals which they regard as essential to the welfare of Church and Nation.

THE SOVEREIGN STATE AND CHRISTIANITY

By the Rev. W. F. Lofthouse, D.D., formerly Principal of Handsworth Theological College, author of *Ethics and Atonement*, *Christianity in Action*, etc.

I.

THE dominant problem to-day, for high politics, for the future of society, and for the Christian Church itself, is the nation, in its rôle of sovereign state. Versailles took the independent and sovereign nation for granted. The empires went; the nations arrived. The result was economic rivalries, tariff walls, conscript armies, fresh persecution of minorities, and the dictatorships and all their dreadful accompaniments. Hence the nightmare of these succeeding twenty years. What wonder if we are now beginning to hear, 'the nation has come; it must go'? But will it go? Is it not far too strongly entrenched in our human emotions and our political habits of thought? Have the horrors of even this world-conflict prepared the ground for such a radical change?

On the other hand, the Church cannot but reflect that the New Testament appears to have no place for nationality. Words of Jesus, indeed, can be quoted both for and against the overstepping of Jewish national ideals and enthusiasms. Paul at times saw Christ surrounded by a splendour so dazzling that it obliterated all human distinctions. Whether he could ever have understood the word national as we use it to-day is extremely doubtful. But an essential part of the Christian message is that all men are of equal importance in the sight of God their creator; that there is no 'respect of persons' with Him. What right then has the Christian to national or patriotic loyalties? The question is not the less important because it is so disconcerting.

There are, however, three aspects of the question which are constantly forgotten. Are nations so many huge atoms, doomed to clash with one another like ignorant armies fighting in the

dark, knowing no law save the interest of the stronger, and thus defying, by the very principle of their being, the spirit of Christianity? In the first place, men do not live in a civic or political group, but in a number of groups; each group is enclosed in others; and life in such a group may not mean the transformation or sublimation of self-seeking and the struggles to which it leads, but something far more dangerous than the egoism of the individual; the self-seeking of a horde, a group, a nation. Such is pre-eminently the scene presented to us to-day. The squabbles of the little walled villages of Latium or the Peloponnese or the Palestinian hills are repeated on an infinitely larger scale in every continent. Nor do these groups form neat concentric circles. They overlap. Group A may be formed out of members of groups B, C, and D. There were aristocrats and democrats in all the old Greek cities; and communism and capitalism know no frontiers.

Again, nationality as we know it, whether to fear it or to admire, is by no means history's only word. Civilization in the full sense of the word only began with the magnificent attempt of Alexander of Macedon to weld the erstwhile warring nations into one by means of a common culture, language and commerce, not without the aid of religion. It continued under Augustus and his successors, reaching its height at the brief period, as Gibbon would remind us, when a philosopher was king, and when the Stoic doctrine of the brotherhood of man and of world citizenship had become an institution. It lived through the Middle Ages as the Holy Roman Empire; and though the days were to come when, as men gibed, it was neither holy, Roman, nor an empire, it remained true, for centuries, to the creative conception of Alexander. That is to say, for nearly two thousand years, the life in groups has been subordinated to the life in a comprehensive group. What has divided groups has been definitely acknowledged as of less importance than what has held groups and individuals together.

Further, even the sacred principle of sovereignty has not been able to check international arrangements and activities. A great deal was accomplished long before Versailles set everyone talking about it; postal communication, commissions for riverine transport, the freedom and safety of navigation, and research

dedicated to health and the unending war on man's most formidable foe, the insect. Neither geography nor biology cares a jot for the worship of race. The boundaries we set up we break down ourselves the moment we begin to trade; trade routes have always laughed at frontiers; and they are cheerfully and inevitably crossed by every pest to which humanity is subject.

All these admirable but timid organizations were as nothing to the great vision that began to take shape at Versailles. The real achievement of Versailles was to lay down the principle that the needs and the quarrels of each nation must be the concern of all, with the corollary that no nation was to be the judge in its own cause, or to suffer through calamities which it was too weak to meet by itself. Few realize to-day how prophetic was such a claim, nor how the nation was thereby transformed from an atom to a cell, from an independent self-assertive entity to an organism which can only exist by co-operation with others, by receiving and giving. It was not strange that statesmen, bred in an earlier or a later school, were unable to attain so high a note, till with their clumsy hands they wrecked the machine whose working and objects they could not or would not understand. But in spite of them, the League of Nations in general and the I.L.O. in particular have done work never contemplated in the field of international politics before Versailles. And the conduct of those who have betrayed the League, one after another, through these twenty years, has only served to sharpen the alternative — the faith and the order of the League, or ruin.

II.

The boundaries of the nation have always been fluid. This is true too of the boundaries of the state. The two must not be confused. The distinction between them is not always perceived; nor is it universally agreed on. But it is vital. Briefly, the nation is a body of individuals who regard themselves as held together by something more than convention or contract. Ancestry, territory, religion, language, literature, a common tradition, common interests and common enemies, the whole deposit of history and culture, form the nation. It will have its institutions, its government, its army and police; but its basis is neither force nor law, but a common heritage, a common will.

No nation, however, can survive without law, and the existence of some power to enforce it. The state is the wielder of that power. It maintains what it regards as the nation's laws within the nation; it enforces what it regards as the nation's claims outside.

In size, nations are continually changing. On the whole, they have tended to increase. This is really a fact of immense importance. For nationality has been constantly dying to live. There was a time when the mere idea that England and Scotland could ever form a nation, or even Mercia and Wessex, would have been regarded as patent stupidity. Whatever we think of Mr. Clarence Streit's contentions, the thirteen American colonies were watching each other in 1781 as jealously as they had ever watched the mother-country. Even to-day, they and the rest are the *united states*, forty-eight of them! It is not a hundred years since Italy has ceased to be a geographical expression; and even Fascist schoolmasters must remember something of the wars of Florence and Genoa, of Naples and the Papal States. Prussia, Saxony, Bavaria, Hesse, are centuries old; in 1815 there were 145 German states; Deutschland itself is but of yesterday. The Union of Socialist Soviet Republics throws its widespread mantle over communities who scarcely gave a thought to their common allegiance to the Czar. Are Poles and Czechs on the way to Union?

Evidently there is nothing sacrosanct about any one national unit. All the nations who to-day scowl so fiercely at the mere hint that they might modify their national sovereignty are modern and artificial creations, made out of other units whose claims to nationhood in the past were vigorously upheld and urged. Not one of the 'sovereign' nations of to-day but has had a long and tortuous history; and by what right do we assume that the present chapter is the last? The nation can only live as it forgets itself, loses its life, thinks of its neighbours, aims at their interests. And the nation of to-day ceases to exist to-morrow; it is absorbed, swallowed up, in a larger unit. This is true of every 'old and haughty nation, proud in arms' that is known to history.

The nation that lives on unchanged from century to century, with its own destiny and its own mission, is as much a creature

of the imagination as Nordic blood or German soil. National desires may range over the whole field of politics as understood at the time. The more numerous and exigent the desires, the more stable, in general, the society. And when a nation is conscious of speaking the tongue that a Shakespeare has spoken, or holding the faith and morals of a Milton, it becomes itself the object of affection and reverence. Its citizens feel for it as a lover or a child. Apart from this, to most people the land of one's birth exerts a quite inexplicable charm. But its values may change. Circumstances may remove its fears or transform its hopes. Though none can predict what at any given moment a nation may do, it will, like all other societies, set itself to accomplish whatever at the moment seems most worth while for the attainment of what it conceives to be its own interest. 'We may behave as if we were acting according to our own plan; but in reality we are acting according to a law which is imposed on us and lies beyond us.'

Interest, it will be allowed, is a wide term. What statesman can be sure that he knows the real interest of his country? Which of us can be sure that he knows his own? But a nation may be persuaded that it is to its interest to fight Philip, of Macedon or of Spain, to bring to an end its own lucrative slave-trade, to tax its colonies or to renounce its traditional preponderance in its dependencies. I may consider it to the interest of my country to increase its *Lebensraum* at the risk of rousing the deepest resentments elsewhere; to keep it at all costs out of war; or to stir up universal opposition to capitalism. I shall then choose the steps by which, as I interpret my surroundings, I think I shall gain most and lose least. But these steps will be very different according as I have moved in the world of a Neville Chamberlain or a senator of the middle West, a Balkan prince or an Adolf Hitler. The formula is the same for an Axis power as for the Holy Roman Empire; but our interpretation of the means to our ends may alter so gravely that, as we have observed more than once in these last months, our enemies may change into our friends overnight or our friends into our enemies.

III.

Now, how does this square with Christianity? The Kingdom of God, as we learn of it in the New Testament, seems to leave no place for the nation. Men are brothers of one another because they are all sons of one common Father in Heaven. True, according to the enigmatical words of our Lord, there is a sphere or world for Caesar as there is a sphere or world for God, each with its own furniture and belongings. But a world in which the subjects of a Caesar, a Czar, a King of England and a Fuehrer of Germany stand watching each other across frontiers bristling with bayonets and blocked by *douanes* is as foreign to the scheme of Christian living as sects called after Apollos or Cephas or Paul are to the Christian Church.

Nationality, as we know it, is alien even to the Old Testament. The Hebrews indeed could not be indifferent to the imperialistic rivalries of Babylon, Greece and the other powers whose armies swept over their rugged hills. But they were all flung into the common category of the gentiles, the *goyim*; they were either to be destroyed, one after another, or to come together to Jerusalem to learn a better way of life. Save for a rare glimpse, as when Israel was to make a third with Assyria and Egypt, they had, as mere political entities, no abiding value. Either they were to serve as Jehovah's wash-pot, or they were to wait till the time came for them to be instructed by His Servant. In the New Testament the nations are to be collected before the judgment-throne of the Son of Man, or to find healing in the leaves of the celestial tree of life. The only difference between the two Testaments is that when the Father is finally revealed in the Son, the ultimate national distinction, between Jew and Gentile, disappears.

Is there then no place for the nation in the Christian world-view? We might as well argue that since we are bidden to call no man father on earth, and told that in Christ Jesus there is neither male nor female, there is no place for the family. Yet for a certain kind of family attitude there is no place in the Christian scheme.

> 'God bless me and my wife;
> My son and his wife;
> Us four and no more.'

The family as a group, against all other groups, with its own survival, its own satisfactions: this is heathen and not Christian at all. But the family as a school where each member learns the love that is self-giving and the service that is perfect freedom; where from the rights and duties at home in the most intimate circle, a man learns loyalty to the rights and duties on which all society rests: that is to enter the kingdom of heaven. The nation which builds a wall round itself, whether of pride or self-interest or ambition — 'we at least will never be slaves'; 'we are the *Herrenvolk* of the earth': this is heathen; it builds on the sand. And upon how few nations can history pronounce any other judgment? But when a nation can pass from the ideal of

'*parcere subjectis et debellare superbos*'

to being a bulwark for the cause of men, a champion of the weak and a terror to the despotic, the love which a man feels for such a nation may teach him love for the citizenship which is in heaven.

Are we to be told that history protests against such an exalted conception of the nation as this? But even history does not speak with an undivided voice. Not only have the nations persisted in grouping and re-grouping themselves; the most widely separated groups share among themselves far more than what any one of them can claim as its own heritage or achievement. The instinct for the common attainment of man's common needs is there all the time. Indeed, if the politicians and the journalists would only leave us alone, and would cease trumpeting in our ears that war is a law of human nature, and that when honour is touched or interest threatened we must fight, the barriers that we have been seduced into raising, between yellow and black, Slav and Nordic, would vanish like the barriers between Mercian and Northumbrian, Saxon and Dane and Celt. Threat of attack must mean readiness for defence. We dare not forget that lesson. But if our leaders, on both sides of the frontier, would only tell us that we live by mutual help, and that fighting can never be worth while, they would find that they were knocking at an open door. Block up a road, and men will fire down it with every weapon they can lay their hands on. They will discover a hundred reasons for so doing. Open it, and they

will find a hundred ways of trade and co-operation. To 'drive the road and bridge the ford' is not to discover a new way of peace; it is to liberate pacific forces that have always been there.

Each nation and race has inheritances, contributions of its own; English, French and Japanese; Europeans and Asiatics; like Moslems, Buddhists, Jews. If religion means, in Höffding's well-known phrase, the conservation of values, we can see the task of religion in the coming days, and more specially of Christianity. But the ends for which all these groups exist are of two kinds; material and cultural, or, as we might express it, indirect and direct. The first class, including territory, food, raw materials, precious metals, always tends to produce strife; to ignorance and short-sightedness there will never be enough of any of them to go round. Of the second, for the sake of which the first are really desired, the actual satisfactions of life, art, religion, society, play, the various amenities of existence, whether appealing to the high-brow or the low-brow, the Caucasian or the savage, there is always enough to go round. Removed from the bleak and barren fields of competition and the struggle for existence, they are the peaceable fruits of co-operation and emulation.

IV.

All this will not come about by itself, or the world would never have been the horror it is to-day. A fourfold technique would appear to be necessary to accomplish it; an international organization for acquiring and distributing economic goods, especially the most widely needed; an international organization for preserving values — to protect, for instance, the language, the culture, and the religion of minorities; an internationally controlled procedure for directing changes and settling disputes; and an international force which will in the last resort keep the peace. There may be little of this in the language of the New Testament. There is all of it in the Christian interpretation of life.

That interpretation is right. There is such a thing as the corruption of a man's heart. It lives on pride and greed. And the Christian gospel is right. Nothing can extirpate these sins save the grace of God. But the grace of God does not act in-

dependently of human aims and institutions. As ignorance gives way to knowledge and short-sightedness to a wise planning, competition retires before co-operation. Quarrels are not caused by shortage of goods, but by the stupidity which snatches at the nearest and most futile way of obtaining them. And as appreciation of the direct values of life increases, and men grow really more civilized, recourse to war is seen, as the vast majority of thinking men and women see it to-day, as no better than telling a customer to confront his shopkeeper with a rusty shot-gun.

Christianity makes much of life. And the rule of life, in its time-honoured language, is that a man should love his neighbour as himself; that is, he will respect his neighbours as he would respect himself and be respected; he will aim at no satisfaction for himself which does not include that of his neighbour. This is as true of nations as it is of individuals. No lesson has emerged more clearly from the turmoil of the last twenty years. And the Christian Church is committed to the championship of this rule. It is the leaven which will in time leaven the whole lump.

Whatever may be the shape of things to come in the world of nations, one thing it cannot be if the world is to survive; and that is the confused mass of sovereign states which we know to-day. But men will still be living in groups, whether kinship or territory has anything to do with their basis or not. They will still need to obey the laws of life, essential for the well-being of states and individuals alike. They will still find themselves enriched by all that they can share with their neighbours, and by anything that makes that sharing increasingly possible. They will remember that it is better to give than to receive. The strong will still have to bear the infirmities of the weak. And it will be the task of the Church to bear witness to the origin of every human fellowship in the Fatherhood of God, and to be the nursery of devoted men and women who will bear an even more convincing witness to it — the witness of lives in which every individual interest is transfigured by him who laid down his life that he might share it with all mankind. Perhaps in no far distant future we shall find that the Church has a *rendezvous*, not with destiny, but with the Kingdom of God on earth.

COMENIUS: PROPHET OF TRUTH, FREEDOM, COMPREHENSIVENESS, AND SPIRITUALITY

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I.

ON September 20th the tercentenary of the arrival of Comenius in England will be celebrated. This event is being observed by the publication of a series of studies in English, which will estimate his contribution to Education, to the formation of the Learned Societies, and to the Church Universal: and, further, by a joint meeting of the Anglo-Czechoslovak and Anglo-Dutch Christian Fellowships in London. Fittingly, the celebration will link together the threefold claim of Comenius to the lasting gratitude of humanity. For, first, he was, in the words of Masaryk and as is now generally recognized, 'the father of modern pedagogics.' Secondly, he was one of those who first conceived the creation of an international Society for the promotion of learning and science, and helped to inspire the Royal Society of 1662. Thirdly, he was the last bishop of the Church of the Czech Brethren, or *Unitas Fratrum* as they came generally to be named, and a prophet of Truth, Freedom, Comprehensiveness and Spirituality. I can imagine few Christian leaders in history who would have been more at home in the annual conferences of the Modern Churchmen — now sadly, but I trust only temporarily, discontinued — than John Amos Comenius.

When he reached the shores of England on, as he himself tells us, 'the day of the autumnal equinox' in 1641, after a tempestuous voyage which is recalled in his later edition of *The Labyrinth*, his name was known to but few men of letters and science in this country. Comenius himself says, 'I had been summoned by command of Parliament.' In substance, if not in strict legality, this statement seems to be true. For, in the first

place, his name and labours had been brought to the appreciative notice of the House of Commons by John Gauden (afterwards Bishop of Exeter and Worcester) in a sermon which he preached in St. Margaret's, Westminster, on November 29th, 1640, who said :

> ' Here give me leave by way of short digression, in so greate and publique an Assembly, to recommend to your favour, the noble endeavours of two great and publique spirits, who have laboured much for truth and peace, I meane Commenius and Duraeus (John Dury) ; both famous for their learning, piety and integrity, and not unknowne, I am sure, by the fame of their works, to many of this honourable, pious and learned Assembly. The one hath laide a faire designe and foundation for the raising up of a Structure of Truth, Human and Divine, of excellent use to all mankinde, for the easiness and exquisiteness of attaining the true knowledge of things. The other hath long studied, and with greate pains endeavured and wel advanced the peace and unity of the reformed churches (a blessing that cannot be purchased at too deare a rate) whereunto he hath the suffrages and assistance of many learned Divines,' etc.

And, in the second place, when his friend Hartlib — to whom, as will be remembered, Milton dedicated his *Tractate on Education* — had written inviting Comenius to London, he had acted on behalf of a group of members of Parliament consisting, among others, of Pym, Selden, Lord Brooke, the Earl of Warwick, Viscount Mandeville, Archbishop Ussher and Bishop, later Archbishop, Williams. These two facts being brought to the first notice of Comenius on his arrival in London, he said :

> ' " Friends, ye have acted with more caution than candour in that ye have concealed these things from me. Had I been apprised of them beforehand, I know not whether I should have been of such a mind as to suffer myself to be brought forward into a theatre so great : now I am in your power . . . Let me even here lie private, let us alone among ourselves be known to one another for the few days that we have, for I must be returning." They answered that my return was impossible this year. For the King was gone into Scotland for the coronation of the Queen : Parliament was adjourned until the King's return, only forty persons being left for the transaction of lesser business. For me this was grievous hearing, but I resolved to hold my tongue and was taken to the place of my entertainment.'

I cannot here recount the story of his stay in England, or of its main concern, the establishment of a great ' Pansophic ' College for scientific research and for the framing of a new universal language. It has been authoritatively told by Professor Robert Fitzgibbon Young in *Comenius in England* (Oxford, 1932). Suffice it to say that the convulsions attendant upon the Irish

Rebellion and the outbreak of the Civil War put an untimely end to his schemes, and he left England in 1642 for Sweden after, as he says, 'the nine months I was constrained to spend in London (from the autumnal equinox to the summer solstice).' Before leaving, he had received an invitation from Cardinal Richelieu inviting him to discuss in Paris the establishment of an Academy of Science there. Being unable to visit Paris, he sent Joachim Hübner, who had been researching at the Bodleian Library — 'furnished with my answers,' as Comenius says, 'and commended by his own speeches.' His English friends, in parting from him, 'made three solemn requests':

> 'The first was that I should suffer myself to be diverted by no bye-paths from the pansophic project. Secondly, I should not delay me by reading authors, but proceed to search into the very mines of things real. For this is what is expected of us — a new, solid, and time-defying analysis of reality: not pieces of patchwork, however speciously put together. Thirdly, I should go on my way with God only, neither seeking nor admitting collaborators until my return to England, the hope of which they thought certain.'

Before leaving England Comenius had been greatly impressed by such corporate religious life as he had witnessed in London. He wrote:

> 'The ardour with which the people crowd to the services is incredible. London has 120 parish churches, and in all of them — of those which I visited I affirm this as an established fact — there is such a crowd that space is insufficient . . . Almost all bring a copy of the Bible with them. Of the youths and men a large number take down the sermons word by word with their pens. Some thirty years since (in King James's reign) they discovered an art which has now come into vogue even among the country folk, that of rapid script (tachygraphia) which they call stenography . . . Their thirst for the word of God is so great that many of the nobles, citizens also, and matrons study Greek and Hebrew to be able more safely and more sweetly to drink from the very spring of life.'

II.

Before estimating the abiding value of the contribution of Comenius to the Church Universal, I must remind my readers of the salient facts and features of his life, and of the historical situation he confronted. For without such a knowledge he cannot be seen with the eyes of the mind, nor can his true significance be perceived.

He was born in 1592 at Trivnitz in Moravia of well-to-do

members of the community which is designated by various names, all recognized and acknowledged by its members — *The Czech Brethren*, *The Unitas Fratrum*, *The Unity*, *The Church of the Brethren*. Its direct, but not immediate, successor is that known to-day as *The Moravian Church*: its indirect, and late, successor is *The Czechoslovak Church*, founded in 1920.

The Czech Brethren had its origin in the whole Czech movement of religious life inaugurated by the martyr John Hus, who in his turn had been inspired by Wyclif, rightly called 'the morning star of the Reformation.' It was Wyclif in England who, when the mediaeval religious system began to crumble before the threefold assault of man's intellectual questionings, his moral rebellions, and his spiritual aspirations, voiced the new spirit. His spirit and message were, however, as far as was possible, suppressed in the land of his birth. It was then, by the introduction of his writings into Bohemia by Jerome of Prague, that the great national movement, of which Hus was the leader and to which his death at Constance was a potent goad, began. When the Hussite wars died down, and the fierce combination of piety and fury incarnate in Zizka spent itself, other leaders arose — Peter of Chelcic, stern moralist and 'rugged pamphleteer'; Rockycana, the eloquent archbishop-elect of Prague, who like Erasmus of a generation later sought to avoid an open schism; and Gregory the Patriarch, as commonly called, who inherited the firm distinction of his common-sense Czech forerunners between 'essential' Christian doctrines and such virtues as faith, hope and love, and the non-essential matters which have fed the flames of most ecclesiastical controversies. At the same time, it should not be forgotten that an unfortunate narrow 'legalism' in Scriptural interpretation — characteristic of the period — and a weakly-pietistic flight from the world and its responsibilities, were sometimes manifest.

It was at Kunwald in 1457 that Gregory founded the Fraternal Church, though not till 1467 did they separate themselves from the Utraquist (so-called from their claim that laymen should take *both* elements at the Eucharist: Latin *utraque*) branch of the Church, when they appointed by lot their first three ministers, securing their 'succession,' as they firmly believed and desired, through a Waldensian bishop of South Moravia.

The history of the *Czech Brethren* during the years prior to the days of Comenius is one of the most fascinating and revealing in ecclesiastical history. Suffice it here briefly to say, that all the characteristics of Comenius were conspicuous in his community during those years. For example, the *Czech Brethren* discovered that the reconciliation of responsibilities to God and to Caesar is not the simple matter thought by literalist interpreters of texts, and that the 'pacifist' is not always the 'peacemaker.' Again, they discovered that freedom from external 'authorities' demands the Authority of the educated mind, the informed conscience, the consecrated spirit. Again, while pointing forward to Luther's 'justification by faith,' they were never quite happy about it: to many of them, as to many in England, it seemed one-sided and extreme. Again, their zeal for education knew hardly any bounds. Three of the five printing-presses in all Bohemia at the end of the fifteenth and beginning of the sixteenth century belonged to them. In 1501 they produced the first Evangelical Hymn-book, which besides translations of old Latin hymns and paraphrases contained many original hymns. Like Wesley, they regarded suitable hymns as excellent preachers of the Gospel. In 1502 they published a Czech 'Catechism for Children': a book, not for priests, but for fathers of families, and which ensured that parents taught their own children to read. It was reported in consternation to Pope Alexander VI by his Dominican agent, who had been sent to Bohemia as censor of the press, that most of the members of the *Czech Brethren* could read — the presumption being that they had learned the art from the devil.

The freedom they claimed and prized resulted frequently in differences, sometimes in dissensions, occasionally in divisions. The fissiparous tendency is implicit in mental, moral and spiritual reality, as well as in biological structure. The Brethren were more concerned about *Unity* than about *Union*, about *Unitas* than about *Conjunctio*. They did not perpetrate the common English mistranlation of *St. John* and call the 'one-*flock*' the 'one *fold*.' They were too Johannine in spirit to achieve such a perversion. Indeed, they were probably the most Johannine of all sections of European Christianity of the time. But all this meant tension, involving variety rather than uniformity,

vital comprehensiveness rather than static immobility. How to find room for freedom *and* order, simplicity *and* ritual, fresh truth *and* the old Gospel, obedience to God and to the State — *there* was the perennial problem.

The *Czech Brethren* would probably have solved these problems in our English common-sense way. But the political animosities, the ecclesiastical intrigues, to say nothing of the doctrinal acerbities, of the time were too much for a people placed by Providence in the very heart of European life. No 'isolationism' was possible. After a century of vicissitudes, the bitter Thirty Years' War broke out, over a revolt of the *Czech Brethren* and other Protestants against King Ferdinand's avowed object of — to use Fisher's words — '"liquidating" the heretics and bringing all the religious and intellectual life of his realm under the iron rule of the Jesuit Order.' The battle of the White Hill in 1620 decided the fate of the *Unitas*, and of all Protestantism throughout the Habsburg domains, for generations. June 21, 1621, was a 'Day of Blood' in Prague. On that day the flower of the Czech Protestant nobility fell to the executioner's sword. Second on the list to be executed was Budowa, leader of *The Brethren* — 'the last Bohemian, as Brutus was the last Roman'! When advised to petition the Emperor for mercy he had said: 'Malo mori, quam Patria videre mori' — 'I prefer to die than to see my country die.'

He died — and so did his Church; in the same way that the corn of wheat dies in the ground. Ferdinand knew that those who wish to kill must strike at the head or the heart. He struck therefore at *The Czech Brethren.* The recent (1941) account of *Two Years of German Oppression in Czechoslovakia*, which every Christian should read, is only a version, with twentieth century technique, of what happened in the Czech land in the short space of fifteen years after the battle of the White Hill. The population of Bohemia dwindled from over three millions to less than a million. The message was sent to Rome: *The Unity* is no more.

Comenius was then a minister and teacher of his Church at Fulneck in Moravia. After the sack of Fulneck, where he lost nearly all his worldly possessions, he had eventually, in 1628, to flee the country. At the top of the mountain range separating

Bohemia and Silesia, he uttered his now historic prayer, with his face turned backwards to his own valleys — that God would preserve in his land a 'Hidden Seed' from which one day a tree of righteousness would grow.

Comenius had written in 1623 what many think his masterpiece, *The Labyrinth of the World and the Paradise of the Heart*. It is a book belonging to the literature of humanity, and only comparatively recently, by Count Lutzow, translated into English! With the Kralice Bible, *The Labyrinth* was the inseparable companion of the exiled Brethren; as witness their song:

> Nought have we taken with us,
> All to destruction is hurled;
> We have but our Bible of Kralice,
> And our 'Labyrinth of the World.'

At Leszno in Poland he wrote many of his educational books, which can only here be mentioned — the famous *Janua Linguarum Reserata* (*Gate of Languages Unlocked*), *The Great Didactic*, as well as 'Pansophic' books. (I have before me as I write Jeremy Collier's 1651 English translation of Comenius' 'A Patterne of Universall Knowledge in a Plaine and true Draught.') He was always interested in the cause of Christian Unity among the Churches, and in this respect his relations with John Dury, the indefatigible Scot who travelled Europe in his endeavours to bring the Evangelical Churches together, are historically interesting: but that is another story which can only be here mentioned. In 1644 Comenius attended the famous *Colloquium Charitativum*, as it is called, at Thorn in Poland, when an endeavour was made to achieve some visible unity between the Roman and Protestant Churches of Central and Eastern Europe. But he didn't stay long, for he never cherished the ecclesiastical pretence that problems are solved by looking away from them. I commend, at this point, the chapters in *The Labyrinth* where 'The Pilgrim beholds the Estate of the Priesthood' and 'the Christian Religion.' Suffice it to say, that the *Colloquium Charitativum* ended, like some more recent ecclesiastical conferences, in meriting the name *Colloquium Irritativum*.

The Peace of Westphalia, in 1648, concluding the Thirty Years' War, almost overwhelmed his spirit. His despairing

hope that he would live to lead his exiled Church back to their Czech land was now extinguished : though it flickered up in the falsely prophetic books, *Lux e Tenebris* and *Lux in Tenebris*, which made him the butt of scoffers like Bayle, the Frenchman. History, however, has been kind to his outmoded aberrations : as, in the mercy of God, it will be to the superstitions still harboured by the wise and the good.

In 1650 he issued in Czech his *Testament*, a copy of which, with the Kralice Bible, Masaryk carried with him in his own exile (how brothers recognize each other across the centuries!). In this poignant work Comenius represented the *Unitas Fratrum* as a mother speaking on her death-bed to her sister and daughter Churches, and dividing among them the treasures entrusted by God to her. He who can read this unmoved is dead while he lives. A year before Comenius had published, in Latin, his edition of Lasitius' *History of the Bohemian Brethren*, the 1702 edition, containing, with the *Ratio Disciplinae*, a document which is, I presume, familiar to all the clergy of the Anglican Church. This edition is before me as I write. The document is called Comenius's 'Exhortation' to the Church of England — 'Paraenesis ad Ecclesias nominatim Anglicanam, De Optima Ecclesiastici Regiminis Forma, Pie Solicitam.' (Might not some member of the Modern Churchmen's Union issue a good English translation of its thirty pages as a booklet?) It ends with the words :

> 'Veni Domine Jesu; repara nos ad beneplacitum tuum! redde Ecclesiae tuae Unitatis vincula! redde Ordinis decorem! redde Sceptri tui venerationem! redde Spiritus fervorem, ut regnum Dei vim patiatur sicut olim. Aut si ultimum seculum inemendabile est, tolle scenam mundi, & inchoa beata illa regna! ubi Unitas erit sine distractione, Ordo sine confusione, Amor sine intermissione, & Deus omnia in Omnibus, in sempiterna secula. Amen!'.

> 'Come Lord Jesus; renew us to Thy favour! restore the bonds of Unity of Thy Church! restore the grace of Order! restore the reverence for Thy Sceptre! restore the fervour of the Spirit, that the Kingdom of God may suffer violence as in the days of old. Of if the last age cannot be amended, remove the outward show of the world, and begin those blessed reigns! Where will be Unity without discord, Order without confusion, Love without interruption, and God be all in all for ever and ever. Amen!'

In these writings the beauty and catholicity of the spirit of Comenius are vividly manifest.

The distress of the *Czech Brethren*, brought home to our English people by Comenius, inspired sympathetic financial help from this country for the exiles. Of his first meeting with the Bishop of Lincoln after his arrival in London in 1641, which took place probably at the Deanery, Westminster, Comenius says: 'After dinner the Bishop proferring me his right hand, placed ten James pieces into mine, at which so large a bounty I greatly marvelled.' Help was forthcoming from the Universities of Oxford and Cambridge, Oxford having seemingly excelled her sister University in generous sympathy for Czech students. 'In England certain stipends were provided in connection with the University of Oxford, for the education of Bohemian youths, who were thereby enabled to acquire the requisite training for an honourable maintenance throughout life. This state of things continued down to the year 1680, or even later, and, generally speaking, a very friendly feeling was long cherished at Oxford for the Bohemians, many of whose descendents in England are said to have adopted English names.' (Benham, whose words I have quoted, adds the note: 'From a letter of Hartlib to Dr. Worthington, 5 May, 1659, it appears the University of Cambridge was then unable to maintain any exiled Bohemian students.—Dr. Worthington's Diary, p. 132.')[1]

Among the last ecclesiastical acts of Comenius was the consecration to the episcopate—he himself having been a bishop since 1632, and Presiding bishop of the *Unitas* since 1648—of his son-in-law, who in his turn consecrated his own son, the last becoming the first bishop of the Renewed Church of the Brethren under Zinzendorf at Herrnhut in the eighteenth century. Comenius was, indeed, 'the last bishop of the Czech Brethren,' for after him the stream flowed under ground. Or, to use his own figure, the 'Hidden Seed' remained germinating in Czech and other soil—first in the Church of the Moravian Brethren;

[1] Members of Cambridge University may be interested to remember the amusing story of the publication at Oxford in 1637 of *Conatuum Comenianorum Praeludia*. Vice-Chancellor Baylie, President of St. John's College, was so dubious about the orthodoxy of Comenius that he submitted the book to the Professor of Metaphysics, who duly reported that it had no taint of Pelagianism and contained nothing contrary to the 39 Articles (see Young, op. cit., p. 35).

secondly, indirectly, in Methodism; and thirdly in the Czechoslovak Church founded in 1920. Among this 'Hidden Seed' was that contributed by his own spirit, and this was among the most potent and prophetic of the Church that is to be.

III.

Succinctly I must try to appraise the contribution of Comenius to the Church Universal. 'The three qualities of his essential spirit and of his writings were, as it seems to me, first, a vital love of personal freedom, tempered by loyalty to tradition, guided by discipline, and made perfect in fellowship; second, an unwearied quest for knowledge and devotion to the goal of absolute truth; and third, a spiritual passion for the things of Eternity, indwelt by a sane and strong moral emphasis which eschewed excessive dogmatic speculation' (in *Comenius and the Church Universal*, now being published with the English translation of Comenius's *Testament* or *Bequest*).

Comenius was a 'liberal.' A bishop with a *passion* for education, dominating administrative zeal, is a rare phenomenon—the 'care of the churches' becomes too much, alas, for the first fine careless rapture for Christian *truth*. 'Let the guiding star and rudder of our Didactic be this,' Comenius wrote, 'to search out and discover a method by which teachers may teach less, and learners learn more.'

He was an 'Evangelical' liberal. 'Perish sects! Perish the founders of sects! I have consecrated myself to Christ alone.'

> 'I seek no advantage for my Church, which is now no more; nor for myself, who am just entering the tomb: but for thee, O Catholic Church, the common mother; whom I so love and reverence, that I should desire thy profit in whatever way. Aloof from all party spirit or strife, I was born, have lived, and die, adhering to Christ alone, along with those whom he has given to me as guides, or to whom he had given me in that capacity. O that all who call on the name of Christ were persuaded to be of the same mind, namely, to take Christ and Christ alone as their leader, ignoring other leaders whosoever they may be, and, while having solely in view salvation and eternal life, to dismiss all trifles, contentions about primacy, precedency, titles, revenues, as worldly rubbish, altogether out of place.'

He was a 'catholic' liberal; 'catholic,' not in the debased modern sense of that noble term, where it has become almost synonymous for the characteristic of sectarian, sacerdotal, and

dogmatic pretensiveness; but 'catholic,' in the sense of a rich and inclusive and universal humanity of spirit. I think that the ideal of John Wesley, himself so deeply influenced by the Moravian Brethren, for the 'Methodist' — that he should be 'the friend of all and the enemy of none' — was more perfectly fulfilled in Comenius than in most who are sharers in the 'Pietistic' heritage. For Comenius never equated his 'catholicity' either with dogmatic pugnacity, or with intellectual inertia, or with the ecclesiastical canalization of 'grace.'

He was a 'philosophic' and 'theological' liberal. Indeed, I have often thought that the only true 'liberal' is he whose 'liberalism' is rooted in an integrated philosophical theology. The important issue that here arises cannot, however, be discussed adequately at the end of this necessarily brief article. Comenius sought a *principle of unity*, and this he found in essential Christian faith. He called this principle, characteristically, a 'Way of Light' — Johannine Christianity! Such was the title of a book he wrote while in England, *Via Lucis*, and dedicated 'to the Torch Bearers of this Enlightened Age, Members of the Royal Society of London, now bringing real philosophy to a happy birth.' Comenius was neither, in the narrow sense, a 'philosopher,' nor, in the dogmatic sense, a 'theologian': he had too much humour and common-sense to be the first, and too much humility and charity to be the second. He may be said to have fallen between two stools here—between a free untheological philosophy, and a rigid dogmatic theology, whether of the Catholic Scholastic or of the Protestant Scholastic type. Thus he was a stone of stumbling to Descartes, who thought Comenius ought not to mingle philosophy and theology —the separation has certainly enabled many to escape the charge of heresy, as it has also saved them from the virtue of candour. Comenius wrote of a meeting with Descartes: 'We exchanged speech for about four hours, he expounding the mysteries of his philosophy, I myself maintaining all human knowledge, such as derives from the senses alone and reasonings thereon, to be imperfect and defective.' Comenius, indeed, was one of the precursors of our modern study, 'The Philosophy of Religion.'

He was a 'moral' liberal. Christianity to him was a *way of life*. He would, I think, have agreed with Erasmus — whom in

many ways he resembled — when he felt it would be well to leave many of the rationalistic theological elaborations of the Christian Creed to our discussions in the next world. Those who are eagerly looking out for support for any latest theological fashion cannot be commended to turn to Comenius. His 'moralism' will cause discomfiture to theological pugnacity, and myopia.

Finally, he was a 'spiritual' liberal. The key to his mind was his all-pervasive spirituality. He approached every theme of his writings in the spirit of prayer. This is the hall-mark of the truly religious man. Prayer was not, to Comenius, a pious cloak for worldliness of mind, a self-deceiving and self-reassuring garb. When he ended his books with beautiful prayers the reader does not feel it unfitting in any way. Comenius saw all things *sub specie aeternitatis*. So whether he was writing about 'Physics,' or about 'The Great Didactic,' or about 'The School of Infancy,' or about 'The Delineation of the Pansophical Temple,' to say nothing about his so-called religious works, he concludes with a prayer. In the *Unum Necessarium*, his last significant work, he wrote:

> 'The one thing needful for myself, therefore, is this. "Forgetting the things that are behind, and reaching towards those that are before, I press forward." Thanks to thee, Lord Jesus, who didst lead me, though often straying from my path, and lingering in my way on a thousand trifles. I bless thee for assigning this earth only as a place of exile, and for thereby helping me, yea compelling me onward to my eternal home.'

The prophesy of Leibniz — himself of Slavonic origin and always sympathetic with Comenius, his fellow-Slav — has been in part fulfilled:

> Tempus erit, quo te, Comeni, turba bonorum,
> Facta spesque tuas, vota quoque ipsa colet.
>
> The day will come, Comenius, when many shall praise thee,
> Thy hopes accomplished, and thy prayers fulfilled.

THE INFRANATURAL AND ITS RESURGENCE

By the Rev. Gamaliel Milner, M.A., author of *The Problem of Decadence.*

'MIRACLES do not happen,' said Matthew Arnold, that representative of the Victorian *Zeitgeist.* Nearly all his enlightened contemporaries would have agreed with his verdict. There was indeed a good deal of controversy as to whether they ever had happened and when they ceased to happen. The orthodox Protestant opinion was that they only happened in Bible times in the neighbourhood of Palestine; the Puseyites were inclined to extend their belief in miracles to the days of the Early Fathers. But in the actual work-a-day world miracles had ceased, as the Archbishop of Canterbury says in *Henry V.*

Nevertheless even in that high noon of rationalism odd things continued to occur. There were reports of spirit-rapping from America; and in Paris, Home Sweet Home, as *Punch* called him, otherwise Mr. Sludge the Medium, was holding *séances* much frequented by the frivolous notabilities of the Second Empire, at which very strange things took place; there were phenomena there and elsewhere which the sceptic, with the best will in the world to disbelieve, found it difficult to explain away. Browning, much as he abominated Sludge, whom his wife had rather patronised, was left with the uncomfortable feeling that there might be something in all this spiritualistic nonsense. There might be more things in heaven and earth (and under the earth) than was dreamt of in the rationalistic philosophy.

Seventy years have passed, and science has continued to advance, but the doubt about the omniscience of its professors has tended to deepen. There have been alarming apostasies among the high priests of natural science; a Wallace, a Crookes, a Lodge have taken the road to Endor, have sought unto them which have familiar spirits. Among the ordinary run of people of every class superstition of every kind, belief in the occult, the miraculous, is rampant. Irrationally perhaps, but most naturally.

political events have helped to disturb our spiritual equilibrium; our grandfathers lived in an ordered world where effects followed causes in rational sequence; in our modern chaos it seems as if anything may happen. In reactionary quarters this revival of belief in the extra-natural was hailed at first as a favourable sign; there was talk of the returning tide of faith. Unquestionably man is not naturally a Rationalist. 'Logicians have but ill defined as rational the human kind,' says Swift. 'Mr. Speaker,' said an honourable member in one of the Bradlaugh debates, 'I take it we all believe in — a sort of a something.' Otto, in *Das Heilige*, calls it the 'numinous.'

Primitive man, and apparently some of the higher animals, to judge by their behaviour, vaguely sense certain 'spiritual' forces, usually of a hostile kind. It was a step in advance when the earliest poets, the makers of myths, gave to these airy nothings a local habitation and a name. Anthropomorphism, a belief in gods in the likeness of men, was an advance towards rationality. These high gods of the dawn of civilization were of like passions with ourselves. Victorian prudery found it necessary to expurgate Lemprière's Classical Dictionary. On the other hand, the Ancients, broadly speaking, lacked the sense of the diabolical; that is one of the secrets of the unfading charm of their literature. In the lower levels, however, there lurked a belief in malevolent powers, and from the East, with the reflux that followed the tidal wave of Alexander's conquests, there came a swarm of magicians, astrologers, soothsayers, whose nefarious activities sometimes led to severe repression at the hands of the Roman Government, contemptuously tolerant in general of religious aberrations.

The Devil, the supreme ruler of the hosts of darkness, appears as the shadow cast by ethical monotheism. Ahriman, the eternal opposite of Ahura-Mazda, the Wise Spirit, the God of Light, first appears in Zoroastrian Persia. The Hebrew imagination concentrating its gaze on the One, the Living God, occupied itself less with His possible adversary, but by the time of our Lord the kingdom of Beelzebub already had its place in opposition to the kingdom of God. Jesus went about doing good and healing all those who were oppressed by the Devil. Exorcism figures prominently in the first accounts of His miracles.

Witchcraft, by Mr. Charles Williams,* is an account of the way in which the Church came to occupy itself in an unhealthy way with certain manifestations of the powers of evil, until the minds of too many Christians became poisoned by the mephitic atmosphere and in sheer panic resorted to modes of repression as devilish as anything against which they fought. It is a horrible story, and it is not certain that we have heard the last of it. He ends his narrative with the era of genial scepticism, the eighteenth century. But there are many signs that the evil has only been driven underground. There has been a recrudescence of Satanism in the last fifty years; it had begun when Huysman wrote *Là-Bas*. On the other hand, in circulating libraries one frequently sees books, usually written by Roman Catholics, which try to rehabilitate the old belief in witchcraft and Satan's invisible world.

Mr. Charles Williams' book is not of this class. He believes in God and His Revelation through Christ; he is an agnostic about the Devil. He neither affirms nor denies the objective reality of the appearances he relates. His attitude towards the Devil is in line with the classical documents of our Faith. None of the three Creeds condescends to notice the prince of darkness. The assertion in the Nicene Creed that God is the Creator of all things visible and invisible is probably meant to negative the Manichaean view of an evil creator alongside the Good. In a recent declaration put forth by the Bishops we are told that 'evil is, as the Christian faith has always declared it to be, a positive, active, demonic agency among men.' This is true, and we are not likely to forget it just now, but the Christian faith does not teach that good and evil are forces of equal rank. Light is something positive, darkness is not; death is nothing but the absence of life; evil has a real existence in so far as it affects personality, but an evil personality is one in a state of disintegration, on its way to extinction; God only hath immortality.

One thing Mr. Williams does make abundantly clear; the victims in the witch trials (the use of the feminine form shows that they were more often women than men) were not always, perhaps not generally, the innocent victims of mediaeval bigotry it was formerly the fashion to represent them. Probably they

* *Witchcraft*, by Charles Williams. (Faber & Faber. 1941. 12*s*. 6*d*.)

were usually guilty, in intention at least. Whether devils appeared or not may be uncertain; it is quite certain that devils were invoked. Some of the ghastly scenes of debauchery related to credulous judges and inquisitors were perhaps bad dreams, but not all of them.

Nor was there anything especially mediaeval about the witch-mania. Its appearance in an epidemic form roughly coincided with the Renaissance, or rather it preceded it. The end of the Middle Ages was accompanied by a general failure of nerve. The mysterious Black Death, the futile Hundred Years' War, the Papal Schism, above all, probably, though Mr. Williams does not mention it, the increased pressure of the infidel, Tartars and Turks, all contributed to a general breaking down of standards and relaxation of morals among clerics and laymen.

In the earlier mediaeval times, sorcerers and witches were often belated professors of the old heathen cults. It was in the interests of the Church to deny their pretensions. Unfortunately the Middle Ages had begun with an ever-increasing emphasis on miracles, including diabolical miracles. The *Dialogues* of Gregory the Great was one of the best known works of the Middle Ages.

> 'They describe—like the tales of the Thebaid—a world of miracles, which does not mean a world of haphazard. It means a world in which other classes of beings beside men operate materially' (p. 49).

And it was believed that for inscrutable reasons evil intelligences of superhuman power had been permitted to invade God's universe. 'Saint Thomas Aquinas declared that the denial of sorcery was heretical.' Five centuries later Wesley said that he could not give up to all the Deists in Great Britain the existence of witchcraft till he gave up the credit of all history, sacred and profane.

The fourteenth century saw a series of noble trials: a dowager queen of England tried on a charge of conspiring with a priest to kill her stepson by sorcery and necromancy (p. 103); the charge against the Duchess of Gloucester, wife of King Henry the Sixth's uncle; and, most dreadful of all, the burning as a witch and heretic of one who is now a canonised saint. It is always a little surprising to hear Roman Catholics extolling the Maid of Orleans. 'Truly ye bear witness that ye allow the

deeds of your Fathers, for they killed them and ye build their sepulchres.' Since it was held that all communications from the unseen world came either from God or the Devil, Joan of Arc's judges had to choose between believing her to be a saint and treating her as a witch; they chose the latter alternative. The Church has always been suspicious, in a measure justly suspicious, of private revelations. Butler said to Wesley, 'Sir, this pretending to a special revelation of the Holy Ghost is a horrid thing, a very horrid thing.' And there were suspicious circumstances not a few in Joan's case. Evidence was produced that, like other girls at Domrémy, she had resorted to a tree supposed to be the abode of fairies. Latterly the 'little people,' the elves, fairies, pixies, of Northern mythology have lost all sinister associations — fairy stories are a feature of the children's hour on the B.B.C. — but in mediaeval times they were still, as Mr. Pecksniff said of the Sirens, 'fabulous monsters, Pagan I regret to say.' Moreover Joan's conduct was in many respects unconventional; she was 'unwomanly,' she wore male dress, she brought politics into religion in a way which the English, at least, felt was highly undesirable, her behaviour to her judges inclined to the contumacious. Anyway, she was burnt as a witch.

It was as late as 1490 that Joseph Sprenger, a Dominican, the General Inquisitor for Germany, with the assistance of another German priest, did for the law and practice of the Church in the matter of sorcery what Tribonian at the order of Justinian did for Roman Law. They published an immense work (it runs to two hundred and fifty thousand words) called the *Malleus Maleficarum*. Innocent VIII showed his approval of the book and its authors in a very practical manner: he published a Bull by which he declared the jurisdiction of the authors in the Germanic countries. Two centuries before, another Pope called Innocent had entrusted the task of suppressing the Manichaean heretics of the South of France to the Dominican Inquisition, an institution, says Gibbon, more fitted to confirm than to refute a belief in an Evil Principle. The whole machinery of torture, secret accusations, espionage, were now employed to combat sorcery, as it had been, and still was, to combat heresy. We are witnessing to-day the employment of similar methods in the service, not of religion in the old sense, but of Nationalism;

Herr Himmler and his Gestapo are the Inquisition of our times. By a singular perversity the most fair-sounding maxim was perverted to purposes of cruelty. The plainest evidence was insufficient to convict a witch unless she freely confessed her guilt; torture was employed to bring her into a right state of mind to confess, but confessions made under torture were inadmissible; hence the need for more torture.

For the next two hundred years the persecution, or prosecution, went on. There exists a great mass of records of trials for witchcraft (the accused was not always of the female sex). The general impression which they leave on the mind is one of unrelieved horror and squalor. The atmosphere is fetid; it calls for fumigation, if necessary with fire and brimstone. Burns in *Tam o'Shanter* and Goethe in the first part of *Faust* have given us pictures of witches' revels, but the glimpses of fantastic evil are seen through a medium of humour and playful fancy. Burns' belated rustic sees Alloway's auld haunted kirk in a blaze and hears it resound with mirth and dancing:

> 'There sat auld Nick in shape of beast;
> A towzie tyke, black, grim and large;
> To gie them music was his charge . . . .
> With mair of horrible and awful
> Which even to name would be unlawful.'

But the diablerie is only half serious; here, as in the *Address to the Deil*, the prince of darkness is partly a figure of fun.

In the witch trials it is all grim, deadly earnest. The vilest kind of village gossip, the hallucinations of religious maniacs, and the diseased imaginations of sexual perverts seem to have contributed to the narratives to which courts, secular and ecclesiastical, listened, to which they gave credence, and on which they acted. Mr. Williams disclaims all wish to horrify or to gratify prurient tastes; he merely presents some of the stories, true or false, as they are found in the records. An impartial study of them leaves no doubt that a considerable number of people all over Europe did sell their souls to the devil and worship him as their lord and master. The investigations of the *Chambre Ardente*, a court of lawyers of high character appointed by Louis XIV in 1680, proved that persons of great distinction about the Court of the Most Christian King were engaged in

traffic with the powers of evil, and it was eventually discovered, to the horror of the Grand Monarque, that his mistress, Madame de Montespan, the mother of the children whom he legitimated, had engaged in the most abominable rites to retain his love.

As we have said before, Mr. Williams reserves judgement on the question whether there were or were not objective appearances of beings from another and lower world, infranatural phenomena. Practically it does not matter very much.

> 'Witchcraft,' says Carlyle, 'and all manner of spectre-work and demonology we have now named Madness and Diseases of the Nerves. Seldom reflecting that still the new question comes upon us: What is Madness, what are Nerves? Was Luther's picture of the Devil less a reality, whether it were formed within the bodily eye or without it?'

One might have hoped that the Reformation would have led Protestants to protest against witch-burning, that people who destroyed priceless stained glass because it was Popish might have been influenced in a hostile direction by the Papal Bull approving of the *Malleus*. But Luther was a peasant's son, an ex-monk and a dyspeptic. Calvin was more of an intellectual, but his legal mind found in the Sacred Text the words 'Thou shalt not suffer a witch to live'; Scotland, which adopted his teaching, became a hotbed of the witch-fever. England on the whole was one of the countries least affected; the punishment of sorcerers was left to the secular courts, in which the rules of evidence were somewhat stricter than in the ecclesiastical courts. Yet there were eminent lawyers who believed ardently in the reality of diabolical interference in human life and the need for the courts to take a strong line with Satan and his aiders and abettors. One of them was the great Sir Edward Coke. The pious and learned Sir Matthew Hale sentenced some women to death for bewitching cattle. Apart from the Puritan section the clergy in England do not seem to have been very active in hunting down witches; they were inclined to leave it to the civil magistrates. They were not as zealous as their brethren in Scotland, and rather more latitudinarian than Catholics and Puritans.

> 'The Ministers of the Kirk were far more like the ideal Inquisitors of the *Malleus* than were most of the English Bishops. Inquisitors, bishops and ministers all believed that witches existed. But the bishops were a little more inclined to allow that hysteria and fraud might play a part in the accusations' (p. 201).

There was one other country which partially escaped the epidemic. The Spanish Inquisition has few friends to-day; even among Catholics it has apologists rather than admirers. But it was an Inquisitor who conducted an inquiry into a large number of charges of witchcraft and found that he had not discovered any indications that a single act of witchcraft had really occurred. He expressed the opinion that there were neither witches nor bewitched till they were talked and written about.

This was, and still is, the practical conclusion of the whole matter. Tell people that it is possible to enter into relations with the powers of darkness, to sell their soul to the devil, and you will produce a crop of false charges against innocent people and will put into the heads of morbid or unscrupulous ones the idea of doing the very things you denounce as supremely evil.

That was the view that the practical good sense of the Age of Reason took of the matter. Witchcraft and the belief in it went out of fashion, went underground, perhaps, simultaneously. The orthodox Addison wrote:

> 'I believe in general that there is such a thing as witch-craft; but at the same time can give no credit to any particular instance of it.'

The devil was not exorcised; he was politely bowed out from the swept and garnished domain of the person of quality. Whether he may not have returned with a whole host of complexes is another matter.

Voltaire said that if God did not exist it would be necessary to invent him; we may subjoin that if the devil exists it is better to ignore him. That from the depths of the unconscious which underlies our intellectual life there may rise phantoms of evil is true enough; these fiery outbreaks prove within us the existence of a chaos, if not a hell. That there exist in the universe intelligences other than human, good, bad and indifferent, seems likely enough. That they are sometimes able to operate materially has been the general belief of mankind in all ages. St. Paul believed not only in angels and demons but in certain apparently neutral powers, the elements of this world. Yet he says that though there are many that are called gods, whether in heaven or on earth, yet to us there is but one God, the Father, from Whom are all things and we in Him, and one Lord Jesus Christ, by Whom are all things and we in Him.

THE WISDOM LITERATURE OF THE OLD TESTAMENT AND ITS THEOLOGICAL SIGNIFICANCE

By E. L. Allen, M.A., Ph.D.

THE modern revolution in Old Testament studies was effected when the Graf-Wellhausen hypothesis suggested a drastic displacement in the various strata of Hebrew religion. Whereas it had previously been regarded as axiomatic that priority lay with the Law and its developed ceremonial, while the prophets did but serve as commentators upon and champions of the Law, it was now seen that prophecy represents the formative element in Israel's religion and that large elements of the so-called Mosaic Law were, in point of fact, subsequent to prophecy. Herein, to be sure, modern scholarship was but confirming one of the major intuitions of the Pauline epistles: the argument of *Romans* iv is that the personal revelation of the living God and man's personal communion with him by faith are primary in the history of Judaism, while the Law is but secondary.

It is clear, however, that priest and prophet do not between them account for the whole religious development of their people: beside them stands a third figure, less assertive and commanding indeed, but perhaps because of that all the better qualified to elicit our sympathy to-day — the figure of the wise man. It is not suggested that a fuller appreciation of the worth of this type and of its peculiar contribution would overturn the structure which Old Testament scholarship has built up during the last two or three generations, but that it would compel us to recognize complexities and modifying features which would leave our final picture of Hebrew religion perhaps all the more satisfying because it was less sharply-outlined than we had once thought it to be.

As a preliminary to any such consideration of the consequences for Old Testament study and for Christian theology in

general of the Wisdom literature, it will be necessary to touch on the question of its date. Clearly, if it is all to be thrust into the Greek period, nothing can be derived from it which would require us in any way to think out afresh the course taken by religious development in the nation which produced it. But such an extreme view is surely no longer tenable. If this literature began as a mere collection of proverbs already current among the common people, it is not possible to fix a *terminus a quo* for some at least of the material which it contains. Nor do I see any good reason to doubt the tradition which speaks of Solomon as the patron of the wisdom of his time: this would have been but one more way in which that monarch strove to reproduce the magnificence of Pharoah in miniature in his kingdom. In what follows, therefore, I assume with Oesterley and Robinson (*Introduction to the Books of the Old Testament*, 204 ff.) that *Proverbs* xxii, 17—xxiv, 34, may be treated as pre-exilic, while much in the two collections x-xxii, 16, and xxv-xxix can be taken as early.

In recent years numerous studies, those especially of Humbert, Gressmann, Baumgartner, and Fichtner, have taught us to see the wisdom of Israel as part of a much larger whole: this type of literature and the attitude to life which it enshrines were the common possession of a class which was represented throughout the Near East, particularly in Egypt. Perhaps, however, a further widening of the horizons would bring a still better understanding of the spiritual phenomena with which we are here dealing. For the Israelite or Edomite sage has his counterpart in many other countries, particularly in China, where the classics which served for millenia as the basis of a whole culture have many points in common with the wisdom of the Near East in Old Testament times. To this day in China the proverb is the depositary of that shrewd and very human philosophy of life by which a great people has been guided throughout its history. The proverbs of ancient China, like those of ancient Israel, reflect a type of society in which personal relations are all-important and the family is the social unit, in which none can be secure of justice save he who can afford to buy it, and in which the distinction between moral values and prudential counsels for the guidance of life has not yet been clearly

drawn. In the background of both moralities is a rational theism of a somewhat vague and indistinct order: the Chinese peasant is sure that Heaven's eye is upon all and that Heaven takes thought for those who have none to champion their cause. 'You may deceive men, you cannot deceive Heaven' is a common sentiment. In each filial piety is chief among the virtues, and a long life is among the blessings most coveted. 'There are three things which are unfilial, and to have no posterity is the greatest of these'—might not this have been spoken by a Hebrew 'Solomon'? Clearly, the denotation of the term 'wisdom' is wider than we had at first thought: not merely is it not peculiarly Hebrew, it is not even confined to the Near East; rather does it reflect an attitude to life which is perhaps universal in character.

That this is so, is further borne out by those phenomena to which investigators of primitive religion have called attention and to the significance of which van der Leeuw devotes an illuminating chapter (*Phenomenology of Religion*, 159 ff.). While rejecting the theory of a primitive monotheism as advocated by Father Schmidt and others, he nevertheless finds in the background of primitive religion an inchoate conception of the Supreme Being as One who does not interfere seriously in human affairs, yet whose will is the ultimate sanction of human conduct. 'He is the God in the background, to whom one refers but does not bring down from heaven, and who also does not come forth from there spontaneously.' It is particularly important for our present purpose that the proverbial philosophy of the common people tends to centre round this Supreme Being rather than around the gods of ordinary polytheistic worship. Further, van der Leeuw writes of

> 'the intimate union between Power and morality, although the necessity of submitting one's actions to a certain order, and the further need of adapting events in general to a fixed rule, assume in the supreme being a somewhat vague form. It is, however, the court of appeal for human conduct and the guarantee of the world process.'

We have something here which meets us in such diverse quarters (quarters) as the Chinese classics, the Hebrew Proverbs, and eighteenth century Deism!

I.

In the light of such considerations as these, we can scarcely continue to ascribe all the indications of an incipient monotheism in *Proverbs* to the influence of prophetic teaching, as, for example, Oesterley tends to do in his *Commentary* on that book. Rather should we see in them evidence that the religion of Israel, under the kingdom, contained, at least in the background, elements of a purer and higher order than those which were represented at the local sanctuaries, and against which the prophets inveighed. There is no reason to suppose that what is to be found in the thinking of the plain man in so many other countries was absent from that of the Israelite peasant. If, however, it is said that it was rather the wise men and scribes who collected these proverbs who introduced into them the later morality of the prophets, the answer is that, *a priori*, there is little likelihood that men of this type, reticent, cautious, and prudential, with much to lose because of their official attachments, would have been favourably disposed to the prophet, any more than, for example, Bishop Butler was inclined to learn from John Wesley. One suspects that Amos would have been dismissed as a fanatic as readily by the court-officials of Jerusalem as by the priest of Bethel.

To bring out the possibility that *Proverbs* in its pre-exilic sections may represent a type of religion which arrived at some of the prophetic results by another road than that of the prophets, two points may be dealt with in more detail. Thus, in the first place, the conception of Yahweh as Law was by no means unknown in Israel before the eighth-century prophets gave it such forceful expression: it was evidently in the mind of the common people from the earliest days and was part of the popular wisdom embodied in their proverbs. For Chinese thought 'all that happens in the universe, natural and human, is a continuous whole like a chain of natural sequences' (Fung: *A Comparative Study of Life Ideals*, 173). The Hebrew mind seems to have worked on similar lines, and Fichtner opens his account of the content of the teaching of the Wisdom Literature with the statement that there is a law in things which man can hope to understand, and in virtue of which there is a specific

result corresponding to each action on his part (*Die Altorientalische Weisheit*, 12 f.).

In the second place, what are we to say of passages such as *Proverbs* xv, 8, xxi, 3, 27, with their criticism of sacrifice divorced from morality? Are these the work of men who have learned from the prophets or of men who anticipated them? The second of these explanations seems the more probable. Baumgartner compares the Hebrew 'To do justice and judgment is more acceptable to the Lord than sacrifice' (xxi, 3) with the Egyptian 'Righteousness of heart is dearer to God than the sacrifice of an ox when it is brought by a godless man' (*Israelitische und Altorientalische Weisheit*, 26 f.). Since the latter belongs to the beginning of the second millenium before Christ, we have no grounds for supposing that circles in Israel which were in touch with Egypt cannot have known this truth before Amos. Love to enemies is an item in the morality of Hebrew wisdom, as in that of the Near East generally (Fichtner, *op. cit.*, 34): this represents an advance upon what some of the greatest of the prophets, Jeremiah among them, were capable of: a class of men who could rise to such a height must be supposed quite capable of seeing that the cultus is no substitute for right-doing. Again, if we are to argue backwards from the polemic of Amos and Jeremiah against the sacrificial system that, while they undoubtedly exaggerated in denying that this had any place in the religion of the wilderness period, there must at least have been in Mosaism a subordination of the cultus to morality, we can imagine that this feature of Yahwism, while it had no place at the local shrines, was at least implicit in the proverbial philosophy of the peasantry and explicit at times in the thinking of the cultured class. The situation would be not unlike that in the Middle Ages, when alongside of the Papacy with its secular ambitions and a priesthood which shared the superstitions of the people, there was a current of evangelical piety which never ceased to flow.

It is not here submitted that the prophets were directly indebted for their conception of God or their moral teaching to the wise men of their time; rather has it already been urged that these two types would not be likely to understand each other. But that the final result — the triumph in Israel of ethical

monotheism — was due not only to the inspiration of the prophet but also in some small part to the sober, rational thinking of the wise man is hardly to be doubted. The incipient monotheism, the largely prudential morality, and the retribution-theology of the latter probably did not in any respect shape the message of the former — not even as suggested by Gressmann (*Israels Spruchweisheit*, 86 f.) — but they represent a way by which the same result was achieved by a few. This is not to detract from the greatness of the prophets: it is the 'living God' to whom they bore witness and not the shadowy 'God in the background' of their more intellectual contemporaries whom we worship to-day. As Bergson says of the contrast and agreement between Christian and Stoic morality:

> 'It is a far cry from this emotion (the philosopher's love of his doctrine) to the enthusiasm which spreads from soul to soul, unceasingly, like a conflagration' (*The Two Sources of Morality and Religion*, 47).

II.

When now we pass from the Old Testament to the New, we can detect the presence there of just these same two strands. While in one of its most important respects the teaching of Jesus represented a prophetic reaction against the overt over-interpretation of the Law in which the scribes of his day saw their principal service of God's truth, he was also, in common with those scribes, indebted to the teaching of the wise men. The Gospels are much less remote than might at first sight appear from the homely morality of *Proverbs*.

There are in the Synoptics two explicit references to Wisdom, *Matt.* xi, 19 (*Luke* vii, 35) and *Luke* xi, 49. In each case Wisdom is the source of divine inspiration, and in the former is spoken of as 'she' as in *Proverbs* i-ix and the later literature of this *genre*. Jesus claims that his practice and the very different one of the Baptist rest ultimately on the same divine authority and that this will be recognized — *Matthew*, when the outcome of each type of ministry is observed; or *Luke*, by those who are themselves sufficiently in touch with God. In the second instance, there is surely no need to think of a lost written source for the quotation: 'The Wisdom of God said' is equivalent to

'God in His Wisdom said': here Wisdom is the spokesman of God. One of the leading conceptions of the later Wisdom Literature was therefore familiar to Jesus and used by him. One might refer in this connection to the similarity between the invitation in *Matt.* xi, 28-30 and *Ecclus.* li, 23-30.

The form in which Jesus casts his teaching — short, incisive sayings and parables — is too similar to that of the rabbis of his day for stress to be laid on this agreement on his part with the wise men. The same is true of the appearance in his message of the thought of God as Law, and as a law which renders to every man according to his works. 'With what measure ye mete, it shall be measured unto you,' was a commonplace in the Judaism of the time, but we can trace it back to the popular philosophy of the earliest period. The same conception of retribution appears in the contrast between the hypocrites who receive their reward now from men and the genuinely devout who await it in the future and from God.

If we examine the Sermon on the Mount closely, we shall find that it is a rope woven out of two strands. In other words, the ethic which is developed here has two sources: it springs at once out of a unique consciousness of God as Father and out of simple human reflection upon life. What is presented at one point as an inference from the nature of God is reached at another time from a rational and common-sense standpoint. Anxiety, for example, is to be avoided, not only because it is incompatible with faith in a God who cares for us as a father does for his children, but equally because trouble should be left alone till it actually forces itself upon us, inasmuch as each day brings with it enough care without anticipating to-morrow's (*Matt.* vi, 34). A similar thought lies behind the Golden Rule (vii, 12), while the argument from the tree and its fruit (vii, 16-20) is reminiscent of the proverbial wisdom of the countryside. There is surely no occasion to allegorise the injunction to agree with one's adversary quickly (v, 25 f.); Jesus is here offering prudential counsel merely — one should settle one's case out of court! This is not the only occasion on which he gave advice on how to conduct oneself in society: *Luke* xiv, 7, tells us that he once spoke a parable specifically to rebuke those who were ambitious for the seats of honour at a feast, and the

parable itself appears to be an adaptation and expansion of *Proverbs* xxv, 6 f.

Windisch in his study of the Sermon on the Mount (*Der Sinn der Bergpredigt*) has shown how strong in it is the element of what he calls *Weisheitslehre*, which he opposes to what in the teaching is eschatologically conditioned. Wendland's reply to this is that even the *Weisheitslehre* is derived ultimately from the nature of God, and is therefore one in origin with the eschatological ethic.

> 'The absoluteness and the eschatological character of this ethic are one and the same thing' (*Die Eschatologie des Reiches Gottes bei Jesus*, 106).

But, if what has been said above is at all correct, it is difficult to deny the presence in the Sermon and elsewhere in the Gospels of a prudential strain: how else are we to describe, for example, the appeal to 'lay up treasures in heaven'? It is not the this-worldly prudence of *Proverbs*, but — as again, for example, in *Luke* vi, 37 f. — the motive for action is in the good consequences of one's act.

It is impossible, of course, to eliminate the thought of consequences from any religious ethic. But clearly the standpoint of Jesus is nearer to that of the writers in *Proverbs* than it is to that of Kant. It is out of place to describe his ethic as rigoristic, as 'love-perfectionism,' to declare that it is wholly impracticable, or to say with Niebuhr that

> 'the absolutism and perfectionism of Jesus' love ethic . . . does not establish a connection with the horizontal points of a political or social ethic or with the diagonals which a prudential ethic draws between the moral ideal and the facts of a given situation. It has only a vertical dimension between the loving will of God and the will of men' (*An Interpretation of Christian Ethics*, 49).

It is the glory of this ethic that it appeals at once to the character of God and man's knowledge of what is of use in the conduct of his life: it lies at the point at which the truth which is God's revelation meets the truth which is man's appreciation of the meaning of life in this world. The conclusion of the Sermon, with its vivid description of the two alternatives — to act on what has been said or not to act on it — would be farcical if he who spoke it were not in point of fact persuaded that men could so act there and then.

III.

It only remains to draw one final conclusion from the evidence which has been assembled. It is not possible within the limits of this article to enter into such vexed questions as those of 'reason and revelation,' 'natural and revealed religion.' These lie within the province of the systematic theologian: our sole concern here is with the Biblical data which require to be considered in this connection. But one is surely justified in asking whether sufficient justice has yet been done to so significant a fact as the inclusion of the Wisdom Literature in the canon of Scripture and its use by our Lord. Can the hard and fast distinctions which have sometimes been drawn be maintained, once it is recognized that the documents of a rational theism lie in our Bible side by side with the priestly law and the oracles of the prophets, and that Hebrew thinking about God was in close touch with the universal human search for truth?

A NEUROLOGIST ON MIND

By J. C. Hardwick, B.Sc., author *Religion and Science,* etc.

THE most distinguished neurologist of our time, Sir Charles Sherrington, who, with the late Dr. Henry Head, revolutionized our views of the nervous system, has recently published his conclusions with regard to the nature of mind.[1] The views on this subject of one who probably knows more about the human brain than any man living are of considerable interest—an interest felt in far wider circles than the purely scientific.

The science of life, biology, analyses the human organism into an assemblage of quasi-independent units called cells. Indeed, each of us at the outset of his career is actually such a single unit. Buf if for the science of life the unit is the cell, for the science of matter, physics, the unit is now not the atom but 'an electrically charged packet of motion.' Biologists have disputed as to whether the biological unit, the cell, is resoluble without remainder into these physical units. In other words, is biology only an extremely complex branch of chemistry and

[1] *Man on His Nature,* by Sir Charles Sherrington. (Cambridge University Press. 21*s*. 1941.)

physics? To-day biologists are almost without exception answering this question in the affirmative, and Sir Charles Sherrington endorses this view. The biological unit, the cell, he says, is entirely resoluble by physical science into *its* special type of unit. Thus under the ultimate physical analysis the behaviour of the whole organism is resolvable into the behaviour of invisible units of energy.

But if life, *i.e.* the organism, is resoluble into physical terms, what becomes of mind, which is a characteristic element in the higher organisms? Is mind nothing but a collateral product of the organism's working, and all psychical activity, whether volitional or intellectual, of an illusory character? Is T. H. Huxley's view the correct one, that 'The feeling we call volition is not the cause of a voluntary act, but the symbol of the state of the brain which is the immediate cause of that act.'[2] If we can reduce life to terms of matter and motion, it would certainly seem logically to follow that mind and consciousness, which so far as can be recognized do not exist apart from the organism, must be similarly reducible. Indeed, it has generally been taken for granted both by men of science and philosophers that life and mind stand or fall together, the status of each being interdependent. For example, an 'animistic' view of mind (such as that of the late Professor McDougall) has usually been held to be congruous with a 'vitalistic' biology, such as that of Professor Driesch. Driesch denies that the organism is wholly explicable in terms of chemistry and physics, but posits the existence of something non-material in the organism, which he styles the 'entelechy.' This is, as it were, a primitive psyche which in the human organism becomes a conscious mind, which also is immaterial and irreducible into terms of chemistry and physics.

As a matter of fact the phenomena of embryonic growth upon which Driesch based his theories have now been otherwise explained in terms of differential metabolism rates; and, as has already been stated, the movement of current scientific opinion is definitely unfavourable to all vitalistic theories. In view of this, it is interesting to note that the leading neurologist of our time, though he states that the biological unit, the cell, is en-

[2] *Collected Essays*, Vol. I, p. 224.

tirely resolvable by physical science into its own type of unit, yet does not hold that mind is thus resolvable. For him life and mind belong one to the physical sphere, and the other to some sphere that is not physical. Though all organic phenomena can be explained in terms of energy, this is not the case with mind.

> 'Not so long ago expectation was entertained by many that mind would with the growth of knowledge prove to be energy of some form, as yet perhaps not delimited. . . . This expectation has not been fulfilled. Further knowledge has not brought them together. It has more definitely parted them.'[3]

Although under the ultimate physical analysis the behaviour of the whole organism is resolvable into behaviour of sub-visible units of energy, there remains among the happenings met with in such a compound organism as ourselves, a residue not thus resolvable either by the biologist or the physicist. These residual phenomena may be classed together under the one term *mind*. And of mind a difficulty is to know whether it is just motion; if it is not, then it is not equivalent to energy and cannot be explained in terms of energy, *i.e.* of physics.

Another point about mind is that among the phenomena of life it seems of a restricted distribution, at any rate if we use the term *mind* to signify recognizable mind, mind as understood in everyday parlance and experienced as feeling, knowing, wishing, etc. Mind thus understood is more restricted in distribution than is life, and seems to be a relatively modern product of evolution. Its immediate rôle in the body would appear to be to influence acts; but the 'how' of the mind's leverage on acts, *i.e.* on matter, is a mystery. Here inquiry meets an *impasse*.

The organ of *liaison* between mind and matter is the brain. 'Much as one special organ, the heart, maintains the flow of nutriment throughout the body; so one organ, the brain, is the provider of mind for the whole individual.' Yet Sir Charles Sherrington says that reference to the brain at present affords little help to the study of the mind; the 'how' of the *liaison* between them remains for science, as for philosophy, a riddle.

The situation is that knowledge, looking at its world, has arrived at two concepts, that of energy and that of mind. The former is adequate to deal with all that is known as knowledge, except mind. But between energy and mind science finds no 'how' of give and take. There is co-existence, and that is all.

[3] *Man on His Place in Nature*, p. 356.

To man's understanding the world remains double, though common sense may pragmatically treat the two as one.

The two concepts mind and energy, which cover all our experience, are of course both creations of thought. But what they respectively stand for still remains divided as having nothing in common except time and this curious and only point of spatial relation, namely, 'collocation in the brain.' This localization of the mind in the brain correlates mind with place. This is of fundamental interest because it assures us that 'as known to us at any rate, mind is always and without exception individual mind.' That is to say, mind as known to us in the general and the aggregate is always many contemporary minds. The mental as we know it is always in actuality 'a limited and impermanent individual system.' Moreover, mind as we know it appears to be individually insulated and devoid of direct *liaison* with other minds; it has to find indirect *liaison*, and energy is the medium of this indirect but sole connection between mind and mind. Speech is one instance of this indirect *liaison* by means of energy. The question has been asked, Why should mind have a body? The answer may be, To mediate between it and other minds; the body may be a means of communication.

But can there be a scientific understanding of mind? What prevents this is the fact that mind is not, and cannot be, an object of sense. There are two ways of being imperceptible. The first is to be quantitatively too little, and so below the threshold of sense, as when our sense organs are not delicate enough to register certain light or sound waves. Scientific devices can help us partly out of this disability by artificially extending the range of our senses. But no microscope can reveal to us the mind, for the mind is imperceptible in another fashion. It is by its nature inaccessible to sense and to all artificial extensions of sense; there exists no sense organ that can perceive mind.

Yet in 'motor-behaviour,' *i.e.* in acting, there would seem to be awareness both of the self and of the act, and a connection between them. One source of this awareness is sensual, for the motor act in its bodily execution consists in changes in length and tension of muscles, etc., for the muscles besides being motor instruments are sense organs. But besides this there is in the conscious motor act an awareness of the self acting, the 'I-doing,' and this latter awareness is not derived from sense, but is the

'I's' direct awareness of itself acting. A difference between it and the 'sensed' type of awareness is that while the latter has spatial projection, the former has not. Perception through any of the senses immerses us in space. To see a thing is to see it somewhere, and so with all the other senses. But awareness of the self 'doing' is not thus projected; it is, on the contrary, the centre from which projection takes place. The total of sensual space for our percipient self at any moment may be likened to a sphere of which the percipient self is the centre, and projection applies to the radial distance from that percipient self. To pass centralward along any radius is finally to come to the non-spatial 'I.' As a matter of fact the exploration of the radius always stops short of that non-spatial centre; thus the spatial world of sensual experience always lies outside the unprojected central core where the 'I' is.

> 'If we think of projection in grades, the perceived star is further than the perceived toe, the toe than the perceived tooth. The "I" is even more central that the perceived tooth and its pain. In no direction of sensual space is the "I" projected. Yet its centrality is somewhat vague. Perhaps we can put it best by saying that it is always more central than is what it perceived.'

In the complex of awareness belonging to a conscious motor act there is, along with the awareness of the 'I-doing,' which is unprojected, the sense-derived awareness of the bodily act which *is* projected and thus separated from the unprojected 'I,' and mentally distinguished from it. But the two things thus mentally distinguished are again mentally combined by the causal link.

> 'The mind relates the "I-doing" in the conscious motor act causally with the act. The unprojected "I" is the "cause" and the projected motor act is the "effect." This attribution is a naïve unargued assumption, one of those unanalysable workings of the mind which are a mental analogue of the physiological reflex.'

But this 'I' which when I move my hand I experience as 'I-doing' and regard automatically as the 'cause' of the action, how do I perceive it? The answer is that I do not perceive it, if perception means awareness through sense. In this particular case my awareness and my self are one. My 'self' is not an object I can examine through sense, for the 'I' can never come into the plane of objects of sensual perception. Even if the mind were equipped with a sense-organ which were turned inward, so to say, upon the mind itself, what object would it fulfil? If the purpose of sense is to translate physical events into

mental, what purpose would it serve in application to the mind, which is mental already? Besides, the 'I,' which *is* awareness, would still remain not 'sensed.'

Yet the mind does experience itself, and memory attaches to that experience. The self can remember and re-live at second hand and reflect upon its experience of itself. It can think over what its experience in 'doing' was. The 'I' endures in time. Just as space is a continuum for it, so also is time, though time is a continuum which moves. As in the old cosmology the sun moved and the earth did not, so temporal change is attributed by us not to ourselves but to the 'flow' of time.

> 'And though we think of flowing Time as a continuum, much as in space-continuum we conjure up lines, so in our time-continuum we distinguish brief stationary cross-sections of the flow and speak of each as "now." That such a "now" is an artefact does not prevent it from serving to integrate the "I." The mental items embraced by any "now" compose one integral whole, which is the "self" of the moment.'

The 'I' is central to the two indefinables, 'space' and 'time.' And it finds itself central in a world of 'things,' though itself an existence without contour, shape or dimensions, invisible, intangible, devoid of sensible attributes. Compared with 'things' it is largely a negation of all that goes to make them up; yet it is based on observation as truly as they. It is as 'real' as they; perhaps more real. Indeed, strictly, the observation and fact underlying the nonsensual concept and its 'I' are more at first hand than are those underlying the spatial concept and its 'things': for these latter are, after all, an inference. Thus mind, though imperceptible, and by nature necessarily so, is real, and a reality which is experienced directly. The descriptive power of the spatial concept using its space-time figment energy, is so great that the assumption is that it can cover everything, but here is something belonging to another category.

What is remarkable about Sir Charles Sherrington's analysis is that he finds the two concepts, energy and mind, irreducible. As he says:

> 'No field of experience is now open to which hybrid conceptions, partly or temporarily spatial and partly or temporarily non-spatial, apply. Now it must be one thing or the other, space or non-space. Intermediate fields had once been generally admitted. There had been go-betweens, in which non-sensual and the spatial properties combined or alternated — spiritual substances which were at once material and

immaterial. . . . The removal of the intermediate was in effect a purification of the two complemental concepts in their own respective applications' (p. 347).

As the spatial concept, fortified by the natural sciences, now strives to cover the whole of reality, so the non-spatial concept has been ambitious, but its applications have been restricted and purified. What then remains to the non-spatial concept when stripped of untenable pretensions?

'There remains a residue inalienably its own. A residue more precious than any of its mistaken ambitions. A residue which is the source of all its splendid "realities" as well as of all its dreams. A residue which contains *all* the "values"—for space is irrelevant to values. In a word, the conscious "I," called in the abstract "mind." And what a residue! Among its contents are those two same concepts we have been following, creations of thought, embracing between them more than the universe, for if we call the Universe energy, they embrace mind as well. It may be said this residue, beyond all problematical "reality," *is* the value of our world' (pp. 347-8).

'Mind, for anything perception can compass, goes therefore in our spatial world more ghostly than a ghost. Invisible, intangible, it is a thing not even in outline; it is not a "thing." It remains without sensual confirmation, and remains without it for ever. Stripped to nakedness there remains to it but itself. What then does that amount to? All that counts in life. Desire, zest, truth, love, knowledge, "values," and, seeking metaphor to eke out expression, hell's depth and heaven's utmost height.

'And that other concept, energy; what of its yield? We saw that Time has winnowed its harvest too. How much remains? The perceptible world. All that the space-time continuum contains; gathered harmoniously into one category, a category which nothing which does not act on sense can enter and which all that does so act does enter. If so, it seems strange that it should fall into so sharply different a category from all the other products of the mind. With this hint implicit in it, the perceived world is then our other concept's fruit.'

The outcome of it all seems strange enough, and provides much food for meditation. The mind is non-spatial, but exists (or seems to) in a spatial world, the brain being the 'organ of *liaison*' between them. But why should minds exist at all—these non-spatial ghosts over against the tangible spatial world? And why the 'organ of *liaison*'? But yet what would the coloured, tangible, spatial world be but a ghost apart from the conscious perceiving mind? And what would the mind be but a ghost if not set in a space-time organism in a space-time world? Though each seems a closed system, perhaps the two worlds need one another: that neither is real without the other? Perhaps we exist to be the link which creates the reality.

THE INTERPRETATION OF CHRISTIANITY IN IDEALISTIC PHILOSOPHY IN GREAT BRITAIN IN THE NINETEENTH CENTURY*

By Rev. J. S. Boys Smith, Ely Professor of Divinity in the University of Cambridge and Canon of Ely.

IN this paper I am concerned with a group of British thinkers, with them only in so far as they offer an interpretation of Christianity, and with this interpretation chiefly as it bears upon a particular problem. But with this problem in view I must look also beyond Great Britain and must refer both to the great thinkers of the Romantic age in Germany, to whom the British thinkers were deeply indebted, and to others of a later day, some of whom are hostile to Idealism and unsympathetic to philosophy. My purpose is to treat a group of thinkers as representative of a point of view — a point of view characteristic of the century to which they belonged — and thereby to focus attention upon a problem the nineteenth and twentieth centuries have been forced to meet but have been unable to solve.

The term Idealism is variously used. It may mean a certain theory of knowledge, a theory of the relation between objects known and the mind that knows them, and thus a theory of the nature of objects themselves. With this sense of the term I am not immediately concerned, though the thinkers I have in view were, in general, agreed upon the answer to be given to the question. The term may also mean a type of thought which devotes special attention to those aspects of experience which are broadly called spiritual — the intellectual, the moral, the aesthetic, and the religious aspects — and holds that they are not merely prominent aspects of human experience but must be accepted as fundamental in any thorough philosophical interpretation of the world as a whole. Not all those who are idealists in the latter and broader sense are idealists also in the former

*A paper read before the Oxford Society of Historical Theology on 15 May, 1941.

sense, though epistemological idealists are naturally disposed to adopt some form of idealism in that broader sense. In the nineteenth century, however, the two contentions tended to go together, though there were notable exceptions; and they were so united because the main stream of idealistic thought descended from Kant and his successors of the Romantic age in Germany, of whom the chief was Hegel.

The group of thinkers I have in view were all powerfully influenced by Hegel and by the movement of which he was the climax, though none of them was ready to accept without reservation the title 'Hegelian' that has generally been conferred upon them. In their several ways they were all typically English, or British, thinkers; and, though they drew much of their inspiration from the German philosophy of the period from Kant to Hegel, both the problems and the characteristics of English thought are everywhere apparent in their writings.

I have especially in mind Thomas Hill Green, Edward Caird, Francis Herbert Bradley, and Bernard Bosanquet. Green and Caird were born in the thirties of the last century, Bradley and Bosanquet ten years later; and all lived into the present century, except Green, who died at the early age of forty-six in the year 1882. They were the most prominent and influential, though they were far from being the only, representatives of the philosophical movement of the later nineteenth and early twentieth centuries in this country known as Idealist or Hegelian; a movement neglected by Continental thinkers but of profound influence in Great Britain and America. They were philosophers, not theologians. But this distinction is not of great importance in the English-speaking world, where religious thought has found expression as truly in philosophy and in literature as in theology in the more special sense, and perhaps more fully. For some purposes it would be necessary to lay stress upon certain differences between these thinkers, especially between the two elder, Green and Caird, on the one side, and the two younger, Bradley and Bosanquet, on the other; but for my present purpose these differences are relatively unimportant. All four represented a common tradition and shared, subject to some qualifications, a common outlook; and their connexion was made the closer by varying degrees of mutual

acquaintance and by association with the University of Oxford. It happens — in the case of these thinkers the fact had perhaps no great importance — that the original religious affinities of all four were with Protestant or Evangelical Christianity; but their influence, beyond the range of professed students of philosophy, was felt by the more reflective minds of all schools of Christian thought, not least by the younger High Church school, as may be seen, for example, at an early date in the influence of Green upon some of the writers in *Lux Mundi*. They have been regarded, I think rightly, as belonging to the so-called Platonic strain in English religious thought. Their emphasis upon the community, derived both from Greek thought and from Hegel, had a natural affinity with the renewed emphasis in the nineteenth century upon the society and continuity of the Church, though their own emphasis was rather upon what, after Hegel, they called the State. They had no place for a radical distinction between these two; not because they gave any special attention to the idea of an established Church, but because in their view the State was a spiritual community, human society in which men's spiritual functions find a main, though not the complete, sphere of their exercise. All four thinkers wished to merit, and did merit, the title 'Christian'; but their interpretations of Christianity, like Hegel's before them, departed widely from that of the past and also from that then generally current. All were convinced that the essential principle of Christianity, as they understood it, was true and of profound importance, and they believed that the philosophical conclusions to which they were led in their own reflection were in harmony with it. It was in this sense that they wished to merit the title, and none of them was indifferent to the implications of their conviction in practice. Of the four, Bradley, without question, was the greatest, and also the most influential, as a thinker; but for my present purpose I must devote special attention to Green and Caird, because they had more to say directly upon the particular problem I have in view, and they therefore afford a fuller illustration of the answer characteristic of the movement. On this answer I think all these thinkers were in essential agreement, though Bradley and Bosanquet nowhere discuss it at length.

A German writer, Rudolf Metz, in a recent survey of currents of philosophical thought in Great Britain, takes the view that the idealistic movement was 'a late off-shoot from the stem of German Idealism, that it was fed predominantly from German sources and was permeated by the German spirit, or, to, express it more prosaically, that it was a German export-article.'[1] This judgement, natural in a German writer, is one-sided. Though the main philosophical impulse, the leading philosophical conceptions, and much of the more particular content and method of their thought, came to the British thinkers directly from Kant and his successors, especially from Hegel, they constitute a genuinely native movement. The ideas of the Romantic age, which found notable and characteristic expression in German philosophy and theology, had at the same date found scarcely less notable expression in England; but here the expression was in literature, not in philosophy or in theology, which long remained largely under the influence of the preceding period.[2] If Coleridge and a few less important philosophical thinkers of a rather later date are excepted, it may be said that these ideas, already native to this country and fully expressed in its poetry and indeed in other branches of literature, found their first full philosophical expression in England a generation or more later in the idealistic philosophers; no doubt under a fresh impulse from abroad, but in a characteristically English form. There is, moreover, a close connexion between the idealistic movement and the tradition of classical studies in English education. This connexion was further strengthened by the important personal influence of Jowett on the earlier members of the group, and it too links them with the thought of their own country.

[1] Rudolf Metz, *Die Philosophischen Strömungen der Gegenwart in Grossbritannien*, Leipzig 1935, Bd. i, S. 218. It must be added that Metz, in his sympathetic account of the movement, qualifies this statement in certain respects and recognizes the influence of English literature of the Romantic age and of the classical tradition in English education.

[2] *Cf.* A. C. Bradley, 'English Poetry and German Philosophy in the Age of Wordsworth,' the Adamson Lecture, 1909, reprinted in *A Miscellany*, 1929, pp. 105-38; and B. Bosanquet's own comments in his essay, 'The part played by Aesthetic in the development of Modern Philosophy,' *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society*, vol. i (1889), pp. 77-97, reprinted in *Science and Philosophy*, 1927, Essay xxii.

If, however, the idealistic philosophies of the later nineteenth century in Great Britain were in important respects a late expression of ideas which first emerged in the Romantic age, they were not on that account out of touch with their own age. Conditions had greatly changed since the early decades of the century; there were new needs and new problems. When, therefore, Green and Caird and their younger contemporaries, under the powerful influence of Hegel's writings, came to develope their own philosophies, it was in an atmosphere widely different from that of Hegel's Germany. And it was in fact they who stimulated, and eventually dominated, the great advance in English philosophical studies that took place during the last third of the century. In Germany, as has been noticed already, the new outlook, often called 'immanentist,' which looked for the satisfaction of the religious sentiment within, rather than beyond, this world, and found it through a new conception of the world itself, had already gained full philosophical and theological expression at the outset. Hegel and Schleiermacher, who were almost exact contemporaries, were its chief representatives in these fields. In England it was otherwise. When Green began to teach a generation later, English philosophy still remained in the critical and empirical tradition, and in ethics the doctrines of utilitarianism reigned supreme. The dominating figure was John Stuart Mill. Philosophy had done little to interpret the newer tendencies in religion, and was not indeed primarily occupied with religious questions. Only here and there was theology actively fulfilling this function. With some notable exceptions — Coleridge earlier, Carlyle, whose writings were one of the main channels by which German thought came to England, and later Maurice — English theology remained out of touch with the 'immanentist' tendencies of the time. The influence of Romanticism can indeed be seen in the Tractarian movement; but there the influence was exerted, not by its 'immanentist,' but by its conservative, side and by its interest in the past, and it appears in a renewed emphasis upon the Church as a society, upon its authority and its continuity. The 'Liberalism' the early Tractarians so greatly feared was still largely dominated by the individualism and rationalism of the preceding century. On the other hand, under the influence of

the advancing natural sciences, there was a strong trend towards what came to be known as 'naturalism,' in which the 'immanentist' outlook of the time took a positivist or agnostic form. It was the achievement of the idealistic movement in philosophy, in close touch with English literature, in which, it may be said, the lay theology of the period found its most living expression, to offer a radically different interpretation of the world, an interpretation in which art, morality, religion, and human society were viewed as the realities of primary importance. Thus religion was given the highest place and received a philosophical justification; yet the spiritual world, in agreement with the new outlook of the period, was found within or through the natural world and thus answered, not only to the religious interest, but also to man's other spiritual interests, artistic, moral, and political. These thinkers thus stand truly in succession to Hegel; for such had been his aim, and for him too — to employ a phrase of Bradley's—'there is nothing more real than what comes in religion.'[3]; but their work was done in the different conditions and to meet the different needs of a later day.[4]

I have made use of the term 'immanence' to describe the position of these thinkers. But its use tends to obscure a complementary aspect of their doctrine. Like the thinkers of the Romantic age, they insisted upon the ultimate unity of all things, and rejected theism as commonly understood[5]; but they insisted no less strongly, like Hegel himself, upon the transcendence of ultimate reality, which they named the 'Absolute.' Though the 'Absolute' is nothing apart from its 'appearances' it is manifested in them in various 'degrees' and may be said to transcend them all: this doctrine, essentially Hegelian in its main char-

[3] F. H. Bradley, *Appearance and Reality*, 1893, 2nd ed., 9th impression, 1930, p. 398.

[4] In some respects their aim and achievement may be compared to those of Lotze in Germany; though Lotze, unlike the British thinkers, felt himself, perhaps with less justification than he supposed, to be in reaction against Hegelian influence. Bradley and Bosanquet were not uninfluenced by Lotze, in particular by Lotze's *Logic*, to the translation of which Bosanquet contributed; but Lotze's most notable influence in England was exerted through the Cambridge thinker, James Ward, who stands apart from the idealistic movement, though the effect of his work is in some ways comparable.

[5] This is truer of Bradley, and especially of Bosanquet, than of Green and Caird.

acter, Bradley was to insist upon as the 'centre of philosophy,' and it was with this twofold emphasis that he concluded his two principal works on metaphysics.[6]

In terms of their idealistic philosophy all these thinkers believed themselves able to affirm and to justify the essential principle of Christianity. In this too they were followers of Hegel. Hegel's philosophy no doubt affords a completer example of the interpretation of Christianity on these lines; but I have chosen to consider the British thinkers because they are more recent in date and have more directly influenced English religious thought. The contact between philosophy and theology in England, at least since the middle of the seventeenth century, has always been close, partly because England has not had an independent tradition of systematic theology, and the influence of these thinkers on Christian thought has been great. It has naturally been chiefly exercised in the borderland between theology and philosophy, though it may be traced more widely. None of them, however, attempted to deal systematically with Christian doctrine; they preserved an attitude of detachment, and references to it by the two later thinkers were not always friendly. I shall not attempt to estimate the relation between their philosophical conclusions and the system of Christian doctrine as a whole. I confine attention to a particular problem, which troubled the nineteenth century and still perplexes the twentieth. It is commonly spoken of as that of the place of the historical element in Christianity and concerns particularly the place assigned by Christian doctrine to the events of the life and death of Jesus Christ. Here the idealistic thinkers adopt a characteristic view, similar to Hegel's; and their view represents one of the principal ways in which, during the past century and a half, the problem has been met.

At first sight, it is curious that the century dominated, above all others, by the historical point of view, which is perhaps its leading and most original feature, should also have been the century which found most difficulty in providing a secure place in its thought for the historical element in Christianity. But on

[6] *Appearance and Reality,* 2nd ed., 9th impression, pp. 488-9; *Essays on Truth and Reality,* 1914, pp. 470-3. For Bradley's attitude to the idea of 'immanence' or 'indwelling' in its religious reference, see the latter work, pp. 432-7.

more than one account it was precisely this new historical sense that created the difficulty. The thought of the century was dominated by the ideas of process and change, that is by the conception of development. This conception began to come into prominence towards the end of the eighteenth century, and in the nineteenth the new methods to which it gave rise were applied, not only in historical study itself, but in every branch of scientific enquiry amenable to them. The result was an extraordinary transformation of outlook and an extension of knowledge altogether unprecedented. The unique position given to Jesus Christ by Christian theological tradition appeared to be endangered in more than one way. It was not easy to attribute to a moment in a process at once continuous and undergoing unceasing change an importance of the kind ascribed by Christian theology to the life of Jesus. The difficulty was, of course, greatly increased for those who tended to assume that development was equivalent to progress. A belief in progress as inevitable, however, was not characteristic of the idealistic thinkers, and by the later representatives of the movement it was expressly repudiated.[7] Indeed, it was perhaps less generally characteristic of the century than is sometimes suggested. The nineteenth century was certainly a century of hope; it was conscious of a duty to posterity and felt that the opportunity for progress lay open before it. But it was not a complacent age — that fault could more justifiably be attributed to the century that preceded it. The nineteenth century knew that progress required effort, and in many respects, especially in religion, the temper of the age, as a period of rapid change, was restless and uncertain of itself. Nevertheless, finality was not easily ascribed to any event in the world's course. Further, the new outlook I have spoken of as 'immanentist,' with its reluctance to interpret revelation as entering this world from without, made the traditional interpre-

[7] See, for example, F. H. Bradley, *Appearance and Reality,* 2nd ed., 9th impression, pp. 442-4; *Essays on Truth and Reality,* p. 321; B. Bosanquet, *The Principle of Individuality and Value,* 1912, p. 136; *The Value and Destiny of the Individual,* 1913, Lecture X; *The Meeting of Extremes in Contemporary Philosophy,* 1921, pp. 206 ff. It should be noted that the British Idealists did not follow Hegel, either for good or for evil, in his philosophical interpretation of the course of historical events or world-history.

tation of the person of Christ hard to assimilate with the thought of the period. These factors, together with the enlarged horizon of knowledge, historical and scientific, gradually deprived of much of its validity the ancient scheme, at once historical and theological, in terms of which the religious meaning of the life of Jesus Christ had, from the outset of Christian history, been interpreted. The newer Biblical studies, which were an important expression of the new historical direction of enquiry, contributed prominently to this result; for the ancient theological framework was largely derived from the Old Testament as interpreted by the Christian Church. Added to these influences was the recognition, never before present in an equal degree, of the critical doubt to which every judgement and interpretation of the past must be exposed. What is the logical basis of a historical judgement about a past event? On what evidence does it rest? Certainly not only upon the particular testimony to its occurrence or meaning, but also upon underlying and perhaps unrecognized assumptions. What in fact — to adopt the title of Bradley's earliest work, written partly under the influence of F. C. Baur — are 'the presuppositions of critical history'?[8] 'There is no such thing,' he wrote, 'as a history without a prejudication; the real distinction is between the writer who has his prejudications without knowing what they are, and whose prejudications, it may be, are false, and the writer who consciously orders and creates from the known foundation of that which for him is the truth.'[9] And he emphasized the importance in all historical judgements of the argument from analogy. Such considerations had been largely overlooked in the earlier appeals to Christian evidences, and naturally so when there was little recognition of the wide differences between the presuppositions of one age and those of another and when consequently the biblical narratives could still be accepted without question, that is could be unconsciously interpreted in the light of the presuppositions of the present or of an accepted theological conclusion. The successive lives of Jesus composed in modern times and surveyed in Schweitzer's well-known work[10] are an interesting illustration of the prejudi-

[8] F. H. Bradley, *The Presuppositions of Critical History*, 1874, reprinted in *Collected Essays*, 1935, vol. i. [9] *Collected Essays*, vol. i, p. 20.

[10] A. Schweitzer, *Geschichte der Leben-Jesu-Forschung*.

cations of the historian, as too, with reference to an earlier age, is such a survey as that provided in Gore's dissertation on 'The Consciousness of our Lord in His Mortal Life.'[11] But in England, where biblical criticism developed slowly and late, especially in its application to the New Testament, the conscious critical doubt played a relatively small part until later in the century. Uneasiness about the classical Christology was due rather to the other factors I have mentioned — the conception of development, an increasingly 'immanentist' outlook in theology, and the disintegration of the original biblical framework.

Nevertheless, the new interests of the period found positive as well as negative expression in Christian theology, especially abroad. The new consciousness of the Church, characteristic of Schleiermacher early in the century and of Ritschl later no less than of the Tractarian movement in this country, led to interpretations of Jesus Christ which assigned to him a position, different from, indeed, yet hardly less important than, that which an older orthodoxy had given him. The views of Schleiermacher and Ritschl, and the development of Ritschlianism associated with the name of Harnack, were in general harmony with the presuppositions and knowledge of the decades to which they belonged. What weakened them, as time went on, was the rise of the critical doubt, combined with new historical conclusions, especially those reached by the so-called 'eschatalogical' school of critics,[12] and the coming reaction against the evolutionary and 'immanentist' point of view. But it is perhaps permissible to express the opinion that, unless there is a large element of truth in the conception of Jesus associated with Liberal Protestantism and sufficient historical evidence to support it, it will be hard indeed to justify any interpretation of him which gives him a position comparable with that he has held in Christian tradition. To substitute mystery, or the 'numinous,' or some 'incognito' impenetrable by the historian, for moral stature and religious insight is not likely to provide a secure foundation for Christology.

[11] C. Gore, *Dissertations on Subjects connected with the Incarnation*, 1895.

[12] J. Weiss and A. Schweitzer in Germany, and A. Loisy in France.

But it was not in these ways that the idealistic thinkers, following in the Hegelian tradition, sought to interpret Christianity. The main direction of their thought is clearly indicated in Bradley's early work already referred to.

> 'If we meddle in any way with the history of certain times,' he wrote in the Preface, 'we must touch the element or a part of the element in which hitherto the Christian principle has brought itself home to the religious consciousness. And to a person who identifies the element with that which exists in it, or who believes that the truth of a principle is to be found at the beginning of its temporal development, such modification will doubtless appear an *all*-important matter.'[13]

'The Christian principle' and the historical events through which it 'brought itself home to the religious consciousness'—there, implicit in that distinction, is the point of view characteristic of Hegel and of all his successors. The distinction does not find easy admission into the tradition of Christian belief, and there may be good reason to scrutinize it closely and perhaps in the end to reject it. But two considerations, the one general, the other historical, are worthy of attention, because they shew that the idealistic thinkers were pursuing a constructive purpose. First, if there be a fundamental Christian principle, and if it can be made the essential principle of a coherent and comprehensive theory of the world, then, even though the truth of the principle turn out to be essentially independent of the particular historical occurrence which was the original occasion of its vivid apprehension, that theory will not be undeserving of the name of a Christian philosophy; in it Christian conviction will have been at once preserved and vindicated. That, in essentials, was the interpretation of Christianity offered by the idealistic philosophies of the nineteenth century. Secondly, a result not wholly different was achieved much earlier by those thinkers who first closely wove the Logos-conception into the fabric of Christian belief; and it may be doubted whether apart from their work, even though it met with opposition and was eventually modified, Christian theology could have become, as it did become, the dominating influence in European, and eventually in more than European, thinking. The parallel, no doubt, is inexact; but it is relevant. A theology is not enough if it falls short of being also a comprehensive philosophy.

[13] *Collected Essays*, vol. i, p. 3.

The earlier Idealists, Green and Caird, though really committed to this line of thought, pursued it less radically and less consistently than, as I suppose, it was pursued in his own mind by Bradley. But Bradley wrote little expressly on the subject, and Bosanquet still less. Of these two, Bradley, I think, remained the closer to Christian feeling, partly because, if I estimate rightly, he had the deeper understanding of religion. The term 'mystic' should be used with care; but it is ultimately to the tradition of the mystics, some of whom were rational philosophers, that Bradley himself belongs. Towards the end of his life, some fifty years later, he returned to the subject, though primarily to illustrate a point in his logical doctrine.

> 'Suppose,' he then wrote, '. . . a man convinced of the truth of Christianity, and rightly or wrongly to understand Christianity as the unity of God with finite souls, a reality at once consummated and eternal and yet temporal and progressive. Christianity is to such a man a main aspect of the Universe, conscious of itself above time, and yet revealing itself in the historical growth of spiritual experience. And imagine the same man asked to compare with this principle the truth about some happening in time. I will not instance such events as the virgin birth and bodily ascension of Jesus of Nazareth, but I will take the historical assertion that Jesus actually at a certain time lived and taught in Galilee and actually died at Jerusalem on the cross. And by "actually" I mean so that, if *we* had been there, we should have seen these things happen.
>
> '"All such events," our supposed man might reply, "are, if you view them as occurrences, of little importance. Enquire by all means whether and how far there is good evidence for their happening. But do not imagine that Christianity is vitally concerned with the result of your enquiry. Christianity, as I conceive it, covers so much ground, fills such a space in the Universe, and makes such a difference to the world, that, without it, the world would be not so much changed as destroyed. And it counts for much that this eternal truth should have appeared on our planet (as presumably elsewhere), and should here (we hope) be developing itself more and more fully. But the rest, if you will take it as mere event and occurrence, is an affair so small — a matter grounded by the very nature of its world on so little — that between the two things there can be hardly a comparison."[14]

Bradley does not in this passage expressly commit himself to this view of Christianity; he puts it forward to illustrate his doctrine that absolute truth is possible in metaphysics and that more restricted assertions, though they seem less open to doubt, may be more fallible; and he goes on to qualify the position of his 'supposed Christian.' Before I quote further, it is of interest to compare a passage written many years before by

[14] F. H. Bradley, *The Principles of Logic*, 2nd ed., 1922, pp. 688 f.

Bosanquet, which, I do not doubt, was in Bradley's mind. It illustrates the subtle difference, which every sensitive reader must feel, between these two closely-associated thinkers. To illustrate the doctrine that what is actually stated in a sentence may differ widely, in consequence of some confusion, from the proposition the sentence is intended to assert, Bosanquet instanced a preacher who

> 'exclaims passionately, "*I* want no evidence; I *know* these things to be true" — these things being a variety of historical facts. He means to assert the great fact of religious experience which has coloured his whole life; but the inability to throw this into rational form drives him to find the precise content needed for explicit judgment in doubtful historical matter, which he asserts with all his force purely by an intellectual confusion.'[15]

The logical point illustrated is not relevant to the present purpose; but it is clear that behind Bosanquet's choice of the illustration lies the interpretation of Christianity — a principle fundamental in experience but essentially independent of any particular set of historical events — common to all these thinkers.[16]

Bosanquet speaks of 'confusion,' and even of 'an absolute blunder of identification.'[17] Bradley, whose religious insight and feeling were deeper, is more circumspect.

> 'Imagine him,' he continues of his supposed Christian, 'asked whether, thinking as he does, he cares nothing for "the historical truth" of Christianity, any more than for the detail of Christian creeds and symbols — and possibly his answer might surprise us. "I understood you to be speaking," he might reply, "about mere temporal events and happenings, just as you might speak again about mere material things such as this crucifix or that flag. These by themselves are all abstractions, mistaken for realities by what too often is called Common Sense; and these most assuredly are not the genuine facts and beliefs of religion. Religious events and symbols, though on one side things and

[15] B. Bosanquet, *Knowledge and Reality: a criticism of Mr. F. H. Bradley's 'Principles of Logic,'* 1885, pp. 131 f.

[16] *Cf.* a later statement of Bosanquet's: 'History is a hybrid form of experience, incapable of any considerable degreee of "being or trueness" . . . The study of Christianity is the study of a great world-experience; the assignment to individuals of shares in its development is a problem for scholars, whose conclusions, though of considerable human interest, can never be of supreme importance' (*The Principle of Individuality and Value*, pp. 78 f.).

The difference, already noted, between Hegel's attitude to world-history or the course of events and the attitude of the British Idealists is forcibly illustrated by this saying of Bosanquet's.

[17] *Knowledge and Reality*, p. 133.

> happenings in your 'real world,' are something on the other side whose essence and life is elsewhere. Identified with what is beyond, they are no mere occurrences in time or things in space. They represent, and they are the actual incarnation of eternal reality, and for the least of them a man might feel called on to die." "[18]

Bradley is not committed to this modified statement more fully than to the other, though it is in line with his philosophy, especially with the later phases of his thought. The passage is interesting as shewing that the Idealists' interpretation is less simple, and therefore less easily to be accepted or rejected, than might at first sight appear. In the words of a recent essay, the New Testament record of events is 'not simply a chronicle of occurrences, but a record at the same time of the meaning which the occurrences bore for those who were immediately touched by them.'[19] All the idealistic thinkers would emphatically have endorsed this statement. But the difficulties are not thereby removed. What meaning did those occurrences then bear? What meaning do they bear now? And in what sense do they bear it? Widely different answers are possible to each of these questions, not least to the second and the third. The Idealists adopted an answer of the kind I have indicated, and, as I have mentioned, Hegel was not their only predecessor. But it cannot be affirmed that a majority of Christians at any time, or even a majority of those few who have arrived at a clear view of the question, have been in agreement with them.

Green and Caird had already taken a similar view. Their references to Christianity are more extensive, and they themselves stood closer to the ordinary channels of Christian life and practice. But they tend to assume the idealistic interpretation rather than to discuss or defend it, and their statements are consequently often less explicit. In an *Essay on Christian Dogma*,[20] written shortly after 1860 under the influence, like Bradley's earliest published work, of F. C. Baur, Green offers an interpretation of the development of Christian doctrine. In his view, Jesus himself, in and through a normal human life lived under

[18] *The Principles of Logic*, 2nd ed., pp. 689 f.

[19] C. H. Dodd, 'The New Testament' in *The Study of Theology*, prepared under the direction of Kenneth E. Kirk, 1939, p. 223.

[20] *Works of Thomas Hill Green*, ed. by R. L. Nettleship, 2nd ed., 1890, vol. iii, pp. 161-85. *Cf.* Nettleship's exposition of the Essay in his Memoir of Green prefixed to vol. iii (pp. xxxviii f.).

the limited historical conditions of a particular time and place, which can partly be reconstructed from the Gospel narratives, achieved an absolute union of mind with God, in the sense that the human life of Jesus was the expression or self-manifestation of the nature of God and at the same time the fulfilment of the possibilities and aspirations of man. But this experience or achievement, Green held, is not confined to Jesus. R. L. Nettleship, Green's pupil, and author of the Memoir prefixed to the third volume of his *Works*, states Green's view thus :

> 'The incarnation is not completed, the truth which Jesus proclaimed is not fully revealed, until the whole of mankind and the whole of nature become a perfect vehicle for the life which lived in him . . . It is because Jesus, under limiting conditions, lived a life which is limited by no conditions and under special circumstances proclaimed a principle which is applicable to all circumstances, that his life and his principle are rightly called " absolute ".'[21]

On Green's interpretation of the history, the first Christianity, at least in its fuller forms in St. Paul and St. John, in which it attains to an implicit philosophy or theology, involved an actual experience of this sort, made possible by the immediate influence of Jesus on the Christian community. But in the course of time, partly because this first experience lost its first freshness and vigour, and partly under the influence of various factors in the Hellenistic environment, Christian dogma came more and more to limit the revelation to Jesus himself and to interpret the union of divine and human in him, either in such a way that the human experience was virtually denied, or, eventually, so that it appeared as an external association or alternation between the two natures. In consequence, as Green wrote in an address entitled *Faith*, delivered in Balliol College in 1877,

> 'Such terms as forgiveness, reconciliation, and salvation, instead of representing experiences of the believer, processes of his spiritual life, came to represent certain divine transactions, in which the believer had no personal part, though through faith he had the benefit of them in the acquisition of final happiness. The death and resurrection of Christ ceased to be looked upon as perpetually re-enacted in the surrender of the fleshly self and the substitution for it of a new man in the moral life. They became past events by which certain blessings had been obtained for us, or divine testimony given to an authority claiming our obedience. The identification of the believer with Christ was no longer realised through a consciousness operative in the Christian society, but was supposed to be effected in some mode, mystical not moral, by the sacraments.'[22]

[21] Green's *Works*, 2nd ed., vol. iii, p. xxxix.

[22] *Works*, 2nd ed., vol. iii, pp. 256 f.

This account of the history, whether of its first phase or of its later phases, might, no doubt, be criticized, though it contains at least an important element of truth; but, in any case, it well illustrates the characteristic idealistic interpretation of Christianity.

In the address entitled *Faith*, Green fastens upon a further point, which is important. Faith, he observes, in consequence of the development he has traced, came to bear a two-fold meaning, or at least to have a two-fold reference. On the one hand, faith is

> 'a prevailing conviction of our presence to God and his to us, of his gracious mind towards us, working in and with and through us';

on the other hand,

> 'the object of faith is declared to be the work of Christ, consisting specially in the incarnation by which he took on him our nature, in the death by which he purchased the forgiveness of sins, and the resurrection by which he opened to us the gate of everlasting life. These were events, continuous no doubt in their effects, but which took place in an historical past. Faith accordingly, as having the work of Christ for its object, is regarded as necessarily involving the belief that propositions, asserting the actual occurrence of these events, are true . . . A belief, not different in kind from the belief that Caesar was murdered on the Ides of March, must be an integral part of it, if its object is the work of Christ in the sense above explained.'[23]

Green continues:

> 'The faith then which is supposed to be demanded of us as Christians involves two elements, which, to say the least, are wholly different . . . There is thus an inner contradiction in that conception of faith which makes it a state of mind involving peace with God and love towards all men, and at the same time makes its object that historical work of Christ, of which our knowledge depends on evidence of uncertain origin and value.'[24]

Both the idealistic interpretation of Christianity and the influence of the critical doubt are evident in these passages. But there is also a further contention. It is one thing, Green urges in effect, to include established historical events in the total evidence on which religious faith is grounded; but it is quite another to suppose that their occurrence can itself be an object of faith. In the same essay he writes:

> 'As Christian theology supervened on Christian faith, the latter, pressed for its reason why, could only appeal to the ostensible facts embodied in the tradition of the Church; which was in effect to ascribe its origin to an assent given in the past to a certain interpretation

[23] *Works*, 2nd ed., vol. iii, pp. 258 f.
[24] *Works*, 2nd ed., vol. iii, pp. 259 f.

of certain events, while in truth both interpretation and assent were the result of the faith supposed to be derived from them.'[25]

Green, however, like the other thinkers of the school, was far from doubting the importance of the life of Jesus as having originated the Christian movement and its convictions[26]; and the passages quoted shew that he did not wish to interpret that life merely as a pictorial representation of a general truth. But he held that 'the practical Christian faith' does not now depend upon acceptance of the occurrence of past events:

'An assent to [historical] propositions upon evidence is no intrinsic element in it, nor that on which it ultimately depends . . . Without the Christian tradition it would not have been what it is, but a judgment as to the authenticity of that tradition, though it has hitherto followed from it almost as a matter of course, is not essential to it as a spiritual state.'[27]

Green has less to say of the actual content of the 'Christian principle,' to use the expression he, like other members of the school, is accustomed to employ. But where he formulates it the expressions used are in close harmony with the 'immanentist' tendency of his own philosophy, and with his ethical doctrine, in which the conception of self-fulfilment through self-sacrifice holds a central place. For example, he writes:

'In the higher forms of the Christian religion the spirit of man has reached that stage . . . in which the consciousness of God is a consciousness of him, no longer as an outward power, but as one with itself, as reconciled and indwelling.'[28]

And in an earlier address:

'A death unto life, a life out of death, must, then, be in some way the essence of the divine nature — must be an act which, though exhibited once for all in the crucifixion and resurrection of Christ, was yet eternal — the act of God himself. For that very reason, however, it was one perpetually re-enacted, and to be re-enacted, by man.'[29]

R. L. Nettleship summarizes Green's interpretation of Christianity thus:

'We may best conceive of God as . . . a completed self-consciousness, a being of perfect understanding and perfect love, whose life is an eternal act of self-realisation through self-sacrifice. The essence of Christianity lies in the fact that it has expressed more articulately and enforced more practically than any other religion this conception of the divine nature. In the New Testament God is described as loving

[25] *Works*, 2nd ed., vol. iii, p. 263.
[26] See, for example, *Works*, 2nd ed., vol. iii, p. 241.
[27] *Works*, 2nd ed., vol. iii, pp. 262 f.
[28] *Works*, 2nd ed., vol. iii, p. 270, *cf.* p. 263.
[29] 'The Witness of God,' an address delivered in Balliol College in 1870, *Works*, 2nd ed., vol. iii, p. 233.

> the world, as dying for it, and as living again in it, and these acts are represented not merely as events which took place once and were over, but also as an eternal life in which every man may partake if he will, and apart from which he is spiritually dead. In the latter mode of representation, as Green conceived, lies the permanent truth of Christianity, and to realise this truth for himself and others was the object of all his thinking about religion.'[30]

Edward Caird gives greater prominence in his writings to the essential content of Christianity as he understands it. For him the Christian principle is summed up in the maxim 'die to live' —'Whosoever shall seek to save his life, shall lose it, and whosoever shall lose his life, shall preserve it.' He sees this both as the fundamental principle of the moral life — and there all the idealistic writers are in substantial agreement with him — and as the principle fundamental in a philosophical understanding of the universe; and in his own thought he returns to it at all the essential points. He sees it also as the main principle of the Hegelian philosophy,[31] and in this, no doubt, he is substantially correct, though Hegel's terminology was different. Hegel spoke rather of 'die Macht des Negativen.' Goethe's lines,[32] which Bosanquet was fond of quoting, with their maxim 'Stirb und werde!', are a singularly happy example of a great Christian principle in the garb in which it was clothed by the poets and thinkers of the Romantic age. The principle well sums up the spirit of their thought; and in this, as in so much else, the British Idealists were their true followers. The maxim did not set forth an ideal of abnegation. Self-sacrifice was demanded, and it was real self-sacrifice. It is not correct to represent the ethical theories of the Idealists, still less their practical ideals, as a concealed egoism, even though at times the expressions used in their ethical writings may lend some colour to the charge. But the end of self-sacrifice was positive, an enriched not an impoverished existence; and the ideal did not stand in opposition to a full life in this world. In an address on this theme, delivered like those of Green in Balliol College, Caird wrote:

> 'We are prepared to recognise that the highest realisation of Christianity means salvation here as well as hereafter; not the renunciation

[30] Memoir prefixed to Green's *Works*, 2nd ed., vol. iii (p. xciii).

[31] Edward Caird, *Hegel*, 1883, chapter ix.

[32] 'Selige Sehnsucht' in *West-östlicher Divan*. Cf. B. Bonsanquet, *Some Suggestions in Ethics*, 1918, chapter vii.

of house and home, of property and marriage, and of commerce, science, and literature, but the infusion of a new life into them all.

'This truth is one which is constantly repeated to us, by, we might say, all the highest voices of our time, by all our great imaginative or reflective writers. Nor need we fear that we are in any way forsaking Christianity in listening to them . . . And the truth to which it is leading us in this generation seems above all to be this, that the Christian must not live mainly for another world, and seek to reach purity by escaping from earthly interests and affections; but that the way to salvation here and hereafter lies in a deeper understanding of the wonderful world in which we are placed, and a higher conception of all the ties, material and spiritual, that bind us to our fellow-men.'[33]

This outlook is thoroughly characteristic of Caird, as also of Green and Bosanquet, and indeed of the century to which they belonged. Bradley, though he was not in disagreement with it, and could at times give forcible expression to its importance, did not wholly share it.

'Our life has value only because and so far as it realizes in fact that which transcends time and existence. Goodness, truth, and beauty are all there is which in the end is real. Their reality, appearing amid chance and change, is beyond these and is eternal. But, in whatever world they appear, that world so far is real. And yet these eternal values owe their existence to finite wills, and it is therefore only each in our own world that we can come to possess them. We must till our garden awake and in no dream to gain the fruits and flowers for which alone it is worth while to live, and which, if anywhere there are better, at least to us are everything. If this is not Heaven, it at least comes nearer to the reality of the Blessed Vision than does any stupid Utopia or flaring New Jerusalem adored by the visionary. The fault of the visionary is his endeavour to find, now or in the past or future, as an existing place that Heaven which is no place, while he neglects those finite conditions by which alone Goodness and Beauty can in any place be realized.'[34]

The Hegelian and the Platonist need not, after all, be separated by more than a thin partition.

Yet Caird's outlook, while optimistic, was not superficial. Returning to the same theme in a later address, he wrote that Christianity

'called attention to the fact that the highest life of humanity is not merely something which realises itself *in spite of* the transitoriness and mortality of the individual, but that this transitoriness is just the opportunity which is necessary for its realisation . . . Hence Christ laid down a principle of far-reaching application when he declared that he who would save his life must be willing to lose it . . . It is the essential meaning of Christ's life and death that every one must die to himself in order to rise to the wider life of Christian love.'[35]

[33] Edward Caird, *Lay Sermons and Addresses*, 1907, pp. 67 f.
[34] F. H. Bradley, *Essays on Truth and Reality*, p. 469.
[35] *Lay Sermons and Addresses*, p. 269, p. 270, p. 273.

But to the question how this Christian principle, with its far-reaching application, is related to the historical Jesus, Caird gives essentially the same answer as Green — the answer characteristic of the whole Hegelian tradition. And he takes a similar view of the history of Christian doctrine. His view finds fullest expression in his two courses of Gifford Lectures on 'The Evolution of Religion' and 'The Evolution of Theology in the Greek Philosophers.'[36] It was

> 'through Jesus Christ that that capacity of men to become sons of God, which was in humanity from the first, was actualised or clearly revealed; and that, not merely in some casual voice of exalted religious feeling, or in the abstract conceptions of philosophy, but as the ruling principle of a life lived under ordinary human conditions.'[37]

Yet it was revealed, as he writes in his account of the teaching of St. Paul, in the sense that the death of Christ, understood in the light of his resurrection, was

> 'a kind of illustrated epitome, a condensed picture, which showed as by a flash of lightning the principle and meaning of the whole divinely appointed order of the world . . . Thus the law of the moral life of man . . . becomes the counterpart, as it is the highest revelation, of the love of God.'[38]

> 'It is a law of human history that principles and tendencies which are really universal, should at first make their appearance in an individual form, as if bound up with the passing existence of a particular nation or even of a single man.'[39]

It is in that sense, but not, I think, in any further sense, that, in Caird's view, the Christian principle with its far-reaching application is bound up with the historical Jesus. As he writes elsewhere, the principle is not 'distinctly expressed' so long as it is 'wrapped up in the conscious relation of the individual to One in whom it seemed once for all to be embodied.'[40] And, like Green, Caird sees in the subsequent tendency to separate Christ from humanity, and in the doctrine of two natures, a restriction of the true meaning of the Christian doctrine of the Incarnation.[41]

As I have already observed, though the main theological

[36] Edward Caird, *The Evolution of Religion*, 2 vols, 1893. See especially vol. ii. *The Evolution of Theology in the Greek Philosophers*, 2 vols, 1904. See especially Lecture xxvii.

[37] *The Evolution of Religion*, vol. ii, pp. 231 f.

[38] *Op. cit.*, vol. ii, pp. 199-201. [39] *Op. cit.*, vol. ii, p. 220.'

[40] *The Evolution of Theology in the Greek Philosophers*, vol. ii, p. 352.

[41] See, for example, *The Evolution of Religion*, vol. ii, pp. 213 ff., p. 233; *The Evolution of Theology in the Greek Philosophers*, vol. ii, p. 366.

movements of the nineteenth century, with few exceptions, were deeply concerned with the problem of the historical element in Christianity, not all of them found difficulty in assigning a unique position to the historical Jesus. For Schleiermacher, for Ritschl, and for Harnack, for example, there was no Christianity apart from Jesus Christ. So far, at all events, these thinkers were at one with the classical tradition of Christian orthodoxy. That they had assigned to him a unique position was not, in itself, the cause of the difficulties their views had later to encounter; the cause lay rather in the more particular historical presuppositions in terms of which the positions they gave to him had been defined — presuppositions which later investigation shewed to be insecure. The Hegelians, occupied with the same problem, attempted to solve it along other lines. It is of interest to note in conclusion two later attempts to solve the same problem. The first is that of the Roman Catholic Modernists. They, strongly influenced by the so-called 'eschatalogical' school of Gospel critics, were led to a sceptical conclusion in their investigation of Christian origins. They were greatly affected by what I have called the critical doubt. In consequence, they tended to acquiesce in a severance between Christian belief and its historical origins, at least in so far as its origins are ascertainable by the critical historian; but they sought at the same time to maintain the Catholic system of dogma and devotion and to support it by appeal to continuity of tradition, to religious experience, or to a pragmatic philosophy. The movement as such was short-lived, but there must still be many, both within and without the Roman Catholic communion, who occupy a position essentially the same.

The second and more recent attempt is that of the Barthian school of theologians. This school is in extreme, indeed in extravagant, reaction against the 'immanentism' of the nineteenth century, and its hostility to everything, practical and theoretical, that bears the name Idealism amounts to a polemic. The Idealists had sought to shew that Christianity was the absolute religion by shewing that in it religion itself attained its highest, and its complete, manifestation. The theologians of the Barthian school also maintain that Christianity is the absolute religion; but for them it is absolute because it has no analogy elsewhere. Like the Hegelians, though in a very different man-

ner, they too wish to win emancipation from the limitations and embarrassments of history. In Jesus, and in him only, the Word of God speaks to man. But it speaks only to faith. To the historian, the life of Jesus affords no evidence sufficient to justify the ascription to him of this unique position. Thus the biblical critics of this school, while maintaining their theological conclusion, can accept, and may even welcome, a sceptical historical conclusion. Their theological doctrine, if unsupported, is also untouched, by the conclusions of critical studies; but this result is achieved at the cost of the secularization of all other knowledge. It is clear that the radical dualism of God and man, the heavenly and the earthly, which pervades their outlook, also controls their conception of the task of the historian. If the Hegelians were unable to solve the problem of the historical element in Christianity, the Barthians have not been rewarded by greater success.

Thus the problem which troubled the nineteenth century still perplexes the twentieth. It must, I think, be admitted that the interpretation of Christianity offered by the idealistic philosophies of the nineteenth century assigned to the historical element in Christianity a meaning widely different from that which it had borne in Christian tradition. If it be felt, as I think it should be felt, that in this respect the Christian tradition enshrines a further truth of great importance, it becomes necessary to face the question how, after the changes the nineteenth century brought with it, this truth can be retained. A full discussion of that question lies beyond the scope of this paper. But I think that the historical element in Christianity will be permanently retained only if three conditions can be fulfilled. First, this ' historical element ' is not something that can be fitted into every view of the world. It requires, and must be inseparably bound up with, a general view of the course of historical events that bears a religious or theological meaning. Christian tradition had such a view, and it was derived largely from the Old Testament as that had been interpreted by the Christian Church. That view found a meaning in the course of events as a whole, and at the same time it gave value to individual persons. As I have already noted, the disruption of that view under the impact of new assumptions and new information was one of the factors which made the historical element in Christianity a problem of

acute difficulty to thinkers of the nineteenth century. A view such as the Barthian, which finds no meaning in the course of events except such as is open to the historian confined to secular values, and then, by the eye of faith, singles out one event which the historian cannot distinguish, provides no solution of the problem. Further, I think it likely that any view which could be the real equivalent in the present day of what the traditional Christian scheme, at once historical and theological, was for a past day would be found necessarily to recognize the reality, uniqueness, and irreplaceable value of individual persons. The idealistic philosophies of the nineteenth century are perhaps ultimately incompatible with that recognition. Secondly, the uniqueness ascribed to Jesus must be such as relates him coherently to such a general view. From his place in it he will then derive his unique importance, and he in turn will throw a unique light upon the whole scheme within which he stands. And thirdly, his uniqueness, though its apprehension will require moral and religious, not only historical, qualities, must be attested by sufficient historical evidence. From this last condition there is no escape. The evidence may be in various ways indirect; it may still be sufficient even though it include little direct testimony; and the testimony need not be suspect merely because it is coloured — for it may also be illuminated — by religious devotion. But a historical judgement that rests on evidence open to investigation and consequently can never be entirely immune from all possibility of doubt is still indispensable. Historical evidence may properly form part of the total evidence on which religious faith rests; and a faith that affirms a view of the world such as that here contemplated, and includes an estimate of a historical event, can never dispense with historical evidence or replace it by evidence of another sort. It must lie with the future to shew whether these three conditions can be fulfilled.

The nineteenth century was theologically of outstanding importance in that it was the first century expressly to raise the questions with which this paper has been concerned. It bequeathed them without convincing answers to its successor. The nineteenth century was also the first century fully to recognize that, by the very nature of historical knowledge, no age can ever merely inherit the historical judgements of another.

THE VICTORY-SIGN AND THE *BOOK OF DANIEL*

By the Editor.

THE origin of the victory sign and its wide-spread popularity may be as much a matter of speculation in the future as was Lilliburlero in the past. No claim, however, of Scriptural authority was ever advanced in support of Lilliburlero such as has been recently made on behalf of the Victory sign. It is asserted that this Scriptural proof is to be found in *Daniel* v, 5:

> 'In the same hour came forth the fingers of a man's hand, and wrote over against the candlestick upon the plaister of the wall of the king's palace: and the king saw the part of the hand that wrote.'

This Biblical passage has already enriched the English language with a notable phrase — 'the writing on the wall' — the sentence of judgement, the declaration of impending disaster destined to overtake some policy or institution which appears strong and triumphant to its supporters but is seen by the prophetic eye to be doomed to imminent destruction. In a wider sense, the phrase, 'the writing on the wall,' is used to denote the Divine judgement, unseen by all save the inspired seer, which is ever declaring itself in the successive and impending events of human history — Schiller's *Die Weltgeschichte is das Weltgericht.*

It was used in this wider sense by Charles Kingsley in his impromptu lines written in the album of the Crown Princess (later Empress Frederick of Germany):

> A King is dead! Another master mind
> Is summoned from the world-wide council hall.
> Ah, for some seer, to say what lurks behind —
> To read the mystic writing on the wall!

But what is to be said of the discovery of the Victory sign in the *Book of Daniel*? Little and much. Little, because apparently what has led to the discovery is that the passage in *Daniel*, when its chapter and verse are given, can be represented in

Roman numerals by two V's (V.v.). For the educated student of the Bible the V. sign thus discovered here is not Scriptural at all but the merest superficial coincidence. The divisions into the chapters and verses of our English translations of the Bible do not go back to the original *Book of Daniel* but came into existence more than a thousand years later.[1] Therefore it can be plainly said here that the Victory sign has no more Scriptural authority behind it than the chalking of the V. sign on the pavement, or the whistling of it in a cinema, possesses the promise and potency of victory for the Allies.

In the British Empire, where all are free in speech to express their loyalty to the allied cause and their conviction that in so far as that cause is the cause of freedom, justice and humanity, it will and must prevail ultimately if there be a divine government of the world, the use of the V. sign is indeed superfluous. But in the case of the continental nations, enslaved, terrorized and silenced by Nazi tyranny, the secretive and widespread use of the V. sign may well possess great value as declaring the loyalty of those who make it, to the great ideals for which their allies are waging this war and their conviction that victory must crown such heroism and sacrifice.

Although the *Book of Daniel* in the numeration of its chapters and verses contains no Scriptural authority for the Victory sign, yet the teaching of the Book as a whole can be for those who understand its background, purpose and character, no small contribution to securing the inevitable conditions of ultimate victory, and is therefore radiant with hope for every heroic loyalist.

The *Book of Daniel*, probably the latest of the Old Testament books, was born of blood and tears. It is the product of an heroic struggle and was written to inspire its heroes with the faith, courage and hope which would both promise and secure victory. The book, which is pseudonymous, was produced by the desperate struggle in which the Jews were engaged under their Maccabean leaders against Antiochus Epiphanes, King of Syria, in the second century B.C.

[1] The system of chapters and verses into which the Scriptures are now sub-divided used to be attributed to Hugo of Lyons who lived in the thirteenth century, but it seems probable that it is even later than his day.

Antiochus Epiphanes was a ruler of great ability, dominated by the political ideal of uniting all his subjects of many races, religions, and civilizations by conforming them all to the Greek ideal of life — and let it be remembered that the Greek ideal of life was in many respects the most wonderful which humanity has ever known. As he reflected on Greece's contribution to human culture Professor T. H. Huxley exclaimed: 'It is the Greeks, not the Jews, who are the chosen people.' All in the wide dominions of Antiochus Epiphanes submitted to his policy of Hellenization — what in modern phrase we should call his ideology. The only exception was the Jews and then at first only a very small number of them. A small body of Jews led by an aged priest and his heroic sons refused to submit. Loyalty to the God of Israel, loyalty to the divine law which was their most precious possession, compelled them to oppose the Greek tyrant. 'I have set thy sons oh Zion against thy sons oh Greece' (*Zech.* ix, 13). Sober-minded Englishmen will ask: Was no compromise possible. No: not then nor in those circumstances: it was achieved later. I refer to that process, initiated by Philo the Jew, carried forward by the Greek Fathers, and consummated at the *Renaissance*, when 'Greece rose from the dead with the New Testament in her hand.'[2] Had the loyalists in Palestine not taken up arms, their religion and its unique contribution to the spiritual life of mankind would have been obliterated.

A period of revolt and bitter persecution ensued. Victory swayed from side to side, but in the end, although faced by overwhelming odds, the Jewish loyalists and heroes secured the religious right — freedom to worship God and to live in accordance with his law — for which they had contended. The *Book of Daniel* was, as we have said, born of this struggle. But what manner of book is it? It is not history, although the Christian Church for centuries has interpreted it as though it were. To

[2] See *The Christian Platonists of Alexandria*, by C. Bigg (Bampton Lecture, 1886).

The Influence of Greek Ideas and Usages upon the Christian Church, by E. Hatch (Hibbert Lecture, 1888).

The Platonic Tradition in English Religious Thought, by W. R. Inge (Hulsean Lectures, 1925-6).

view it in that way is utterly misleading and lands the modern reader of the book in difficulties, even absurdities. We can gain no historical facts from the *Book of Daniel* either about Daniel himself and the period in which he lived or about the later period of the great Maccabean struggle. If we desire to learn the history of that revolt we can read it related with a high standard of historical accuracy and moving simplicity in the *First and Second Books of Maccabees* — that kind of history which is indeed 'a cordial for drooping spirits.' True the *Book of Daniel* is also a cordial for drooping spirits but the cordial is the product, not of historical narrative, but of religious faith and prophetic vision. The book consists of twelve chapters: the first six chapters relate stories of Daniel and his companions and the last six chapters relate Daniel's visions. All are imaginary. The *Book of Daniel* is one of the world's great books of fiction, and at the same time it is the vehicle of life-giving truth. Our modern Biblical studies have enabled us to understand its literary character in a way which was hidden from our fathers. Three technical terms may be used to describe it: *Midrash* (research), *Haggadah* (narration), *Apocalyptic* (unveiling). The first six chapters are *Midrash* and *Haggadah*: the last six *Apocalyptic*. This kind of literature is essentially Jewish in its method and aim. *Midrash* and *Haggadah* are produced by research into what is regarded as the full and inner significance of some message or incident in Holy Writ. It is not literary or historical research as modern scholars practise it. It is prompted by religious and moral feeling and is primarily devotional and mystical. It takes a phrase, or it may be a narrative, and by expanding it with the aid of symbolism and imagination, it draws out meanings of moral and spiritual significance. *Apocalyptic* on the other hand starts with no literary basis as does *Midrash* and *Haggadah*, but is purely visionary. The seer in this case, rather than the rabbinical scholar, beholds visions in which the future events of human history are unveiled to his eyes and their significance interpreted to his understanding. Such then is the *Book of Daniel*. What is its significance and what is its message?

It was written to inspire the Maccabean loyalists with a spirit which can never know defeat even although the bodies

in which that spirit dwells may suffer death, destruction and decay. Its message is fourfold.

(1) That the Most High rules in the Kingdom of men and gives it to whomsoever he will. Above the human monarchs, despots, tyrants and potentates sits throned invisible the King of Kings, and all human power as also the final destiny of humanity is in his hands. Despots and their subjects are slow to recognize this reality. Such was the case with Nebuchadnezzar, the great Sovereign of the *Book of Daniel*, who boasts: 'Is not this Great Babylon which I have builded?' and demands that all his subjects shall worship the image of gold which he has set up. The truth of the divine supremacy Nebuchadnezzar only learns after he has been driven forth from the habitation of men to live the life of a brute until 'seven times' had passed over him. Belshazzar, his son, fails to recognize this truth, and the sentence which pronounces his downfall and the overthrow of his empire is inscribed in the mystic writing on the wall of his palace on the night when Belshazzar was slain and his capital captured.

(2) That, in the course of human history, kingdom overthrows kingdom and empire succeeds to empire; all of varying character and quality—kingdoms of gold, silver, bronze, iron. Yet this sad series of conflict and destruction is not without meaning. It is the expression of a divine purpose and policy. It is preparing the way for the advent of an Empire which shall express the divine ideal of righteousness and inaugurate the Kingdom of the Saints of the Most High—the Divine Kingdom upon earth that must succeed all other kingdoms and empires but shall itself know no successor. This is the *Book of Daniel's* philosophy of history.

(3) That there is only one supreme loyalty—loyalty to the Most High. No authority which is in opposition to his authority may be acknowledged or obeyed. The *instans tyrannus* who will cast men into the fiery furnace or into a den of lions because they refuse to obey his decree must be defied to the face by those who are loyal to God whose authority the tyrant blindly defies.

(4) That the loyalist who is loyal to God in the face of threats, torture, death, will find that the God to whom he is loyal will

also prove loyal to him. With the three children in the burning fiery furnace walks one who is 'like unto the Son of Man.' When Daniel was cast into the lions' den, the Lord sent his angel to stop the mouths of the lions.

This is the fourfold message of the *Book of Daniel* to those who were called upon to face the avalanche of persecution and warfare which befell the Jews of Palestine in the days of Antiochus Epiphanes. In that fourfold message is included the promise of inevitable triumph for the loyalist and the martyr. But the *Book of Daniel*, at least in its *Midrash* and *Haggadah* sections, is marked by a limitation which is not true in many cases to human experience. It teaches that God's government, God's righteousness, God's deliverance, will operate triumphantly on the level of human history — on the plane of man's experience in this world.

There was another book inspired by the period of Maccabean loyalty and heroism which is of greater moral and spiritual quality than the *Book of Daniel*, and like the *Book of Daniel* it is pseudonymous. It is entitled the *Wisdom of Solomon*.[3] The fourfold message of the *Book of Daniel* constitutes its basic conviction, but the *Wisdom of Solomon* transcends the *Book of Daniel* in one most important point. It recognizes — and how true is this to our human experience — that God's government, God's justice, God's deliverance do not operate triumphantly in the sphere of our normal human experience in this world, where loyalties are not delivered from the burning fiery furnace nor from the mouth of the lion, where women do not receive their dead raised to life again, and where although the armies of the Aliens may be turned to flight, it is not the loyalists and heroes who turn them to flight who survive in this world to celebrate the victory (*Heb.* xi, 33 *et seq.*). The writer of the *Wisdom of Solomon* sees another world above and beyond this one into which the loyalists and the heroes win through and receive their full reward.

> 'The souls of the righteous are in the hand of God . . . In the eyes of the foolish they seemed to have died . . . But they are in peace . . . Their hope is full of Immortality . . . For God made trial of them and

[3] It was probably written about a century before Christ. It belongs to the Greek Period, but its date is uncertain.

> found them worthy of himself. As gold in the furnace he proved them . . . And the Lord shall reign over them for evermore. They that trust in him shall understand truth. And the faithful shall abide with him in love: because grace and mercy are to his chosen' (The *Wisdom of Solomon* iii, 1-9).

The veils of space and time roll back and the victory disclosed is one of unearthly splendour consummated in that eternal world into which neither death nor sin can enter for the former things save in the values which they have created are passed away. This is the victory teaching of the age which produced the *Book of Daniel*—the product of a nation's sacrifice and suffering, loyalty and heroism. It was a people's steadfastness to God in the face of anguish and peril which secured for it not only victory and the freedom and justice which that victory achieved, but also insight, deeper insight and further insight into moral and spiritual truth which constitutes the eternal foundations of right human society, whether in this world or in that which is to come.

A REVISED SERVICE OF INFANT BAPTISM*

It is desirable that a simple address be given on the meaning and value of Baptism.

The Parents and Godparents standing at the font, the Minister shall say:

Hear the words of the Gospel according to Saint Mark, written in the tenth chapter at the thirteenth verse:

They brought young children to Christ, that He should touch them; and His disciples rebuked those that brought them. But when Jesus saw it He was much displeased, and said unto them, Suffer the little children to come unto Me and forbid them not, for of such is the Kingdom of God. Verily I say unto you, whosoever shall not receive the Kingdom of God as a little child he shall not enter therein. And He took them up in His arms, laid His hands upon them and blessed them.

*A Revised Service of Infant Baptism, included in *Prayer Book Services Revised*, by H. D. A. Major, was published by B. H. Blackwell in 1936. That Service, further revised by R. D. Richardson and H. D. A. Major, is published here. Criticism and suggestions are invited.

Beloved, we hear in this Gospel that our Saviour Christ commanded the children to be brought to Him, and blamed those that would have kept them from Him. We perceive how by His outward gesture and deed He declared His good will toward them, for He took them in His arms, laid His hands upon them and blessed them. Wherefore, being fully persuaded of the goodwill of our Heavenly Father towards *this child*, you have come here to acknowledge *him* a child of God, to claim membership for *him* in Christ's Church, and to promise that *he* shall be brought up to lead a godly and a Christian life.

Let us pray.

O Heavenly Father, we give Thee hearty thanks that Thou hast called us to the knowledge of Thy grace and faith in Thee. Increase this knowledge, and confirm this faith in us evermore. Bless us, and *this* Thy *child* whom we present before Thee now with grateful hearts. And grant that being brought up in the true knowledge of Thee and of Thy Son Jesus Christ, *he* may be steadfast in faith, joyful through hope, fervent in love, and ever walk in the way that leadeth to eternal life, through Jesus Christ, our Lord. *Amen.*

Then shall the Minister speak to the Parents and Godparents as follows:

Beloved, by bringing this child* to be baptized you have signified your desire that *he* should become a Christian.

* *If there be more than one child, the Minister shall here turn himself to each child present.*

Will you then faithfully teach *him* to resist all evil?

Answer. I will.

Will you take care that *he* be instructed in the Christian Faith?

Answer. I will.

Will you diligently train *him*, by precept and example, to keep God's holy will and commandment and to walk in the same all the days of *his* life?

Answer. I will.

Let us pray.

O Heavenly Father, grant to *this child* the strength to withstand evil and to overcome temptation. *Amen.*

Grant that *he* may know the power of victorious faith, and may evermore put *his* whole trust and confidence in Thy mercy. *Amen.*

Grant that whosoever is here dedicated to Thee may receive the true Baptism of the Spirit, and that all things belonging to the Spirit may live and grow in *him. Amen.*

O Lord and Heavenly Father, whose Beloved Son, our Saviour Jesus Christ, was Himself baptized, and by His Spirit gave commandment to His disciples to teach all nations and baptize them; Grant that this Baptism with water may be to us in very truth the sacrament of the hallowing of heart and life; And that *this child*, now to be baptized, may come to know the fulness of Thy grace and daily power to cleanse and strengthen; through Jesus Christ our Lord. *Amen.*

Then shall the Minister take the child into his arms and say:

Name this child.

Then, naming it, he shall baptize it, saying:

N. I baptize thee into the Name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Spirit. *Amen.*

or

N. I baptize thee in the Name of Jesus Christ. *Amen.*

Then shall the Minister say:

We receive *this child* into the congregation of Christ's flock, and do sign *him* with the sign of the Cross, in token that hereafter *he* shall not be ashamed to confess the Faith of Christ crucified, and manfully to fight under His banner against all evil, and continue Christ's faithful soldier and servant unto *his* life's end. *Amen.*

Let us pray.

We yield Thee hearty thanks, most gracious Father, that it hath pleased Thee to receive *this child* into the fellowship of

Christ's Church. Humbly we beseech Thee that *he* may be brought up to lead a godly and a Christian life, and following the example of our Saviour Christ be made like unto Him; Grant that as He died for us, so may we all who are baptized die daily unto sin and live unto righteousness, and ever abide in the family of Thy loyal and loving children; Through the same Jesus Christ our Lord. *Amen.*

As our Saviour Christ has taught us, let us say together:

Our Father, which art in heaven, Hallowed be Thy Name; Thy Kingdom come; Thy Will be done, in earth as it is in heaven. Give us this day our daily bread; And forgive us our trespasses, as we forgive them that trespass against us; And lead us not into temptation, but deliver us from evil; For Thine is the Kingdom, the Power and the Glory, for ever and ever. *Amen.*

Then, all standing, the Minister shall say:

Beloved, you have promised that you will train *this child* to be a Christian: I therefore urge you in the name of our Lord Jesus Christ, the Lover of little children, that you fail not in this your promise. Earnestly endeavour, I beseech you, to fit yourselves for the faithful discharge of your duty in this matter, and let your daily life be such that *this child* may ever look on you with love and reverence, and learn the lesson of true religion from your life as well as from your lips.

You are to take care that *this child* be taught to practise Prayer and Public Worship; and that when *he has* reached years of discretion *he* be brought to the Bishop to be confirmed, and so become a *full member* of the Church to which *he has* now been admitted.

Then shall the Minister let them depart with a blessing:

The Peace of God which passeth all understanding keep your hearts and minds in the knowledge and love of God, and of His Son, Jesus Christ, our Lord. *Amen.*

or

The grace of our Lord Jesus Christ, and the love of God, and the fellowship of the Holy Spirit be with you all. *Amen.*

THE MODERNIST REVIVAL*

By the Rev. Hubert Handley, M.A.

'Come from the four winds, O breath, and breathe upon these slain, that they may live.' (Ezekiel xxxvii, 9.)

THE great religious revivals of history are of vast sweep and absorbing interest: in India, Buddhism; in Arabia, the rise of Islam; in Western Christendom, Catholicism and the Reformation. I have not anything approaching the range and depth of knowledge to picture these mighty growths or agitations. We will come down to a modest sphere of events and influence — in our own loved land, England, and roughly in our own times: (1) the Evangelical revival here of the eighteenth century, (2) the Catholic revival of the nineteenth. The former stands before us full of life and human kinship in the Journal of John Wesley; the latter proclaimed its own origin and key-note in the Assize Sermon at Oxford by Keble, preached in 1833. We all have learned and gained from these two sacred movements — their eagerness, their spirituality, their sacrifice. They have made their contribution and have taken their place in what to us is a treasure and a trust beyond words — the Christianity of England.

We, Liberal Churchmen, think that these two revivals lacked one essential note of vitality — the appreciation and absorption of growing *knowledge*. They were prepared to ignore, even to defy and combat *knowledge*. The circle of their theological confession was not large enough; it *cracked* here and there under pressure of the gradual, God-given disclosures of natural science and historical criticism. We do not pretend that all the mistakes here were on one (the Church) side; the prophets of science seem to us sometimes to have been blind, narrow, arrogant; but they had a message from on High in the realm of what used to be called the temporal, while we had a

* An Address prepared for delivery in Ripon Hall Chapel, Long Vacation Term, 1941.

message in the realm of the eternal. If only we and they could *understand* and co-operate!

There, my younger hearers, lies your mission—to pray, work, and suffer for that end. I wish particularly not to lecture you, the privileged students of Ripon Hall; not talk down to you; we are all on a level here. But I, an old man, cannot think of your call unmoved—so grand and healing, for yourselves and for this loved land and Church. The time is ripe; your turn has come. '*Ye shall receive power, after that the Holy Spirit has come upon you.*'

The peace-making has begun. Gifted minds and brave men are striving on both sides towards co-operation. I will notice three little books which I hold in my hand—small books, but of great significance, declaring the key positions. (1) Eddington's *Science and the Unseen World;* (2) Rashdall's *Jesus, Human and Divine*; (3) Inge's *Personal Religion and the Life of Devotion.*

I. Take the representative of science first. Sir Arthur Eddington is a Fellow of the Royal Society and Professor of Astronomy at Cambridge. He is a Quaker. He concedes the point between us thus: 'Are we, in pursuing the mystical outlook, facing the hard facts of experience?' He answers, 'Surely we are.' Again, 'Natural law is not applicable to the unseen world behind the symbols . . . You cannot apply such a scheme . . . any more than you can extract the square root of a sonnet.' 'If we *have* our relationship with God, the most convincing disproof is turned harmlessly aside. If I may say it with reverence, the soul and God laugh together over so odd a conclusion.'

II. Come now to the religious side of the co-operation. Paulus, the eminent German rational critic, states our creed in a nutshell with his dying words, '*There is another world.*' Sir Leslie Stephen, in his *History of English Thought in the Eighteenth Century*, not writing from the specifically Christian standpoint, declares that during that period '*Wesleyanism*' is '*by far the most important phenomenon*' (italics added). Dean Rashdall represents religion out-and-out with surpassing right and authority. 'He brought,' says the Memorial Tablet in New College, Oxford, 'to the service of his age a rare passion for

virtue, knowledge and truth.' Here in this little book *Jesus, Human and Divine*, is Rashdall's exposition for to-day of the monumental doctrine of the Divinity of Christ.

> 'We see in the fully-developed doctrine of the person of Christ [in the Creeds] the expression in the language of a bygone philosophy of that which still is and, I believe, always will be, the central truth of Christianity, namely, that in the life and character, the teaching and the Personality of Jesus Christ the world has received its highest revelation of God, a revelation, however, which is still being continued and further developed in the work of God's spirit in other human minds, and particularly in the society of Christ's followers.'

Lastly, let us hear the dominating mystical note in the chorus of Christian Belief; sounded by Dr. Inge, who has been a protagonist of Mysticism since those early days of the Bampton Lectures in 1899. It sounds now in his beautiful little book, *Personal Religion and the Life of Devotion.*

> 'There does not seem to be any reason why the testimony of the mystics should be less trustworthy than that of other specialists.' 'At the core of every man's soul, deeper even than consciousness, lies the hidden man of the heart who can hear God speak . . . The soul may have wandered far from it's true home; but when it meets one who *has been there*, it will spring to meet him.'

Dr. Inge asks for himself and for others the searching question: 'Who are the people who have really helped me?' He thus replies:

> 'They have been, I think, laymen more often than clergymen, women perhaps more often than men, the occasions have been most trivial, the words spoken and the things done have been slight and unpremeditated. They have been sidelights upon the person's character, peeps into the life of one whom God hides privily by His own presence from the provoking of all men; whose mind is kept in perfect peace because it is stayed on God; of one who sees God because his heart is pure. It is the sudden sting of self-reproach, the shame of the contrast, the longing to be like such an one, to see things as he sees them that sticks in a man's mind, and sends him to his knees as soon as he is alone.'

Young brothers, may God in his almighty mercy help you and me to be like that!

SPEAKING THE TRUTH AND SOME OF ITS PROBLEMS

By Canon W. H. Rigg, D.D., Archdeacon of Bodmin and Vicar of St. Mary Magdalene, Launceston, Cornwall.

PILATE'S famous question, 'What is truth?' is one of the most difficult problems in philosophy. Fortunately for us it is not necessary to consider such theories as that truth is a correspondence of the idea with reality, or the view that 'truth is in its essence systematic coherence,' not to speak of the Pragmatist view associated with the late Professor James,

> 'the true is only the expedient in the way of thinking, or roughly that is true which works.'

Important as these theories are, and I for one do not wish to underrate their importance, they are not our immediate concern. 'Truth' in the sense in which the word is employed in this paper is related to conduct. It betokens the attitude a man should adopt towards himself, towards society of which he is a member, and to the universe of which he is a part.

Taking this last first a few words are necessary. A man may be upright in his dealings with his fellowmen, honourable in all his undertakings, free from deception and a man of his word, and yet at the same time be no lover of the truth for its own sake. In this sense there is much to be said for the late Baron von Hügel's contention that truth is not one of our national virtues. Speaking of a Germany which had not fallen under the terrible blight of the all-pervading and all-embracing system of Naziism,

> 'Theory, system, *Weltanschauung,* is, for the average Englishman, something that instantly puts him ill at ease, or at least something that he disbelieves and avoids; for the German, it is in his very blood,'

and he relates how a young German scholar, and pastor quite recently reported to him, as his main and unexpected observation made during the half-year he had just spent amongst all kinds of religious groups in England,

> 'the very general unpopularity, not of Roman Catholicism (as he had forecasted), but of Unitarianism; and how he had finally discovered

> that this widespread dislike sprang mostly, not from any sensitive orthodoxy, but from the deep-rooted, ever alert, antipathy of the averagely pure Englishman to everything deliberately systematic, intellectualist or doctrinaire.'[1]

The antipathy of our countrymen to any theory which has to be thought is, alas, often due to laziness on their part, aversion to acquaint themselves with the facts which arise from the uncomfortable feeling that their whole mental outlook may require considerable adjustment in order that the new ideas may be taken up and form part of their experience. There is from the intellectual point of view such a thing as taking up one's cross and following the Master, which must be a painful process. On the other hand no nation understands better than the British the importance of honesty and truth in the relations existing between man and man. No one gains a real hearing for long unless his word is his bond and he speaks truth to his neighbour. Truthfulness implies far more than speaking the truth. A person's language may be formally correct and yet he himself be quite insincere. If he is gifted with readiness of speech and possesses a dexterous tongue, he may frame his statements in such a manner that they may be susceptible of many interpretations, and thereby save himself from being convicted of verbal falsehood. Paradoxical as it may sound, situations can arise where untruthful speech may be a duty, but a man ought to be truthful in all circumstances. How imperative it is that both preacher and teacher should bear this in mind, for should the impression get abroad that they are not quite sincere their usefulness has been to a considerable extent impaired.

Nevertheless they cannot fling the truth at their hearers regardless of what they may feel or think. To speak the truth, as it has often been observed, requires two people, one to say it, the other to receive it. Hence a wise teacher will frame the lesson he gives to the members of his class in such a way as to leave a correct impression upon their minds, his subject matter being adapted to the particular stage of mental development which they may have reached at the time. Likewise the preacher in preparing his sermon must always be picturing the kind of audience he will be addressing. Knowing their lives,

[1] *The German Soul* (1916), pp. 125 ff.

he will try and find out the best method of approach for the purpose of impressing upon them the truths they are capable of receiving. Now, all language is symbolical, and it can never therefore be an exact expression of a person's meaning. Our past experience colours all that we say, and the same law applies to our hearers. All will be agreed that where possible the kind of sermon suitable for a morning congregation should not be delivered to an evening congregation. In addressing children a particular style is required quite other than the one adopted towards grown-up people. Obviously a sermon suitable to those living in country districts might hardly be understood by those living in one of the congested areas of a big industrial city, and *vice versa*.

Our difficulties, however, do not end here. There is the critical view of the Bible which is taken for granted amongst theological scholars and writers. The preacher himself shares their attitude, but this does not apply to many of his hearers, who still retain very conservative views about the Bible. What is he to do, *e.g.* on Septuagesima or Sexagesima Sunday? Supposing he baldly states that the stories in Genesis are folklore, in all probability he will convey a very false impression to the majority of his congregation. Quite a number of them may refuse any literal credence to what is contained in the earliest book of the Bible, earliest being used not in the sense of chronology, but of the order in which it comes in our Bible, or they may reply, 'If one book is treated in this way, what is there to prevent the other writings in the Bible from being treated in a similar fashion, and thus is one led to disbelieve in the Bible as a whole'? I speak from experience, but the preacher will be well advised to measure his words and frame his addresses in such a manner that whilst to the discerning hearer he is very far from committing himself to their literal accuracy, yet whatever view may be entertained concerning them the accounts in the early chapters of *Genesis* convey spiritual truth of the highest importance. Pictures are often more profoundly true than photographs, even though liberties are taken in the details.

Supposing a child asks you what is heaven like? Being very small he may interrupt your description with the question whether Teddy bears exist in heaven? If you say 'no,' your answer in

his eyes means that it must be a very dull place or state of existence. In order to convey a right impression it may be necessary to sacrifice verbal correctness, and answer 'most certainly,' or if it is preferred, 'If you like to have your Teddy bear with you I am sure God will allow you to have it, as He is your Father and loves to see His children perfectly happy.'

From the subject of imparting truth let us pass on to the consideration of whether it is ever justifiable to tell a lie. At the outset we must remind ourselves that no moral principle should be considered in isolation from any other, that is, without any reference to the end or standard of goodness from which it derives its meaning and function. Morality does not consist of a number of maxims unrelated to each other and nothing more, but it forms an organic whole. Take any one principle and push it to an extreme, and sooner or later it will land him who adopts it in self-contradiction. The command, 'Thou shalt not take away thine own life' is a moral precept and of binding obligation. Taken by itself, however, it implies that a man should never sacrifice himself for the good of his family, or defend his country at the cost of his own life, or give himself for any high or lofty cause. William Law never sent any beggar away from his door on the principle of 'give to him that asketh thee, and from him that would borrow of thee turn not thou away.' The result was that the neighbourhood in which he lived became the happy hunting ground of wastrels and undesirables. Without being strict Sabbatarians it is desirable that Sunday should more or less be a day of rest, but to make the cessation of Sunday work an absolute rule would involve untold hardship on countless people. The sick and the suffering would be left to fend for themselves and the animals go unfed. Similarly to speak the truth regardless of consequences is not always right. Nietzche's sarcasm is not altogether unjustified, "'the truth must be told even if the world should be shivered in fragments'—so cries the eminent and grandiloquent Fichte, 'Yes, certainly; but we must have it first.' What he really means, however, is that each man should speak his mind, even if everything were to be turned upside down. This point, however, is open to dispute."[3] What

[3] *The Dawn of Day*. English Translation by J. M. Kennedy, p. 285.

are called 'formal lies,' where there is no intention to deceive, may be dismissed at once, *e.g.* at the beginning of a letter, 'Dear so and so.' In Yorkshire it is a fairly common custom when people meet you for the first time to say 'I am pleased to meet you,' when there is no reason at all why they should be so in the very least. On saying goodbye, after some gathering, 'Thank you so very much. It is so kind of you to have asked me.' A rather more doubtful case is when Mrs. 'A' gives instruction to the maid that 'she is not at home,' though she has not gone out of the house. It is a *façon de parler*, only it should be brought home to her maid that it is such, and behind it there is no intention to deceive. It means, 'I do not receive to-day.'

Most moralists are agreed that when two countries are at war with each other, inasmuch as for the time being all social relationships between either side are in abeyance, confidence and trust being destroyed, deception of all kinds is legitimate. Even the late Professor Lemme, who was distinctly of the Rigorist school, allowed this to be an exception; his words are, 'deliberate deception by untrue speech is with the exception of the state of war to be rejected in all cases.'[4] Admittedly deception in war cannot be avoided. The whole art of strategy is based on the attempt to deceive the enemy. Feints are made to divert his attention from the main attack which will be hurled against him and thereby lessen his resistance when it actually comes. It is also taken for granted that each country has its own system of espionage. But we cannot assent to Lemme's words without any qualification. An army which encourages its soldiers at certain times to wear the uniform of the enemy should incur universal condemnation, and it seems only right that those who are discovered doing this should not be taken prisoners but shot at sight. Again, men carrying the white flag for the purpose of surrender or parleying with the foe, and then under its protection opening fire upon those who go out to meet them are guilty of the basest treachery and deserve very short shrift.

Although all relations between nations at war are suspended for the time being, yet neither of them should lose sight of the possibility of social relations being resumed after hostilities have

[4] *Christliche Ethik* (1905). ii Band. S. 769.

ceased. Both have a duty towards God as well as to man. If long views are taken, the side which narrows the field of deception to its utmost limits will win the confidence of mankind. Leaving on one side war conditions which are abnormal, there are situations which present a conflict of duties or, as we prefer to say, a conflict of claims in the most ordinary lives.

A mother who is about to have a child is dangerously ill; it happens that in the next room her little girl is dying. The doctors have expressed the opinion that should the mother receive a shock of any kind they could not answer for the consequences. Most of us, I imagine, would not hesitate to tell her a lie in order to protect her life and that of her babe. But there are certain difficulties. Afterwards, on learning the true state of affairs, the wife's confidence in her husband's veracity would be severely shaken. This lie could never again be repeated did she happen to fall ill once more and she was anxious to know the state of health of somebody who was near and dear to her. Not only would the wife's confidence in her husband's veracity be severely shaken, but his answer might affect both his and her friends and acquaintances. They likewise might cease to believe in his word. Further, it may be argued that the lie told by the husband to the wife indicates a very defective belief in God's love and providence, Who, if He sees fit, will preserve her from fatal consequences should the truth be told or will at all events do all things for the best. But this assumes that in all circumstances a lie is never justified.

Another example may be given. A burglar breaks into a house where her mother and her children are alone, there being no man on the premises. Would she not be justified in taking up a pistol with an empty barrel, threatening to shoot him did he look as if about to offer violence, or might she not pretend that her husband was close at hand, and call him by name in the hopes that the intruder would betake himself to his heels, and both she and her children remain unmolested? We believe that her action would be justified. By his action the burglar has put himself out of the pale of society, at any rate for the time being, forfeiting all claims of trust and confidence. The truth is not due to him. The mother on her side has a duty she owes to her

own self-respect, as well as being under the obligation of preserving the lives of her own children. Had she neglected to use all the means she could to ensure their safety she would be guilty of negligence and meet with universal condemnation.

Our last instance is the well-known case of Jeanie Deans, who was tempted to give false evidence on a single point for the sake of saving her sister of whose substantial innocence she was assured. It may be remembered that Scott did not allow Effie to be executed as the result of her sister's truthfulness. From one point of view let it be assumed that she had to suffer the extreme penalty of the law. In discussing this problem Dr. Kirk says that no serious-minded Christian could really have advised Jeanie to lie in cold blood. In reply it is difficult to see how anyone could be cold-blooded were he to be brought face to face with such a tragic situation. It may be objected that if it is allowed that a witness may lie in this respect, then what is there to prevent others from copying her example; but this is ruled out as the secret of the falsehood could have remained with Jeanie, and no one but herself need have been the wiser for it. Dr. Kirk says that if Jeanie had told a lie it would have resulted in lifelong distress, questioning and shame which would have made her life unbearable to herself and useless to others.[5] But in reply the reverse might equally have had the same effect. Jeanie might have argued, 'By telling a lie I could have saved an innocent person from being put to death, and she would have been filled with remorse at not having taken this step.' Whichever course is taken Jeanie would have had much searching of heart. If the peculiar sanctity of the relationship between the individual and the society towards which she owed everything in life would have been violated by the lie, even though society remained unconscious of the fact it may be argued on the other hand that society is also injured by having been party to the condemnation to death of an innocent person. This seems to be a case of where it is very difficult to give a simple 'yes' or 'no.'

Some of us parochial clergy who have had a fairly long experience in visiting the sick are fully aware of the importance of not letting those who suffer from cancer know the nature of

[5] *Conscience and its Problems*, 1927, p. 352.

their fell disease. Often I have had to hedge when asked by the patient as to what was the matter with him, affecting a look of perplexity and asking him in turn what does the doctor say? Many doctors would feel perfectly justified in not telling their patients the truth; they would go further than withholding all information which is quite legitimate, but would if they were asked a plain question answer in the negative. This attitude is so common that did I suspect I had the disease I should not believe what was said to me.

These are just some instances where it is difficult to know exactly what line should be taken, but the majesty of truth must always be reckoned with in any particular case, and although there may be exceptions where it must be violated, they must always be regarded as exceptions which go to prove the rule.

The servant of God must pray that he may have truth in the inward parts, and knowing how easy it is to deceive himself, and the difficulty of 'thinking straight,' he must not only profess his belief in the guidance of the Holy Spirit of God but let Him mould and inspire his life. As the years pass by he will be on his guard against that 'tightness of mind' which makes good men so suspicious of each other, and acts as a drag to moral and intellectual progress, especially in ecclesiastical circles. He will have his own convictions, but will be tolerant towards others who do not share them, knowing full well that truth is of God and that no one possesses the whole of truth, and in the end truth must prevail.

'Man with his burning soul
Has but an hour of breath
To build a ship of truth
In which his soul may sail—
Sail in the sea of death,
For death takes toll
Of beauty, courage, youth,
Of all but truth.'

MASEFIELD.

THE BLOOD RITUAL IN THE OLD TESTAMENT AND ITS RELATION TO THE SACRIFICIAL SYSTEM

By the Rev. L. B. Cross, M.A., Fellow of Jesus College, Oxford; Vice-Principal of Ripon Hall.

THAT the blood ritual was an integral and important part of the later Hebrew sacrificial system, no one will deny. Its origin and significance have, however, never properly been investigated. Robertson Smith[1] assumed that in prehistoric Hebrew sacrifice the drinking of blood was the central practice of the ritual, and on this assumption he built up his communion theory of sacrifice. Buchanan Gray,[2] in propounding his gift theory of sacrifice, found in the blood ritual a difficulty which forced him to admit that in the Hebrew sacrificial system 'there is something more than, or something else as well as, gifts.' Likewise, E. O. James[3] and others assume that the blood is a kind of soul-substance offered to a supernatural being.

The failure of these scholars to bring out the real significance of the blood ritual appears primarily to be due to the assumption that, both in origin and in practice it was an integral part of the early Yahweh cult. It would seem that originally, at any rate, it had nothing to do with Yahweh, but was adopted, and later adapted by the Hebrews from their Canaanite neighbours during the long periods of religious syncretism which followed their various settlements in Palestine; we must also remember that both racially and culturally Hebrew and Canaanite were of the same stock. The facts which point to this conclusion are, first, evil and danger are frequently associated with blood; secondly, whereas the main ritual of Hebrew sacrifice is always performed at or in close connection with a Yahweh sanctuary, blood rituals, together with other rituals of a primitive nature, are frequently performed away from such a sanctuary, in most cases in places which are desert, or at any rate unpro-

[1] *Religion of the Semites*, 3rd ed., edited by S. A. Cook.
[2] *Sacrifice in the Old Testament.* [3] *Origins of Sacrifice.*

ductive from an agricultural point of view. Such places were not Yahweh's land, but the haunts of demons, of gods and goddesses of the nether regions. They as well as Yahweh had to be propitiated if life was to be lived without constant interference by some offended demon: that this was done by the Hebrews is supported by the numerous polytheistic and necromantic beliefs and practices of which the Old Testament affords abundant evidence.

Among the 359 references to blood in the Old Testament are many which, while they appear to have a Yahweh significance, closer inspection shows it to be only indirect or by implication.

In *Deuteronomy* xxi, 1 *f.* is given the ritual to be employed 'if one be found slain . . . lying in a field, and it be not known who hath smitten him.' The ritual which follows is not exactly a blood ritual in the sense that blood is poured out sacrificially; rather, it is a ritual to requite blood already poured out non-sacrificially, by murder. In such a case the elders of the city nearest by measurement to the scene of the crime are to provide an heifer of the herd 'which hath not been wrought with, and which hath not drawn in the yoke,' that is, a sacrificial animal. This is to be brought, and it is significant, not to the scene of the murder, but 'into a valley with running water which is neither ploughed nor sown,' that is, to a place specially selected for its unproductiveness. Here the heifer's neck is to be broken, not by Levites, Yahweh's special ministers, but by the elders of the city acting under their instructions. The slaughter completed, the elders then wash their hands over the heifer's body, and say, 'Our hands have not shed this blood, neither have our eyes seen it. Forgive, O Yahweh, thy people Israel, whom thou hast redeemed, and suffer not innocent blood in the midst of thy people Israel. And the blood shall be forgiven them.'

The primitive and non-Yahweh nature of this ritual is too evident to need detailed elaboration, but we may note some of its main features. The ritual, as we have noted, takes place not only away from Yahweh's sanctuary, but on desert land, the haunt of demons. The elders, not Yahweh's official sacrificial representatives, perform the ceremony. The ritual makes those

who perform it unclean. The main motive of the elders in performing the ritual was to free the land from the curse brought about by the presence of blood in its midst, that is, the fear that productive land might become unproductive. The running or ever-flowing water mentioned as present was commonly used for cathartic purposes in Semitic rituals of exorcism. Can there be much doubt that behind the Deuteronomist's attempt to give a Yahweh sanction to a non-Yahweh ritual there lies a very primitive religious custom which sought to lay the blood of the murdered man, and at the same time, and thereby, placate the local demons who had been attracted from the desert to the fertile fields by the shedding of blood without ritual treatment?

In those cases of murder in which the murderer was known, a different ritual was prescribed, though with the same object in view, namely, ridding the land of the pollution consequent upon the presence of blood (*Numbers* xxxv, 12-34). If the murder was deliberate, then the next of kin was required to slay the murderer; if, on the other hand, the murder was not deliberate, but a matter of manslaughter, then the innocent man was not allowed his freedom, but was required to dwell in one of the cities of refuge till the death of the contemporary high priest. If he left the city during that high priest's lifetime, he was to be slain as though he had been found guilty of deliberate murder, because his presence at large would bring pollution to the fertile land. In both cases blood had been shed without ritual manipulation; therefore the demon world was roused, and evil consequences could only be avoided, in the one case, by what was virtually the ritual slaughter of the murderer, in the other, by the ritual retention of the homicide under Yahweh's protection away from the land where his presence would be a perpetual source of danger to the community. Propitiation had to be made.

This association of blood with danger and with the demon world in cases of murder is brought out strongly in various parts of the Old Testament. In *Genesis* iv, 10, we read, 'The voice of thy brother's blood crieth unto me from the ground. And now cursed art thou from the ground which hath opened her mouth to receive thy brother's blood from thy hand; when thou tillest the ground, it shall not henceforth yield unto thee her strength; a fugitive and a wanderer shalt thou be in the earth.' The earth

goddess had been roused to fearful activity and vengeance by the spilling of blood; Cain, who was responsible for her unwelcome presence was to be handed over to her; he was to be a fugitive from men and from Yahweh. wherever he went would be desert, the land of demons. The same idea of chaos and destruction resulting from 'uncovered' blood is presented in *Isaiah* xxvi, 21, 'Earth also shall disclose her blood, and shall no more cover her slain'; and also in *Ezekiel* xxiv, 6-9, 'Woe to the city of bloods, . . . for her blood is in the midst of her; she set it upon the bare rock; she poured it not upon the ground, to cover it with dust; that it might cause fury to come up to take vengeance.'

Perhaps the most significant passages, however, showing the necessity of the careful ritual manipulation of blood are to be found in *Deuteronomy* xii, 13-25 and xv, 19-23. Here we read that, though sacrifice is to cease altogether at the local Yahweh sanctuaries, and is in future to be centralized at Jerusalem, nevertheless, when animals are slaughtered for domestic consumption, the blood ritual is still to continue. The blood is on no account to be eaten, but must be drained from the carcase and poured out upon the ground. What persuaded the framers of the Deuteronomic code to retain the blood ritual when they had dispensed with Yahweh's local sanctuaries, and therefore with the sacrificial rituals associated with them? Surely there can be only one answer, namely, that the blood ritual still had its significance, not in relation to Yahweh though, but in relation to local demon gods. Yahweh's presence was in future to be centred in Jerusalem, and only there could he be worshipped, but the local demons were ubiquitous and had to be propitiated wherever they might be. Wherever blood flowed, there they were. We shall have to return later to this Deuteronomic legislation, but we may note here the striking fact that its authors make so little mention of sacrifice, and none at all of the primitive rituals associated with it in the later Priestly code. They can scarcely have known nothing of these rituals, so their omission would appear to have been deliberate and was probably inspired by a knowledge of their demon association as well as by the unanimous hostility of the eighth century prophets to the whole sacrificial ritual, again probably for the same reason. The

omission of any mention of the sin-offering, for instance, is particularly significant.

A further interesting passage bringing out the danger inherent in blood not treated ritually is to be found in *I Samuel* xiv, 32. Here the people in desperation slay and eat the Amalakite cattle without a blood ritual. It is not until a great stone had been brought and set up as a pillar (*massebah*), and the blood poured out ritually upon it, that impending disaster was averted. The demons thus being satisfied, Saul builds an altar (*mizbēah*) to Yahweh. Again, so hypersensitive is David to the danger of drinking blood that he refuses to touch the water brought by his three companions at the risk of their lives (*II Samuel* xxiii, 17).

So far the examples of blood ritual have been mainly in connection either with murder in some form or other, or with the slaughtering of animals for domestic consumption. We may now turn to some specifically cult ceremonies in which blood rituals occur.

Among these is the ritual of the red heifer in *Numbers* xix, performed in the preparation of the 'water of separation.' Here Moses is represented as commanding Aaron to produce a red heifer of the sacrificial type, unblemished and unwrought. It is to be handed over to Eleazer the priest, taken outside the camp, and there slain before his face, though apparently not by him. Eleazer then commences the ritual of preparation. He takes the blood of the heifer, and with his finger sprinkles it seven times towards the front of the tent of meeting. The carcase of the heifer is then burnt in Eleazer's sight, with skin, flesh, blood and dung, and into the midst of the burning Eleazer casts cedar wood, hyssop and scarlet. This completed, both Eleazer and the man who slew and burnt the heifer are instructed to wash their clothes and their flesh, and are unclean until the evening. The ashes of the heifer are collected by one who is clean, and are placed in a clean place outside the camp where they remain, later to be mixed with water for a 'water of separation,' for impurity. Significantly, as we shall see later, they are described as a 'sin offering.' The mixture thus provided was used in cleansing persons and objects which had contracted uncleanness through contact with some unclean thing.

We may note that the whole of this ritual was performed, not only away from Yahweh's sanctuary, but outside the camp: it can therefore have had no Yahweh significance. Even the ashes thus made, called 'the ashes of the burning of the sin offering,' are kept permanently outside the camp, although in a clean place. Their ultimate use suggests strongly the practice of demon exorcism so common in early Babylonian and kindred religious systems. The sprinkling of the blood seven times towards the front of the tent of meeting — probably the entrance, where the demon of the threshold was thought to dwell — is in line with the general Semitic religious practice of smearing the lintels or tent ropes with blood to ward off evil spirits (*Exodus* xii, 7). So too can the use of cedar wood, hyssop and scarlet be paralleled from Babylonian rituals of exorcism. If this was in any way a Yahweh sacrificial ceremony, why were those who took part in it thereby rendered unclean? This did not happen in the ordinary cult sacrifices, with the exception of the sin-offering. The ritual is undoubtedly primitive, but of its connection with Yahweh worship we may be extremely doubtful; on the other hand, its connection with exorcism would appear likely both in its form and in its purpose.

Another ceremony of a similar type and having a blood ritual is to be found in *Leviticus* xiv, 1 *f*, the law for the cleansing of a leper. The leper who claims to have been healed is to notify the priest, who is to meet him outside the camp. If the priest is satisfied that the leper is cured of his disease, he is to take for the leper's cleansing two living clean birds (doves), cedar wood, scarlet and hyssop. The ritual then commences. One of the birds is slain in an earthen vessel over living water. The remaining bird is then taken together with the cedar wood, scarlet and hyssop, and all are dipped in the blood of the slain bird. The leper is then sprinkled seven times with the same blood, and is thereupon pronounced clean. The living bird is let loose into the open field. The leper now washes his clothes, bathes, shaves off all his hair, including his eyebrows, comes within the camp, and sits at the door of his tent seven days. On the seventh day the ceremony of washing is repeated, though with greater detail, and on the eighth day he is to take two he-lambs without

blemish, and one ewe-lamb of the first year without blemish, together with offerings of fine flour and oil, and is to be set by the priest with his offerings before Yahweh at the door of the tent of meeting. Then follow the various sacrificial acts graded according to their particular significance : the guilt-offering, the wave-offering, the anointing of the tip of the right ear, the thumb of the right hand, the great toe of the right foot, first with the blood of the guilt-offering, then with the oil of the wave-offering, and finally the sin-offering and the burnt-offering.

In this elaborate and complicated ritual we may note two distinct ceremonies. The first, like that of the preparation of the 'water of separation,' took place outside the camp away from Yahweh's sanctuary; the second, at the sanctuary. In the first, the whole ritual would seem to be typical of the practice of demon exorcism, and we may note that central in it is the blood ritual. What is perhaps more striking testimony to the connection of this ritual with demon exorcism is the liberation of the living bird after its blood bath. With it we may compare the liberation of the goat for Azazel in the ritual of the Day of Atonement, the one obvious example in the Old Testament of offerings being made to demon and deity in one ceremony. In the leper ritual the live bird had no doubt a similar mission and destination as had the live goat. As the goat seems to have been connected with Azazel, one of the sĕ'īrīm, so the dove was sacred to Ishtar, the goddess of prostitution. If the man's disease was venereal and not leprosy—and its description given in detail in *Leviticus* xiii does not fit the latter, then the significance of the ritual is clear. The blood exorcises the demon of disease and the bird carries it back to Ishtar whence it came, just as the goat took the sins of the nation to Azazel.

Another feature of the first part of this ceremony which would seem to support its association with demon exorcism is the double command to bathe and shave, the latter probably with a view to disguising the man should the demon return. So too the command that the leper should sit at the entrance of his tent seven days was intended to give the demon of the threshold a chance of seizing him before his presentation to Yahweh, should he desire to do so. The number seven, common in Baby-

lonian rituals of exorcism, is likewise significant. Indeed, there is nothing in the first part of the ritual which would suggest that it had any connection whatsoever with Yahweh.

The second part of the ceremony, performed at the sanctuary, appears definitely to be connected with Yahweh, though the application of the blood of the guilt-offering to the leper's ear, thumb and toe—a ritual identical with that performed on Aaron and his sons at their consecration, and reminiscent of Joab's application of blood to his belt and shoes (*I Kings* ii, 5)—may have been intended to keep away evil in the same way as did the blood on the lintels in Egypt. There can be little doubt that the blood had some kind of magical significance.

In addition to the ritual of the cleansing of a leper, there is also one for the cleansing of leprosy in houses (*Leviticus* xiv, 33*f.*). Details of this ceremony need not be given here; they are practically identical with those we have noted in the first part of the ritual of the cleansing of a leper, and point in the same way to the practice of demon exorcism. There is one important addition, however: if the house is not cleansed within seven days, the infected parts are to be taken to a desert place, and if after the repetition of the ceremony the house is still found after seven more days to be unclean, it is to be broken up and the debris taken away to a desert place, that is, handed over to the demon world.

From the passages we have already examined, it is clear that uncovered blood—that is, blood which had not been subjected to ritual treatment—was considered by the Hebrews to be a potential source of danger. We have also been led to the conclusion that certain ceremonies of a sacrificial type, involving a blood ritual and performed away from Yahweh's altar, were conducted in a manner and in places which lend support to the view that they had as their objective some kind of demon exorcism. If we are right in our interpretation of these passages, can we go further, and find within the Yahweh rituals conducted at the sanctuary evidence which would support the view that demon worship existed there alongside Yahweh worship, and was inseparably connected with it? In other words, had the blood ritual in the Yahweh sacrificial ceremonies the object of demon exorcism? There are two main ceremonies we must consider in

this connection, first, that of the Day of Atonement (*Leviticus* xvi); secondly, that used at the consecration of Aaron and his sons (*Leviticus* viii and *Exodus* xxxix).

Throughout both these ceremonies there is evident a kind of dualism, a negative and a positive ritual. On the negative side is the sin-offering, which in both cases comes first and is given great prominence; on the positive side is the burnt-offering, with the addition at Aaron's consecration of a kind of peace-offering, the ram of consecration. Not only do these two halves appear to be distinct, they appear also to have different purposes: the sin-offering that of purging or decontaminating, literally 'un-sinning' (*hittē'*), the burnt-offering and the consecration offering that of 'filling.'

In the first of these ceremonies, the sin-offering, the object presented is always an animal, either bullock, goat or lamb. It is brought to the door of the tent of meeting and there slain by the offerer, who, before killing it, lays his hand upon its head. The priest then manipulates the blood. This he brings within the tent of meeting, dips his finger in it, and sprinkles it seven times before Yahweh, before the veil of the sanctuary. He then anoints the horns of the altar of sweet incense, and pours the remainder of the blood at the base of the altar of burnt-offering (*Leviticus* iv, 4-7 and xvi, 14, 15, 18). The fat, the kidneys, and the appendage are separated from the carcase, later to be burnt upon the altar with the burnt-offering. The remainder, skin, flesh, inwards and offal, are carried outside the camp to a clean place 'where the ashes are poured out.' Here they are burnt, though on occasions the carcase was eaten by the priests (x, 16*f.*). According to xvi, 28, the man responsible for the burning must wash his clothes and bathe his flesh before coming back into the camp.

In addition to the ordinary sin-offering, the ritual of the Day of Atonement provided a further one, that of the second goat, chosen by lot for Azazel. After the first sin-offering had taken place, this second goat is brought forward. Aaron lays his hands upon its head, confesses over it all the iniquities of the children of Israel, puts them (that is, the sins) on the head of the goat and dispatches it, accompanied by a specially selected man, into the wilderness bearing with it all the sins of

the people into a 'solitary land.' Aaron then bathes in the holy place and proceeds to offer the burnt-offering. The man who takes away the goat must wash his clothes and bathe before coming back into the camp.

In these accounts of the ritual of the sin-offering it is difficult to find any features which would connect it indisputably with Yahweh worship. Excepting for the fat, no offering is made to Yahweh, and this as we have noted only later in the different ritual of the burnt-offering. The carcase, instead of being offered, is removed from the door of the tent of meeting and burnt outside the camp. The main object of the ritual throughout is not the offering of sacrifice at all, but the removal of uncleanness, the decontamination or 'un-sinning' of the altar and other furnishings of the house. On the other hand its connection with demon exorcism is borne out by the fact that the blood ritual whereby this was achieved bears a striking resemblance to that followed in the 'un-sinning' of the leprous house. In both cases the blood is applied to inanimate objects, and the same rare word *hittē'* (un-sin) is used (xiv, 49, 52). The reason given for this ritual, 'because of the uncleanness of the children of Israel, and because of their transgressions, even all their sins,' is forced, and would appear to have no relation to the ceremony performed. Had the blood been applied to the persons concerned, as was done in the case of the leper (xiv, 6), its application might have appeared to have some relevance in relation to them, but its application to the altar and furnishings has none. Only on the analogy of the leprous house does the blood ritual appear to have any meaning. It would seem that, originally at any rate, the blood was applied to remove 'uncleanness' inherent in the objects themselves, and the evidence we have already examined would seem to suggest that the 'uncleanness' was due to demon possession, and not to the sins of the people.

Other features of the ritual lend support to the same conclusions. As we have seen, not only was the man who handled the carcase of the sin-offering thereby rendered unclean, but the carcase itself had to be removed to a place outside the camp and there burnt. This place is specified in iv, 12 as a 'clean place . . . where the ashes are poured out.' It has always been identified with the place where the ashes of the burnt-offerings (vi, 11)

and other sacrifices burnt on the altar were brought daily. On the other hand, in *Numbers* xix, the ashes left over from the burning of the red heifer and used for the 'water of separation' were also deposited in a 'clean place' without the camp. We have already noted that these ashes are called 'a sin-offering' (*hattāth*) (*Numbers* xix, 9), and in verse 17 they are actually called 'the ashes of the burning of the sin-offering.' Can it be that the ashes of the sin-offering proper were used either with, or in addition to, those of the red heifer for cleansing or 'unsinning' purposes? It is interesting to note that the rare word *hittē'*, referred to above, occurs again in *Numbers* xix, 19. Whether we accept this suggestion or not, the very removal of the carcase to be burnt outside the camp implies its removal from Yahweh and a possible association with the demon world.

That all this is no mere conjecture is supported by the ritual of the Day of Atonement. Here, it will be remembered, the second goat, dispatched into the desert to Azazel, carries upon its head the sins of the people. Precisely who Azazel was is not known, but his connection with the *sē'īrīm*, hairy beings, pictured in the imagination of the Hebrews as goat-like demons, is likely. If this was so, not only do we see the point of Azazel being the recipient of the goat, but the parallel which we have already noted between this part of the ritual and the dispatch of the dove to Ishtar in the ritual of the cleansing of a leper becomes more marked. What is more important is that the intention of the ritual becomes quite clear. The first goat, like the first bird, is slaughtered and its blood used to exorcise demons lurking in the locality; the second goat, like the second bird, takes away with it the demons thus exorcised.[4] In the ritual of the sin-offering as practised on the Day of Atonement, it would seem that we have a complete picture; it was undoubtedly of great antiquity, and may well represent the prototype of which the ritual of the sin-offering as portrayed in the Priestly code was only an imperfect survival.

It is only if we suppose that the sin-offering of the Day of Atonement has some such background and purpose that any meaning can be given to it. As it stands, one or other of the goats would appear to be superfluous, and their relation to each

[4] There is an interesting parallel in the story of the Gadarene swine.

other in the ritual itself is left to the imagination, while the introduction of a bullock as a sin-offering as well as the two goats, makes confusion worse confounded. Nor is the connection between the cleansing of the altar by the application of the sacrificial blood, and the placing of the sins of the people on the head of the goat, in any way clear. We have already noted in earlier accounts of the sin-offering this loose connection which exists between the 'un-sinning' of the altar and the persons whose sins were held to be responsible for its uncleanness. In addition, we may note the pointlessness, as well as the difficulty, of slaying the animal with one hand on its head enjoined in the law of the sin-offering (*Leviticus* iv, 4); surely the hand, or the hands, were meant to be placed on the head of the animal about to be set free, so that it might remove into the desert the sins of the people, thus placed upon its head.

If we see in the sin-offering all that survives of a primitive ritual of demon exorcism in which two animals or birds were presented, the blood of the one to exorcise the demons, the body of the other to take them away to their patron 'deity,' we have a complete picture of a ritual pattern of which many parallels could be found from the rituals of demon exorcism common to Semitic and other religions. We have also an explanation of the origin and purpose of the blood ritual as practised in connection with the later Hebrew sacrificial system, but never appearing to be an integral or logical part of it. In addition, we have an explanation of the remarkable fact that the sin-offering is not mentioned in any of the earlier sacrificial codes, or, indeed, in any pre-exilic literature, and this despite its primitive character. The reason is not that it did not exist, but that the framers of the code of the Covenant and the Deuteronomic code, as well as the redactors of the early sources, knew only too well its connection with demon worship, and it never occurred to them that it should be included as belonging to the Yahweh cult. It was not until Yahweh had become sufficiently strongly established in Palestine, and the influence of monotheism was growing, that the framers of the Priestly code, with more daring than genius, attempted to give it a Yahweh sanction.

We may now turn to the second part of the sacrificial ritual, that of the burnt-offering. At first sight it would appear simple,

the offering to Yahweh of the whole animal, to be consumed by fire upon the altar, 'a sweet savour,' or, more literally, an odour of rest-giving. But what appears to be simply a gift to Yahweh is complicated by the presence of a blood ritual inconsistent with this theme. When the animal is sacrificed its blood is tossed against the four sides of the altar (*Leviticus* i, 5 and viii, 19). What is the significance of this, If the whole offering was being made to Yahweh, why was it necessary first to remove the blood before burning the carcase on the altar? Why was the blood drained off at all: why was it not offered with the carcase upon the altar? That this was possible is shown by the ritual of the red heifer, where the blood is burnt along with skin and flesh. Tossing the blood against the altar, especially in view of what we have noticed in the blood ritual of the sin-offering, hardly seems to justify the assumption that thereby it was offered to Yahweh. It is much more likely that here, too, the blood ritual was in some way a survival of a demon cult practice. It may be yet another example of exorcism, or an offering to earth-gods thought to dwell at the base of altars, especially at the base of rock-altars,[5] but of its ultimate demon association there can be little doubt. If the conclusions we have drawn from our examination of the blood ritual in the sin-offering are right, it is reasonable to suppose that they apply equally to the blood ritual of the burnt-offering. The burnt-offering, like the great ritual of the

[5] As early altars were undoubtedly of earth (*Exodus* xx, 24), the tossing and pouring of the blood on the altar would suggest the offering of it to the earth goddess (*Genesis* iv, 11), possibly Yahweh's consort. Kittel draws attention to the subterranean hollows under many Canaanite rock-altars, and suggests that these were the abodes of the earth deities. It is possible that these deities were in some way connected with the departed, and the blood was poured out at the altar to resuscitate them. In the *Odyssey*, Ulysses speaks with his dead companions after resuscitating them with blood-offerings (*Odyssey*, xi). The offering of blood to the departed underlies a great deal of Greek mythology connected with the underworld. In *Theocritus* ii, 12, Hecate is described as faring 'through black blood and across the barrows of the dead'; in an *Orphic* hymn she is described as αἱμοποτίς. Similarly *Virgil* iii 67 and vi, 248 connect blood-offerings with the departed. In *Revelation* vi, 9, 10 the souls of the martyrs were retained under the altar, waiting for their blood to be avenged. Had Hebrew sacrificial ritual the object of placating Yahweh the sky god, on the one hand, and the gods of the underworld on the other? A Babylonian epic poem, *Etana and the Eagle*, relates how the sun god feeds upon the fat tail of the sacrificial sheep, but the earth drinks the blood.

Day of Atonement, in which it formed an important part, served two cults, that of Yahweh, and that of the demons.

Throughout all the rituals we have examined there seems to run the common theme: before Yahweh can properly be worshipped, indeed, before he can even be approached, uncleanness must be removed from his sanctuary. The same theme appears prominent in *Ezekiel*, where the process of 'un-sinning' is extended beyond the furniture of the Temple to its posts, and to those of the gate of the outer court: not until this had been repeated daily for each of seven days could the burnt-offering be sacrificed (xliii, 20, 26; xlv, 19). Similarly throughout, in this process of 'un-sinning,' the blood is the medium.

The completion of the process of 'un-sinning' is technically and exactly expressed by the word translated in the Revised Version 'make atonement.' Whatever be the precise meaning of '*kipper*' and its derivatives, there seems little doubt that it carried with it the idea of removal; in the case of the sacrificial rituals, removal of ritual impurity. In the passages we have examined it is used in relation to material objects — altar, holy place, tent of meeting — as well as in relation to individuals and groups of individuals. Its meaning, its Assyrian ancestry, and its use in the Old Testament would suggest that it might almost be used as a synonym for exorcise.

Why the blood effected atonement is given in *Leviticus* xvii, 10-12: 'I have given it to you upon the altar to make atonement for your souls: for it is the blood that maketh atonement by reason of the life.' What the writer of these words meant by them is difficult to say, but there can be no doubt that he thought of the blood as in some way infusing life into whatever it touched. To him it was a tonic rather than a disinfectant, though how its presence, tossed at it was on the altar and poured out at its base, did make atonement for souls, he leaves to the religious imagination of his readers. The important thing from the point of view of this essay is that the blood was thought to be the life principle.

The conclusion we have come to, that blood was used as the medium for the exorcising of demons, demands that we should at any rate ask how it was considered to affect them. Obviously, only a primitive Semite could be expected to give an answer to

this question, and even he would probably not have been able to do so. We may, however, hazard the guess that, being bloodless and fleshless beings, the demons were thought to be propitiated or placated by the sprinkling and pouring out of the blood. Blood offered ritually to them ensured their favour, and, what was more important, warded off the results which might follow from their displeasure. There can be no doubt that the early Hebrews shared with their fellow-Semites the belief in the power of demons; the Old Testament is full of references such as support this. To them Yahweh was only one of many gods and demons — at times he is portrayed more as demon than god (*Genesis* xxxii, 24 *f.*; *Exodus* iv, 24; xii, 12 *f.*) — and they had to be propitiated as well as Yahweh. Early Hebrew religious belief and practice, certainly prior to Moses, and probably long after, differed little if at all from that of contemporary neighbours. The remarkable discoveries at Ras Shamra show this, and are particularly interesting from the point of view of ritual, for they show that a great deal of what at one time was considered to be peculiar to Hebrew religious practice was common to that of the people of Ras Shamra. What appear to be offering without blemish, peace-offering, sin-offering, burnt-offering, guilt-offering, wave-offering, and offering of first-fruits and so on, are all found mentioned in the tablets.[6]

Can we wonder that those whose clearer vision saw the dawnings of monotheism demanded not only physical separation from their neighbours, but also religious isolation? Though they could not blot out the tradition and the culture of the past, they saw to it that it was given a new interpretation. What they had to fight against is well illustrated by a passage from *Leviticus* which serves at the same time as further evidence in support of our main thesis: 'They shall no more sacrifice their sacrifices unto the he-goats, after whom they go a-whoring' (xvii, 6).

This process of isolating Yahweh and his worshippers from other gods and their devotees may well have begun with Moses; it certainly was in process at the time of Samuel. In a passage already referred to (*I Samuel* xiv, 32-35) is a striking example of the two cults existing side by side, each with its own ritual. To satisfy the demands of the local demons, Saul sets up a

[6] See *The Ras Shamra Tablets*, J. W. Jack, p. 29.

single rock altar on which the blood of the Amalakite cattle is drained out; to satisfy Yahweh's demands, he sets up an altar *mizbeah*. A further and more striking example is to be found in the account of Elijah's great challenge on Mt. Carmel (*I Kings* xviii, 19*f.*). Here the sponsors of the rival cult offer their sacrifice, calling upon the name of their god and cutting themselves with knives till the blood ran: as in the case of Saul's sacrifice no fire offering was made; it was simply a blood sacrifice. Elijah, on the other hand, builds an altar — it should be noted he does not use a rock altar — but he performs no blood ritual; he calls down fire from heaven.

This last passage is of particular interest because not only does it support the view that local Canaanite sacrifices were characterized by their blood ritual, it also suggests that Yahweh sacrifices were distinguished from them by their fire ritual.[7] Perhaps this is actually reflected in the two sacrificial terms *zebah* and *'ôlāh*, two words of which one, on the generally accepted theory of sacrifice, should be superfluous, but which in the light of what has been said above would find not only use but a new significance. The one means literally 'what is slain,' the other 'what is burnt.' Was *zebah* in origin a Canaanite term used of their blood sacrifice, and *'ôlāh* a Hebrew term used of their fire offerings? Perhaps this is the point of Amos's denunciation of the sacrificial system: 'Did ye bring unto me sacrifices and offerings in the wildnerness forty years, O house of Israel?' His inference may have been that the *zebah* was Canaanite in origin. Both he and the other prophets of the eighth century certainly objected violently to Canaanite Baal sacrifices.

We cannot conclude our examination of the blood ritual without reference to the Covenant in *Exodus* xxiv, 8. Here and here alone in the early (E) literature of the Hebrews does there seem to be some justification for the communion theory of sacrifice; the blood of the sacrifice applied to the altar and to the

[7] There is abundant evidence that Yahweh was looked upon as a 'fire' god (*Exodus* iii, 2; xix, 18; xxiv, 17; *Deuteronomy* iv, 24, 33, etc.). Perhaps it was for this reason that the burnt-offering was the *chef-d'œuvre* of Hebrew sacrifice; perhaps it was for this reason also that Hebrew children were made 'to pass through the fire' (*Leviticus* xviii, 21; *II Kings* xxii, 10, etc.); they are never referred to as 'cutting themselves with knives.'

people would suggest some kind of association between the two. In view, however, of the fact that blood covenants were commonly conducted between individuals in the ordinary pursuits and business affairs of life, the ritual need represent nothing more than a bond between Yahweh and his people which must never be broken.

There is, however, the older covenant passage in *Genesis* xv, 9*f*. which would seem to have some relevance in interpreting the blood ritual here. In obedience to the divine command Abraham takes certain animals and two birds, arranging them in the correct sacrificial order. 'And the birds of prey came down upon the carcases, and Abram drove them away. And when the sun was going down, a deep sleep fell upon Abram; and, lo, an horror of great darkness fell upon him.' Then follows the covenant: 'And it came to pass, that, when the sun went down, and it was dark, behold a smoking furnace, and a flaming torch that passed between these pieces. In that day the Lord made a covenant with Abram.' In this narrative there is a strong hint of an attempt by the demon world to frustrate the covenant. The 'birds of prey' which came down upon the carcases, and the 'horror of great darkness' which disturbed Abraham's sleep, are both as reminiscent of it as the 'smoking furnace' and the 'flaming torch' are of Yahweh. If we can infer from this an attempt by demons to frustrate the covenant, then it may be that the object of the blood sprinkling in the other covenant passage was to drive away or placate any demons which might conspire to frustrate it too.

Whatever the significance of the blood may have been in effecting the covenant relationship between Yahweh and his people, there can be no doubt as to the permanence of that relationship. Despite the fact that the worship of Yahweh went on alongside and often in conjunction with the worship of other gods, it finally triumphed over them, and this ultimate triumph was due largely to the succession of great religious teachers with which the Hebrews were blessed. Of these, the greatest were the eighth century prophets and their successors. They at any rate, together with some of the psalmists, saw no value at all in the sacrificial system; they condemned it unreservedly, and, with the exception of Ezekiel, almost unanimously. This fact,

together with their fierce denunciation of all forms of non-Yahweh worship, is surely striking confirmation of the conclusions to which we have been led.[8]

IN MEMORIAM

WALTER GODFREY WHITTINGHAM

When Walter Godfrey Whittingham came into the Diocese of St. Edmundsbury and Ipswich, of which he was Bishop for seventeen years (1923-1940), he had the reputation of a first-rate man of business, who had produced the dilapidations measure, a great boon to beneficed clergy throughout the country. But as soon as we got to know him we found that he was many things besides a good man of business. He was an indefatigable worker who made it his aim to know his diocese, an aim which he thoroughly fulfilled. He won the hearts of all wherever he went by his kindliness, his approachability and tact. While himself a man of strong convictions, he was tolerant of those who differed from him, and in all his appointments to livings made the needs and reasonable wishes of the parishioners his first consideration. Theologically he was a decided liberal and, as he once said to me, did not understand how any reasonable man could be anything else. This however did not prevent him from bestowing a Canonry on an Anglo-Catholic or an Evangelical if their work seemed to merit this distinction. Though not a great scholar or a specialist (except on Lepidoptera) he read widely and had a well-stored mind. He was extraordinarily patient and forbearing with difficult and cranky people, ever kind and helpful to those in trouble. His hospitality was great and those privileged to stay at his house were always made to feel at home. He had a keen sense of humour, which has been described as 'the parent of all the kindlier virtues,' all of which he possessed. He will be missed not only in Suffolk, where he was so well known and loved, but by all who feel how good a thing it is to have on the bench of Bishops a man of such independent judgement, broad sympathies, wide outlook and attractive personality.

E.R.B.

[8] See *Amos* iv, 4, 5; v, 21-25; *Hosea* iii, 4; vi, 6; *Isaiah* i, 11-15; *Micah* vi, 6-8; *Jeremiah* vii, 21-23; *Psalm* l, 7-14, 22, 23; li, 16*f*.

BOOK REVIEWS

A. C. BRADLEY: *POST TOT ANNOS**

'How sweet the moonlight sleeps upon this bank!
Here will we sit, and let the sounds of music
Creep in our ears; soft stillness, and the night,
Become the touches of sweet harmony.
Sit, Jessica: Look how the floor of heaven
Is thick inlaid with patines of bright gold;
There's not the smallest orb, which thou behold'st,
But in his motion like an angel sings,
Still quiring to the young-eyed cherubims:
Such harmony is in immortal souls;
But, whilst this muddy vesture of decay
Doth grossly close it in, we cannot hear it.'

Shakespeare, *The Merchant of Venice.*

Does moonlight sleep? Do the stars sing? If they do not, is the poet's vision less true or valuable? It may still be true that the vision itself, true or untrue, or the contemplation of the starlit heavens, engenders in our souls that peace and harmony, that at least partial release from 'the muddy vesture of decay,' which we crave. Such questions a philosopher or a religious man might ask about poetry and such questions Dr. A. C. Bradley, sometime Professor of Poetry in the University of Oxford and of English Literature in the University of Glasgow and a distinguished Shakespearean scholar, naturally turns upon religion itself, for poetry and religion have much in common. Both aim at a truth inexpressible completely in logical categories, and both aim at achieving an experience which is harmony and union with reality.

The first chapter, entitled 'The Ideal of the Spirit,' investigates the nature of religion. It is argued that ultimately religion is individual and personal. It cannot be purely social or corporate, nor can it consist in outward acts. It must be real in each individual soul and it must be lived to be understood. But religion includes worship, and worship is worship of something. There must therefore be an intellectual element in religion which will define what that 'something' is. That 'something' has three characteristics at least. It is superior to man in some way. It exists in some superior way without man's limitations. It nevertheless has some kinship with the worshipper and admits of union with him in some way. Moreover, between the worshipper and the worshipped there is a 'working relation,' so that the one can obtain peace or discord and the other give weal or woe according to the behaviour of the worshipper. This 'working relation' is at the root of

* *Ideals of Religion*: Gifford Lectures delivered in the University of Glasgow in 1907 By A. C. Bradley, LL.D., Litt.D. (Macmillan. 1940. 12/6.)

religion, for religion's aim is not the desire to understand things or merely to satisfy the sense of beauty or sublimity, but in some sense to escape evil and obtain good, which good may nevertheless include these other things. There will also be an emotional attitude of the worshipper to the object of religion, and this will differ according to his concept of that object and according to his own states of mind, so that it may be either sorrowful or glad, full of fear or love, according to the worshipper's concept of his God and to the nature of the ' working relation ' between them.

But mere emotion is not sufficient.

> ' A man is not religious unless his *will* is in tune with his emotions and his belief, unless he submits his own will to the divine will, and tries to fashion himself in accordance with it and to carry it out in his deeds. Till he does that, we should say, he may torment himself with fear and even with remorse, or drown himself in dreams of his god as blissful as a lover's, and none the less remain without religion ' (p. 30).

This willing, whether it be a single act or repeated acts resulting in permanent direction of the will, may be called devotion, and

> ' there is included in it, fused with the element of will, both the theoretical element of belief and the emotional element of feeling. For the devotion of the will to the object worshipped implies on the one hand an idea of the object or a belief about it, and on the other the presence in some degree of those feelings towards it of fear, reverence, aspiration, or love, which impel to union with it ' (p. 31).

The second chapter, called ' The Ideal of the Mind,' deals with progress in religion and revelation, and how the less developed forms differ from the higher. First there is the advance to monotheism and to universality and infinitude in God, and the emancipation of the idea of God from nature and from the natural or physical in man; and then follows the advance to a moral conception of God. Parallel with this progress is progress in man's idea of himself and of his relations with God. We pass from crude superstition and fear to the idea of evil as separation from God and good as union with a moral superior. Outward worship then has religious value as a means to purely spiritual activities, and through the devotion of the will outward religion will also include visiting the fatherless and widows in their affliction and all religious morality. Its sphere will thus be the whole of life.

The next three chapters entitled ' The Inadequacy of Natural Religion,' ' The Religion of Ideal Humanity ' and ' The Ideals of Seeley and Mill ' seemed no doubt in 1907, when these Gifford Lectures were delivered, to touch a more vital issue than they do to-day. Much water has flowed under the theological, philosophical and even scientific bridges since then, and neither inevitable progress nor easy optimism with regard either to certainty and final advance in scientific knowledge or to human nature is any longer possible. Man now feels that he needs both personally and socially a God who can lift him out of his petty self, can strengthen his will to good in even

human endeavours, and can unite him and his fellows in building a better world in a spirit which will transcend all merely human interests and objects, all merely human secular idealism.

These chapters will be read with interest as testifying to the noble hopes of the nineteenth century, and Bradley's criticisms in 1907 — the lack of power and goodness in the deity and the inability of man, even of Comte, to rest in, or worship, the merely phenomenal or an ideal morality not grounded in reality at the heart of things — will be seen to have been confirmed by time. The good of this type of religion lay in its conviction of the intrinsic value of certain activities, mainly moral, in its free sincerity, in its sense of social duty and in its effort to appreciate and create beauty. It had a beneficent effect on Christianity.

We pass to a chapter called 'Abstract and Concrete Idealism,' and here Bradley outlines our needs:

> 'What we want . . . is a view according to which the finite would be the partial appearance or manifestation of the infinite. All finite existence would be so. Everything would be negatively and positively related to the infinite; negatively because falling short of it, positively because manifesting it. But again these partial manifestations must not be equally partial. They must form a graduated scale from the lowest to the highest' (p. 140).

This double relationship means in the end that

> 'the reconciliation or atonement with God, which the Christian desires and obtains, he desires and obtains now. His sins are done away. He is at peace. He has eternal life. He is told to be perfect. And the idea that all this lies merely in the future and that meanwhile he is to bear the burden of unforgiven sin he would reject with horror . . . But, on the other hand, he is here in the field of time and change where neither he nor anything else can be perfect, and it is equally essential to him to look forward to a future both for himself and his brothers more blessed than the present . . . The kingdom of heaven is within or among us; and yet we pray 'Thy Kingdom come.' . . . Everywhere there appear these dual points of view, a looking at things now from the side of the eternal reality and now from that of the changing appearance or manifestation. And how should this be otherwise for a being like man who on the one side has infinity and eternity within him and therefore can conceive the eternal and infinite, and on the other is a finite creature struggling in the element of change?' (pp. 144-5).

The next two chapters discuss the relation of 'Religious Ideas and Truth,' and here Bradley's poetical interests are most evident and useful. When Shelley speaks of the wind as wailing for the world's wrong, as if it were the voice of the suffering world, is he speaking truth and in what sense? The place and importance of symbolism, imagination and pictorial representation in religion are most fruitfully discussed. Bradley's conclusion is that

> 'to almost all of us, if not all, the bulk of our higher and undoubted practical ideas are really on the same footing with religious ideas. We talk

> of mother-country, or duty, or justice, or liberty; we have not a doubt that these ideas mean realities, but we do not suppose that our country is literally our mother; and, if we were asked to give a final account which could satisfy the intellect of the meaning of the ideas of country, duty, justice or liberty, we might find ourselves in embarrassment. We know that we have a meaning . . . but we do not, strictly speaking, *know* what we mean, and therefore the ideas of country, justice, liberty are more or less symbolic, as most religious ideas are. In philosophy we try to find out what exactly their meaning is, and we have theories as to their meaning just as false to our experience as some theories about religion are to our religious experience' (pp. 205-6).

'Truth and Reality,' 'Man as Finite Infinite' and 'Good and Evil' form the final chapters, and the question why some religious people feel unable to admit symbolic statements into religion is discussed. It is maintained that religion is distinct from philosophy, for example, and what might be inadmissible in the latter is permitted to the former. Religion is concerned with union with the divine will and not with thinking alone, and intellectual activity can no more take the place of that than theology can take the place of charity or the theory of art the place of beauty. Though some will chafe at the traditional puzzles of part and whole, of finite and infinite, and of internal and external relations in which we become entangled in these chapters, and at the tendency to regard evil as illusion or mere imperfection, few will deny the truth of what Bradley is trying to express as the ideal of the religious life which is furthered by all its worship, symbolism and poetry (pp. 234-5).

> 'We cannot get rid of our finitude. There is always for us a not-self in which we find ourselves but partially; but our best moments are those in which we most get rid of the sense of opposition and separation, feel ourselves one with other selves and with everything else, so that it all seems beautiful and good. All our highest experience in feeling, perceiving, knowing, acting, is in the end a form of love, a doing away of separation. From the mere flash of joy at a beautiful sight, or the simplest act of kindness, up to that love of the many members of one body that St. Paul described, it is an experience of dissolving barriers and a fore-feeling of the divine life.'

W. Richardson.

A MODERN SIMPLIFICATION OF CHRISTIAN DOCTRINE*

Mr. Pittenger's book, *The Approach to Christianity*, was published in the autumn of 1939, but since its theme is general Christian doctrine, it is equally relevant to-day, and it is not too late to pay tribute to its qualities. Indeed, the author, who is Fellow and Tutor of the General Theological Seminary, New York, makes no attempt to set his exposition in the framework of passing events, but in 150 pages covers the whole range of the traditional divisions of Christian theology, in severely intellectual fashion.

* *The Approach to Christianity*, by W. Norman Pittenger. (Christian Challenge Series (Centenary Press). pp. 154. 3/6. 1939.)

From the Preface we gather that he has written 'for those who are acquainted with modern scientific thought and the general philosophical outlook of our age' and that his approach 'may roughly be described as Catholic and "modernist."' What this latter implies is partly indicated by the fact that among those to whom Mr. Pittenger expresses his gratitude are von Hügel, B. S. Easton, H. D. A. Major and A. R. Vidler.

The book is inevitably extraordinarily compressed, but it is never obscure, and the key points of Christian doctrine are summarized in telling fashion. Here are three examples from the early pages. Of faith he says (p. 4):

> 'it is reached in the same manner that we reach the conviction that a friend is loyal, that a lover is true';

of science (p. 9):

> 'it makes impossible any religion but the highest and purest. It rules out superstition and magical ideas . . .';

of creeds (p. 12):

> 'the important thing is not the acceptance of small bits of the creeds, but of the creeds as a whole — that is, of the creeds as affirming central truths of Christian experience';

and again on the next page:

> 'The conviction that Reality is love, that He reveals Himself through many channels and supremely in Christ, that Christ is still active in the world in the "fellowship of the Holy Spirit," that sins may be forgiven, that personality persists through death, that all life is to be redeemed by Christ's spirit — this is what matters.'

On the Incarnation and Atonement, the Miracles and the Resurrection, the Holy Spirit, the Trinity, the Eucharist, the Church, your reviewer found much to praise; here and there he had queries, *e.g.* as to the value of the Logos doctrine, the extolling of the Mother of our Lord as the chief of saints, the account of Baptism, which seems to confuse what ought to be with what is in current Anglican practice — but these are small points.

More important is the question as to how far this abstractly argued apologetic is convincing. It is when the necessities of living are seen to involve us in fundamental decisions which we cannot escape, and it is realized that the Christian understanding of life illuminates those very decisions in a way that no rival understanding of life can do, that doctrine 'comes alive.' For this reason we feel that Mr. C. S. Lewis in his recent admirable volume in the same series on *The Problem of Pain* approaches belief in God more realistically when he begins with a popular analysis of the numinous (following Otto) and of the same sense of 'ought,' than does Mr. Pittenger with his brief paragraphs on the five traditional 'proofs' of the existence of God. Again to conclude a book on doctrine with a four page 'note on social implications' as a kind of appendix, shows an odd separation of doctrine and life. Social implications cannot be tacked on to

doctrine in this fashion. Problems of society, like personal problems, arise out of the struggle to achieve God's purposes in the world He has created, and the puzzles and conflicts of personal and social life ought to be seen in their true dimension in the light of that understanding of the nature of God and His purpose which it is the task of theology to provide. Brunner, Berdyaev, Maritain and Niebuhr (to whom there is one reference) have much to teach us here. It is noteworthy, too, that apart from the intrusion of the word 'existential' Continental Protestant thought has left no trace on these pages. 'Justification by faith,' for instance, which is surely one of the key doctrines in the ethical uncertainty of our time, is never mentioned.

One may feel uncertainty as to the precise public the book was written for. Those who really understand current science and philosophy will require something more detailed. But those who are unconsciously influenced by it, and they include the vast majority with a secondary school or technical education, will be puzzled by Latin phrases and by words like pantheism, sabaoth, manicheanism, eschatology, ineffable, which are not directly explained. (Your reviewer was baffled by the one Americanism — a reference to a 'Pollyanna attitude.') If these obstacles are surmounted, Mr. Pittenger is a useful guide for the layman: clergy, too, will be grateful for a suggestive approach to Christian doctrine.

RONALD PRESTON.

A MODERN APPROACH TO THE MIRACLES *

For a long time the prevalent view was that the Gospel miracles were best understood as the ratification of the claim of Jesus to possess supernatural status. It was assumed that this was the intention of the evangelists in giving them so prominent a place in their narratives. This view is invalidated by the fact that in New Testament times the ability to work miracles was not in itself regarded as a proof of divinity. Simon Magus, Elymas, and 'the sons of the Pharisees' were admittedly able to work miracles. Moreover we have to remember that those who compiled or originally read the Gospels were innocent of our modern conceptions of the uniformity of natural law; so that the breaking of any such law was not to them so startling a phenomenon as it might be to us. From the utterances attributed to Jesus in the Synoptic Gospels regarding His miracles, we find Him regarding them as evidence of the nearness of the kingdom of God: 'If I with the finger of God cast out devils, no doubt the kingdom of God has taken you unawares.' As Mr. Richardson puts it:

> 'This is undoubtedly their significance both in the mind of Jesus and in that of the early Church; the author of *Hebrews* speaks of Christians as those who have "Tasted the powers of the Age to Come." That the mighty works of Jesus are the miracles of the King-

* *The Miracle Stories of the Gospels*, by Alan Richardson, B.D. (S.C.M., 6/-.)

dom of God is plainly taught in the account of the Beelzebub Controversy, recorded both in *Mark* and *Q*.'

Moreover, *Matthew's* alteration of the phrase 'finger of God' into 'Spirit of God' supports other plentiful evidence that for the early Church the working of miracles was one of the activities to be expected from the presence of the Spirit (compare *I Cor.* xii, 10, where 'working of miracles' is a 'manifestation of the Spirit'; also *Rom.* xv, 19). To quote Mr. Richardson:

> 'There is plentiful evidence that the early preaching of Christianity was accompanied by miraculous powers, and that these were believed to be manifestations of the presence in the Church of the Holy Spirit, Whose outpouring was regarded as the sign of the drawing nigh of the "last days" (*cf. Acts* ii, 17*f.*; *Joel* ii, 28*f.*, etc.).'

Thus the miracles, whether performed by Jesus, by His disciples, or by members of the primitive Christian communities, were indications of the power and presence of the Spirit which was to be 'poured out upon all flesh,' when there would be 'wonders in the heavens and in the earth.' The miracles were 'signs,' not, as the modern popular apologist might say, of Christ's deity, but 'that the Messianic Age of Isaianic prediction had already arrived.' As the Gospels continually insist, not all could perceive the significance of the miracles, which were intelligible only to those who could 'discern the signs of the times.' Only those who knew 'the mystery of the kingdom of God' realised what they were beholding, *i.e.* a proof that the promises were indeed being fulfilled. For the 'outsider' they were mere portents, and to such, *e.g.* to the Pharisees, Jesus refused a sign when they asked for one; it would not have convinced people whom its meaning would have escaped, who, having eyes, saw not.

We have to realise that the Gospels are the products of the early Christian communities whose faith they express and whose 'evaluations' of the miracles they have handed down to us. Mr. Richardson has a most interesting chapter on what might be called the edificatory and didactic elements in the miracle stories.

> 'There is not a story told of Jesus in the Gospels which cannot be used by the Christian teacher in his work of instruction in the Christian faith and exhortation concerning the Christian life.'

For example may be taken the case of the woman with an issue of blood (*Mark* v, 25*ff*):

> 'The woman, who is rendered ceremonially unclean by her affliction (*Lev.* xv, 19, 25), typifies the sinner who comes to Christ "fearing and trembling," and finds "the power proceeding from Him" unto salvation. "Thy faith hath saved thee." Others may throng Him, yet know nothing of His gracious power; only those who, conscious of their own unworthiness, come to Him in faith, are made whole.'

With regard to the connection between the healing of sickness and the forgiveness of sin, so close always in the Gospels, Professor B. W. Bacon

has pointed out that 'healing and forgiveness of sin are inseparable in the teaching both of the Synagogue and of the early Church' — a view confirmed by Mr. Richardson (*cf. I Cor.* xi, 30). In Bacon's opinion the fact that His message of repentance had been accompanied by the phenomena of healing among those who received it in penitent faith, was to Jesus a sign that God had 'stretched forth His hand to heal,' and so transformed the threat of 'wrath' into a 'gospel of peace.' In this connection Mr. Richardson cannot see anything in common between the faith demanded by Jesus as a condition of healing, and faith in the modern psychological sense as operative in 'faith-healing.' The Gospel miracles of healing 'are not examples of "faith-cures," and attempts to explain them along these lines are far removed from the spirit of the Gospels.' The faith required was 'a saving, personal, believing relationship with Christ.' In these last-quoted words we doubt whether Mr. Richardson is not interpreting the attitude of those whom Jesus healed too much in terms of the later experience of the primitive Church. The faith displayed by those whose healings are described in the Gospels was rather faith (1) in the nearness or actual presence of the Kingdom, and (2) in Jesus as God's messenger invested with 'power from on high' to heal and to forgive. Not but what this would be a 'saving, personal, believing relationship' too.

As to the question of 'faith-healing' in its relation to the miracles, Mr. Richardson remarks that the Gospels 'nowhere suggest that Jesus could not have worked a miracle if the belief that a cure would be effected had been lacking,' and he does not regard *Mark* vi, 5 ('He could do there no mighty work') as an exception. He says the faith demanded was that which 'illuminates the meaning of the miracle.' Though as against this it might be said that a miracle could have no meaning until it had taken place, and the faith which enabled it to take place would be of a sort that the psychologist would recognise, though he would not, of course, estimate its 'truth' or otherwise.

As for the 'nature-miracles,' Mr. Richardson holds that, like the healing miracles, they can only be understood against the Old Testament background. For the Hebrews the sea always remained 'a sphere of danger, mystery and terror,' and was 'a symbol of the troubled and sinful world' (*cf. Isa.* lvii, 20). Thus that Jesus 'shares the power of God as the Lord of the mysteries of creation' is the main teaching of the stories of the stilling of the storm, though there is also a secondary theme 'which brings a message of comfort to a storm-tossed Church in a hostile world.' The feeding miracles, too, are to be regarded as the acts or 'signs' of the Messiah. A miracle of precisely this character might have been looked for in the 'prophet like unto Moses' (*Deut.* xviii, 15 *ff.*), while Elisha fed a hundred men with twenty loaves of barley so that 'they did eat and left thereof' (*II Kings* iv, 42-44).

Mr. Richardson devotes only little more than a third of a chapter (his book contains seven) to the Johannine miracles. He indicates briefly the grounds of his view:

> 'that St. John stands in the general line of the development of the Synoptic tradition; he introduces no new motives into the telling of miracle-stories; he stresses and elaborates the old ones. There is no specifically "Johannine" interpretation of the miracle-stories.'

In other words, just as there are didactic, edificatory and theological elements in the Synoptists' stories, so too there are the same elements in the Johannine, only carried further. The symbolic aspect is now, apparently, primary. Mr. Richardson expresses a doubt whether 'its somewhat unreasonable character' (in creating over a hundred gallons of wine for men who had already drunk freely) does not suggest that St. John did *not* mean the Cana miracle to be taken literally, especially in view of its 'highly suggestive symbolism.' With regard to the raising of Lazarus, Mr. Richardson notes the difficulty of believing that the Synoptists, had they known of it (and the event was public), would not have recorded it. It has also been pointed out that St. Peter might have produced Lazarus as evidence of the possibility of a resurrection.[1]

His final chapter, 'The Historical and Religious Value of the Miracle-Stories,' faces the question, 'Did the miracles really happen?' Mr. Richardson points out that it is not the Johannine miracles only which raise this question in an acute form, since what is probably our oldest documentary source represents Jesus as claiming to have healed the blind, the lame, the lepers and the deaf, and to have raised the dead (*Q*; *Matt.* xi, 5; *Lk.* vii, 22).

> 'History,' says Mr. Richardson, 'is not merely a recording of facts, but an interpretation of the facts as well. Chronicling facts is not the same thing as history-writing, for the latter involves the *selection* of the facts which are deemed to be of the greatest importance and the *interpretation* of those facts in the light of the total outlook and philosophy of the historian.'

In other words, history is not so much the facts, but the facts as known to the historian and passed through the medium of his intelligence. But of course the facts must be there to start with; no historian, not even an ecclesiastical historian, can *invent* his facts. Thus the statement that the Gospel-writers 'selected and interpreted the facts' involves the prior hypothesis that there *were* facts to select from. Thus history is not *just* a question of selection and interpretation. Mr. Richardson says of the Gospel-writers that if we do not accept their interpretation of the facts, 'we become sceptical about the very possibility of our knowledge of the facts themselves.' We doubt if this view would commend itself to many secular historians who are accustomed to discount interpretations so as to get a clearer view of the facts. An historian writing about the reign of

[1] W. H. Counsell, *My Notebook on St. John*, p. 59.

Charles II might discount the interpretations of his Whig authorities, and some of their facts too. Mr. Richardson says that if we had access to a history of Jesus 'written by some contemporary unbeliever,' it might then have been possible to believe in 'a historical Jesus Who was *not* the Son of God, the worker of miracles and the vanquisher of the tomb.' But even this is not so certain, because our 'contemporary unbeliever' would have made his selection of facts and given them his interpretation too, and thus might have been, in his way, as opaque a medium through which to discern the facts as any other. The truth is that there is no such being as an 'unbeliever'; it is just a question of one man having a different set of beliefs from another.

Mr. Richardson concludes that the answer to the question, Did the miracles happen? must be a *personal* answer:

> 'It is not the judgment of an historian *qua* scientific investigator, or the verdict of a school of theologians. . . . It is the "Yes" of faith to the challenge which confronts us in the New Testament presentation of Christ — the only Christ we can know. When we say "Yes" to the question about Christ, we are assenting to the apostolic claim that in Him the power of God, which was from the beginning, was made manifest and was active for our salvation "under Pontius Pilate." The present writer can do no more than testify to his conviction that in Christ the power of God was indeed revealed: the miracles *did* happen.'

Of course the real trouble is that 'the New Testament presentation of Christ' is an easier thing to speak of than to define. Is that of St. Peter's speeches in *Acts* the same as that (for example) of the Fourth Gospel? And if the development of doctrine which we find in this Gospel involves, as it seems to, an enhancement of the miraculous, the question arises when did that process of enhancement start? What, in short, were the original facts? It is true that the answer to any such question must be a 'personal' one; but that applies to all answers to all questions, unfortunately. Yet our personal and private opinions have to be based on 'public' knowledge. We cannot ignore what the 'secular' historian says, even while making allowance for his selection and his interpretation of the facts. And neither can we ignore the Gospel-writers.

Mr. Richardson makes it clear that the attitude he recommends is not one of uncritical acceptance of everything:

> 'We must exercise our critical and historical faculties in respect of the detail of each particular miracle-story. Each must be considered in the light of all the available knowledge which we can bring to bear upon it. The acknowledgment that the power of God was with Jesus in His mighty works is in no sense inconsistent with the admission that our knowledge of His individual acts of power has been mediated to us by a long process of the passing of the tradition from mouth to mouth, from community to community, before it came to be written down.'

To the present reviewer this has been the most interesting book on the Gospel miracles that he has read since Mr. J. M. Thompson's *Miracles in the New Testament* came out thirty years ago. Mr. Richardson knows how to write, and carries his weight of scholarship lightly. There is not a dull page in this really important contribution to the discussion of a crucial subject.

J. C. Hardwick.

NORTHUMBRIAN HAGIOGRAPHY*

Of all the Northumbrian saints St. Cuthbert stands undoubtedly first. In his lifetime he enjoyed an unrivalled reputation among his people, first as the exemplary prior, then as the lonely and ascetic hermit, and finally as the eloquent and wonder-working bishop; while after death, as the centre of a flourishing cult, he quickly attained an immense popularity far beyond his native shores. It was not unnatural, therefore, that some fifteen years after his death a member of Cuthbert's own community at Lindisfarne (the first guardian of his incorruptible body) should attempt a biography, or that a little later Bede, the pride of Northumbrian scholarship, should follow, first with a metrical, and then with a prose version of the life of his fellow-countryman.

And now the spirit which inspired the Anonymous and Bede has descended in full measure on Mr. Colgrave. As a citizen of Durham and a member of the staff of Durham University he must rank with them as a Northumbrian. He is, moreover, an acknowledged expert upon all questions of Anglo-Saxon hagiology. Accordingly he has regarded the editing of these *Two Lives* as 'a pious duty'—a tribute which he felt bound to pay to both Cuthbert the Saint and Bede the Scholar, whose bones now rest at opposite ends of his own great cathedral church.

Precisely to what extent the memory of Cuthbert will profit from Mr. Colgrave's devotion it is a little difficult to gauge; but that a signal service has been rendered to the study of Bede it is impossible to doubt. The standard edition of Bede's works (that of Giles, 1844) is not only hopelessly out of date, but even then entirely inadequate because grossly inaccurate. And, apart from Plummer's magnificent critical edition of the *Ecclesiastical History* in 1896, nothing has been done in the intervening century to close the gap. It is encouraging, therefore, to note that despite the war the year 1940 has witnessed the appearance not only of Mr. Colgrave's edition of the prose *Life of Saint Cuthbert* but also of Professor Laistner's edition of the two *Commentaries on the Acts*. Where these two scholars have led the way one may hope that others will follow, and that within the next fifty years, if not before, one of the major scandals of our national scholarship will have been removed.

* *Two Lives of Saint Cuthbert. A Life by an Anonymous Monk of Lindisfarne and Bede's Prose Life. Text, Translation, and Notes.* By Bertram Colgrave. (Cambridge University Press. 1940. pp. xiii + 375. 21/- net.)

A reviewer of Mr. Colgrave's present work must inevitably compare it with his previously published edition of Eddius Stephanus' *Life of Wilfrid* (1927), which was conceived and carried through on a similar, though slighter, plan. In both the translation is accurate, elegant and readable—so readable, in fact, that one tends to concentrate entirely on the right-hand page and ignore the Latin completely! But in the Introduction and in the Notes to the *Two Lives of Saint Cuthbert* we meet a much maturer and far more interesting scholar than in the Introduction and Notes to the *Life of Wilfrid*. It is not merely that Mr. Colgrave has read more widely and increased his stores of knowledge — that was only to be expected; but he shows in the later work a far greater realisation than formerly that it is incumbent upon him to illustrate his text as a whole and its relation to other texts, as well as to supply each person, place and custom mentioned with a miniature encyclopaedia article. Since 1927 Mr. Colgrave has become an editor as distinct from an annotator, and his book gains immensely in consequence.

In the more limited and technical sense also Mr. Colgrave has made progress as an editor. The Latin text of the *Life of Wilfrid* depends upon but two manuscripts; and since both of these had been edited before (more than once) such originality as the volume possesses can hardly be said to derive from its text. But now the Anonymous *Life of Cuthbert* has been edited from seven manuscripts and Bede's Prose *Life* from thirty-eight, the majority of which have been collated for the first time. So far as it is possible to judge, the task of collation has been performed with the utmost care and the *apparatus criticus* is readily intelligible, even if necessarily rather elaborate. Here, however, two points call for comment.

In the first place, instead of relying upon his own critical judgment and attempting a reconstruction of the original text, Mr. Colgrave has adopted the easier method of printing on the left-hand page the text of a selected manuscript and consigning all variants to the apparatus. But the choice of such a method is in this instance particularly unfortunate in so far as the earliest and most reliable manuscripts of both *Lives* are incomplete and therefore (on Mr. Colgrave's plan) not 'eligible for selection.' As a result not only is the printed text crammed full of anacronistic spelling (in itself a comparatively minor blemish), but a whole host of readings which Mr. Colgrave quite candidly admits are obviously to be preferred are relegated to the apparatus instead of appearing, as one might expect, in the text. And since no more than a general indication of preference is given (pp. 45, 47, 50) the student is consistently left to decide for himself where he might reasonably demand the expert guidance of his editor.

Secondly, although the available evidence for the Anonymous *Life* has been cited, readings from only ten 'representative' manuscripts have been cited for the Bede *Life*. No doubt Mr. Colgrave is wise not gratuitously to overload his apparatus; but one is tempted to ask, Was the *complete collation* of the remaining twenty-eight manuscripts in this case worth while?

Would not an *examination for classification* have been sufficient? A vast amount of unnecessary labour might thus have been saved, and the extra time gained might have been devoted to a more intensive study and critical classification of the resulting 'representative' material or to preparation for the next *magnum opus*. But an editor, like anyone else, learns most from experience; and I look forward with confidence to Mr. Colgrave's next contribution.

For the non-specialist reader a number of interesting points emerge. Thus, Mr. Colgrave attributes the paintings on the backs of the stalls of Carlisle Cathedral, depicting the life of St. Cuthbert, to the influence of the miniatures in the British Museum Additional MS. No. 39343, written in Durham in the late twelfth century. 'There is no doubt in my mind,' he says, 'that the artist had the manuscript before him when he was painting the stalls' (p. 32). But what strikes the Biblical scholar most forcibly when reading the book is its illustrative value for Gospel study.

The Anonymous *Life* was written not many years after Cuthbert's death by an unknown Lindisfarne monk; and, despite the occurrence of the singular first personal pronoun, it is little more than the reduction to writing of the floating tradition current in the saint's own monastery. This 'community' product Bede used as his main source in the prose *Life*, although it is only in the Introduction to the *Ecclesiastical History* that he expressly acknowledged his debt. 'What I have written concerning the most holy father and bishop Cuthbert,' he says, 'whether in this volume (*i.e.* the *Ecclesiastical History*) or in my little book concerning his acts (*i.e.* the *Life*), I took in part from what I have previously found written about him by the brethren of the church at Lindisfarne, yielding simple faith to the story I read; and in part I ventured to add with care such facts as I myself had heard from the unimpeachable testimony of faithful men.' Add to this that in the tradition many stories and incidents have assuredly been attached to St. Cuthbert which originally belonged elsewhere; that the Anonymous borrows, not only words and phrases, but sometimes a dozen consecutive sentences, from the works of previous hagiographers (notably Athanasius' *Life of Saint Antony* and Septimius Severus' *Life of Saint Martin*); that both *Lives of Saint Cuthbert* conform to the distinctive 'pattern' usual in the lives of saints; and one realizes at once that the student of Mr. Colgrave's volume is confronted with much the same phenomena and much the same problems as confront the student of the Gospels. Indeed, the relationship of Bede's prose *Life* to the Anonymous *Life* is identical with the relationship of St. Luke's Gospel to St. Mark's.

Thus when comparing the two *Lives* together we find Bede more than once changing the order of the incidence as related in his source, and as often as not for no very apparent reason: he has a definite tendency, furthermore, to 'heighten' the miraculous—contrast, for example, his circumstantial account of the miraculous provision of food in chap. 5 with the more simple narrative of the Anonymous (i, 6): or again, we notice con-

tinual indications of his superior theological knowledge and especial biblical interests—*e.g.* his more exact specification of 'the angel' (Anonymous i, 4) which healed Tobias as 'the archangel Raphael' (Bede 2) and the detailed cross-reference in the same place to 'the angels on horseback' of *II Macc.* xi, 8.

It is interesting, moreover, to remark in both *Lives* what is frequently a conscious imitation of the Gospel models. Crowds thronging the saint are perpetually in evidence; and persons on whom miracles of healing have been wrought are repeatedly described as having acted in accordance with Gospel precedent. Sometimes the correspondence is frankly recognized, as when Bede expressly comments on the ministrations of a certain woman after her cure:

> 'She thus followed the example of the mother-in-law of the Apostle Peter, who, when she was cured of a fever by the Lord, forthwith rose and ministered to him and to his disciples' (p. 29).

More often, however, no comment is made, yet the influence of the Gospels is no less discernible—as in the following narrative of the Anonymous (derived, as he says, 'from the account of many reliable men who were present, one of whom is Penna'):

> 'At a certain time the holy bishop was making his way from Hexham to the city which is called Carlisle. Nevertheless a halt was made in the middle of the journey in a district which is called Ahse. For when the people had gathered together from the mountains, he placed his hand on the head of each of them, and anointing them with consecrated oil he blessed them, and remained there two days preaching the word of God. Meanwhile there came some women bearing a certain youth who lay on a litter; they carried him to the wood not far from our tents where the holy bishop was, and sent a messenger asking and adjuring him in the name of our Lord Jesus Christ that he would bless him with his holy relics and would utter a prayer for him to the Lord, beseeching God's pardon for the sins by which he was bound and on account of which he endured punishment. So the bishop, seeing their unwavering faith, put us forth from him and prayed to the Lord, and, blessing the boy, he drove away the disease and restored him to health. He glorified the Lord Jesus Christ who helped his servant who trusted in him. For the boy arose that very hour and took food, and departed with the women, thanking and magnifying the Lord who had wrought wonderful things in his servants' (iv, 5).

Accordingly, odd as it might at first sight appear, no serious student of the Gospels can fail to profit from a careful reading of these *Two Lives of Saint Cuthbert,* since they provide an almost exact parallel to his own special study. Here, as in the Gospels, he can construct, at any rate in part, the history of the tradition as it circulated from mouth to mouth; and pick out the various tendencies which moulded it gradually into shape. Here also he can examine the earliest official biography, and note how the Community Mind has itself first dwelt upon the tradition before finally casting it in the customary hagiographical form through the agency of a single writer. And lastly, he can study a revised and expanded version of this

biography by a well-read and polished scholar, who did not scruple to refurbish the material as it came to him in the light of his own 'good sense.'

Workers in more than one field, therefore, should feel grateful to Mr. Colgrave. That his book is a first-rate contribution to hagiography need hardly be stated. That it goes a very long way towards providing a critical edition of yet another of our own Bede's works admits of no reasonable doubt; and it now only remains for Mr. Colgrave himself, or another, to establish a definitive text. That it can be, in addition, of quite incalculable value to the specialist in Gospel studies is also indisputable. And this last is a most important service rendered which the learned author had probably not foreseen.

HEDLEY F. D. SPARKS.

AN ARCHBISHOP'S THOUGHTS IN WAR-TIME*

It was a wise suggestion that the Archbishop of York should collect together in book form some of the addresses he has delivered and of the articles he has written since the outbreak of the war. They fall naturally into three sections: a religious section dealing with such questions as 'Love and Justice,' 'Is Life Sacrosanct?,' 'Prayer in War-Time'; a political section on the spirit and aims of Great Britain in the war, peace aims and war aims, what is a just peace? and the need for steadfastness; a theological section gives a personal statement on theology to-day. In an appendix is to be found a 'National Lecture' entitled 'Faith and Freedom' and a most interesting and valuable paper by the late Canon Streeter on 'War, This War and the Sermon on the Mount.' This appeared originally as one of the 'Papers for War-Time' of which Dr. Temple was editor in the early part of the former war. The observations which will be found in it are even more pertinent to our present situation than when they were written: they deal with basic issues in that seemingly effortless way with which Canon Streeter always matched profundity with lucidity. In *The Hope of a New World* Dr. Temple looks forward to the kind of world which Christians might set themselves to build when Nazi tyranny has been overcome. 'We must recover faith—virile faith—in God, and dedication—costly dedication—to His service, if we are not to slip back into the rather listless and complacent state from which the challenge of the war has roused us.' The call which he makes at the conclusion of his six broadcast talks here printed is not only fine but practical, as also is his chapter on 'Principles of Reconstruction,' in which he urges that we have to find a way of ordering life which

(α) expresses the fellowship of all men in one family,

(β) gives sufficient outlet to the self-centred acquisitive tendency in men to harness it to the common interest, and

(γ) provides adequate checks and balances to prevent it from seriously injuring the common interests.

* *Thoughts in War-Time*, by William Temple, Archbishop of York. (Macmillan & Co. 1940. 4/6.)
The Hope of a New World, by William Temple, Archbishop of York. (S.C.M. 1940. 3/6.)

Dr. Temple is ready for far-reaching changes in the political and economic spheres; he is equally convinced that these must be guided by Christian understanding of the purpose of God and of the nature and destiny of man. Here is a Christian realism which blinks no facts and is dominated by the highest of all ideals. T. WIGLEY.

HELL AND CONVERSION*

Those who were nourished in the genial atmosphere of the theological liberalism of the first decade of our century were inclined to think that their fathers were dutiful Christians through a fear of everlasting damnation. Those who rejected all theology, both liberal and otherwise, claimed that men were only Christians because they were frightened of the consequences of being anything else. So Mr. Bertrand Russell wrote 'Belief in hell was the fulcrum of early Christianity.' In this small book of a hundred pages Mr. Clement Rogers has amassed evidence of every sort from every age which conclusively shows that the fear of hell has played scarcely if any part at all in the conversion of men to Christianity or in its growth and development. As Mr. Rogers writes (p. 21), his purpose differs from that of Dr. Dearmer in his book *The Legend of Hell*. Dr. Dearmer examines the doctrine itself and its incompatibility with the teaching of Christ: Mr. Rogers studies its practical effect. In the concluding chapter Mr. Rogers answers the question why, if the doctrine has had such little practical effect, it has persisted throughout the ages. He points out that the imagery of heaven and hell are the popular representation of 'the idea of judgment, to which all human lives must finally come and without which life has no meaning.' To quote Mr. Rogers' concluding sentences (p. 108):

> 'We cannot limit God's power to save, or deny the possibility of repentance to any soul. But there is one thing that even God cannot do. He cannot alter the past. He cannot make what has been not to have been. He might destroy the memory of it. He can perhaps even undo the consequences of it. But he cannot alter the fact.'

Other factors, however, unmentioned by Mr. Rogers amplified the doctrine and the imagery of hell and maintained its popularity. Not the fear for oneself but the prospect of others in misery popularised the picture of hell. It gave an outlet to that human failing which the Germans call *Schadenfreude*. Persecution can not only ennoble but also can embitter the mind and warp the imagination. The persecuted church was composed of such human clay that it could not help but compensate its own sufferings by the prospect of the tortures held out for its persecutors when the rôles would be reversed and the Christians would be in the stalls of the celestial amphitheatre and the persecutor in hell's arena. Such feelings can be found to germinate in the book of the Revelation, to provide the motif of Tertullian's famous concluding paragraph to his *De Spectaculis*, and to explain the com-

* *The Fear of Hell as an Instrument of Conversion*, by Clement F. Rogers. (S.P.C.K. 1940. 3/6.)

placency with which in comparatively recent times men have listened Sunday after Sunday to the pronouncement of eternal doom. Also those who are pessimistic by nature concerning man have satisfied their morbid imagination in the picture of hell, for it affords the possibility of a worse doom than annihilation; it affords the possibility that death may be the ante-chamber to a succession of hells. In one of the most harrowing of poems, 'The City of Dreadful Night,' a certain James Thomson has presented this thought:

> 'The city is of Night, but not of sleep;
> There sweet sleep is not for the weary brain.
> The pitiless hours like years and ages creep,
> A night seems termless hell.'

Mr. Rogers has added a valuable contribution to the literature concerning hell. Together with Dr. Dearmer's classic study of the doctrine it provides the prolegomena for an examination of the place of hell in the psychology of religion and its appropriate counterpart in a revised eschatology which is one of the most pressing needs of theology to-day.

Although fear does not appear to act as a motive to positive belief, and on that account the fear of hell seems to have played no part in the expansion of the Christian Church, yet the fear of calamity is a powerful motive to provision against calamity. In that way the fear of hell played a large part in the life of the Christian Church. Men were induced to fear hell enough to be moved to insure themselves against it, and the Church for her own profit undertook the work of the insurance company which issued policies against the fires of hell. Hence sprang up the Romish doctrine, practice and abuses concerning Purgatory. Mr. Rogers, doubtless because he is seeking to confute those who, having been brought up in a Protestant tradition, throw out heaven and hell, omits to discuss this corollary to the argument of hell-fire. The Protestant reformers in this case threw out the baby with the bath-water because the doctrine had led to evil practices. Yet some purged doctrine of purgatory seems to be a pre-requisite of any rational eschatology.

H. C. Snape.

THE SEPTUAGENARIAN CROCKFORD*

Once again we welcome the annual advent of *Crockford's Clerical Directory*. With its 1941 issue, *Crockford* has reached three score and ten years. We hope indeed that *Crockford* will not only attain to four score years without any undue measure of labour and sorrow but that, so long as the *Ecclesia Anglicana* possesses a clergy, *Crockford* will continue to chronicle annually their names, degrees, benefices, etc., and that the record will be marked by a steadily rising level in the quality and quantity of the degrees and in the financial value of the benefices — the former of these two wishes having special reference to the well-being of the laity, and the latter to the comfort of the clergy.

* *Crockford's Clerical Directory*. (O.U.P. 50/-. 1941.)

Although this is the second year of the war and the disasters which have overtaken the publishing world in this country have been neither few nor small, yet *Crockford,* with its more than 2,000 pages of closely printed type in parallel columns, shows no diminution, either in quality or quantity. As always, it constitutes a convenient compendium of indispensable ecclesiastical information, and its Preface contains an undiminished percentage of laconic and sardonic wisdom. The Preface deals for the most part, not with plans and visions of the New Order, but is mainly concerned with the existing situation.

The Editor is not enthusiastic about the financial proposals of the Men, Money and the Ministry Movement, but judiciously points out that these proposals, if implemented, will demand a handsomely paid bureaucracy to carry them out, and this must needs diminish the income available for distribution among the parochial clergy. He also indicates that some of the proposals will certainly restrict the existing freedom of the parochial clergy and lower their status, especially in rural parishes. He does not, however, favour the French solution of a peasant priesthood for rural England, and evidently regards the working of large groups of united parishes by celibate non-resident curates in Baby Austins as unworthy of serious consideration. Our own conviction that one solution is to be found in the combination of the country schoolmaster and parish priest, he does not touch on. His comment on the slogan of the New Order that ' every clergyman will be free to do as he is told and to go wherever he may be required ' is characteristic:

> ' He has the former privilege already in full measure, and his worst enemy could not charge him with abusing it. The latter can never be possible for men who have family as well as ministerial responsibilities.'

In dealing with problems of religious education the Editor makes the following original proposal:

> ' A desirable addition to religious education would be a system of elementary classes for budding novelists, so that if in later life they feel impelled to ventilate their opinions on Christian theology, philosophy, and ethics they should at least have some notion of what they are talking about ' (p. xiv).

We fear the Editor has been unduly provoked by Miss Dorothy Sayers.

The Editor is hardly just in his criticism of the slogan, ' No tests for teachers,' which he asserts means that ' you can teach what you have never learned.' What the slogan does mean in present-day educational circles is that while you may and must test the competency of the teacher of religious instruction in the sphere of knowledge and his ability to impart it, you must not test his religious orthodoxy and you must leave him free without prejudice to his professional reputation to decline to teach religion.

There is one item of peculiar interest in *Crockford* which we imagine few of *Crockford's* readers will have noted. It is that H.M. King George VI is a Canon of St. David's Cathedral. It will surprise many that this is so. It will be argued that since our Gracious Sovereign is a layman, he cannot

lawfully be a Canon of one of our Cathedral Chapters. Both inferences are wrong. It is not accurate to describe our Sovereign as a layman. His Coronation is a form of consecration, and henceforth he is entitled to be spoken of as 'sacred.' The Church of England has not restricted canonries to clergymen. Sir Philip Sidney, who fell fighting at Zutphen, was not the least distinguished of the Prebendaries of Hereford. H.D.A.M.

CORRESPONDENCE

To the Editor of *The Modern Churchman*

SIR, THE TRUTH ABOUT SPIRITUALISM.

The review of Canon Anson's book on Spiritualism seems to me to miss the main scope and intention of the book. Failing to realise the impartial courage with which the Canon handles a theme which lies under clouds of personal and professional prejudice, the writer concentrates attention on the warnings and the censures addressed to foolish or misguided sections of those affected by the movement.

For years I have kept in touch with psychical and spiritualist investigations on the literary, though not on the practical or institutional side. Like all such movements—religious, social, or political—'spiritualism' lies open to abuse by impostors, though (thanks largely to the action of its accredited leaders) much less so than is generally assumed.

While heartily and gratefully welcoming Canon Anson's survey, I should say that in his anxiety to do full justice to the adversary, and to utter warnings against dangers and misuse, he has weighted the scales rather unevenly against the defence, and fails to give a just impression of the mass of strict and searching criticism on the one hand, and of irreducible data on the other, that have compelled Committees on both sides of the Atlantic, as well as trained investigators of the highest competence, to accept as incontrovertible the proofs of personal survival, and of established contacts with those who have passed through or from earthly existence to spheres of diversified activities in 'the Beyond.' In attempts to discredit or evade these, hypotheses of telepathy, telekinesis, cryptaesthesia, clairvoyance, and the rest, have been strained to breaking-point, but have failed to produce alternative explanations.

On the side of the defence, not to mention the primary, weightier volumes from Swedenborg and Myers (*Human Personality*) downwards, the L.S.A. provides many careful, well-digested manuals of authentic evidence for all who have ears to hear. Set against these, the ill-advised fulminations or injunctions of reverend 'Fathers in God,' or the hush-hush policy which prompted the suppression of the findings of the Archbishops' Committee of Inquiry, reflect the timid clericalism which has so often been the bane of the official Church. Few realise the extent and weight of the resentment which action of this kind provokes. Taboos on free discussion not only irritate: they give colour and excuse to the slogan 'Clericalism is the enemy.'

That Spiritualism is not a Religion is an axiom which Canon Anson does well to emphasise, and which leaders of the movement fully and openly endorse; but its bearings on religion, like those of Science, Philosophy, and rival creeds, are close and intimate. In some respects, conspicuously that regarding personal survival, it justifies the forecast of Myers:

> 'I venture on a bold saying; for I predict that in consequence of the new evidence, all reasonable men, a century hence, will believe in the

Resurrection of Christ, whereas in default of the evidence, no reasonable man, a century hence, would have believed.'

In others, it commands an armoury, potentially more formidable than any wielded by Strauss, Renan or the Haeckel school of materialists. Not merely as policy, but in defence of truth and of the cause, it is disastrous to convert would-be allies into aggrieved assailants.

GERALD H. RENDALL.

Dedham House, Dedham, Colchester.
July 27th, 1941.

SIR,

Canon Anson's book (S.C.M., 2/-) is of unique value in connection with the subject with which it deals, for several reasons:

(1) It is the product of a clergyman of the Church of England whose name is so well known as a writer that his opinion should carry weight.

(2) He has had special opportunities for studying the subject, having been a member of the Commission appointed by the Archbishop of Canterbury, and in that position having had the testimony of various qualified students brought to his notice.

(3) The quality of justice in this author and the possession of a balanced judgment are conspicuous throughout this work. No difficulties are shirked, and the fairness with which every point is handled should win the confidence of the reader, with whatever bias he may himself approach the subject. Having myself been a student of this subject during the last forty-five to fifty years, I realise how valuable this lucid exposition should prove to be to open-minded enquirers, especially those who are members of the Christian Church, and I venture earnestly to recommend it to them.

HELEN A. DALLAS.

SIR, THE M.C.U. REPORT ON CHRISTIAN PEACE AIMS.

I hope you will permit me, as a member of the M.C.U. for many years and a recently co-opted member of the Council, to record my emphatic objection to the Report on Christian Peace Aims which constitutes the July issue of *The Way*. In its specific recommendations, in its general tone and in its excursion into the field of international politics, the Report in my judgment travels far outside the legitimate activities of the Union and is calculated not only to divert the Union from the objects for which it was formed but to lead to its disruption.

We are reminded on the first page that it is a Report of the Commission 'appointed by the Council of the Modern Churchmen's Union,' but that 'the Report is not to be submitted to the Council, which has no responsibility for it other than having appointed the members of the Commission, *who had power to co-opt.*' (The italics are mine.) So the Report, having been born as a child of the Union, remains an orphan without adoption? If the purpose of its creation was to allow certain gentlemen — members and perhaps non-members of our body — to become articulate on matters outside the normal scope of our known objects, then surely it would have been better if they had expressed their own ideas as a separate entity or as the avowed instrument of that organisation which has obviously inspired the main content of the Report, *i.e.* the New Commonwealth Institute of World Affairs. I protest against the manoeuvre which seeks to convert the Modern Churchmen's Union into an agency for pushing proposals of a partisan political organisation.

I do not accept the Commission's definitions in Part I, 'The Christian Outlook,' nor the superfluous homiletics in Part II, 'Christian Principles of Conduct.' The Editor's fretful references to 'Freedom' do not appeal to me, and I found Part IIB tiresomely redundant. Indeed, the Report as a whole is far too verbose. I repudiate the description in Part III of 'The Social Effects of Post-Reformation Christianity,' with its socialistic clichés and stock phrases of Marxism. But the chief indictment begins with the pernicious statements on p. 46. The Report there launches into a detailed programme for what it calls 'the breaking down of frontiers.' '. . . The proper division of the Continent for administrative and economic purposes,' writes the inspired author of this precious paragraph, 'will be hard to determine.' So he straightway proceeds to join South Germany to a Danubian *bloc, 'including the Catholic Slavs, such as the Poles and the Croats.'* (My italics.) Tireless in the expression of doctrinaire fantasies, the gifted author continues: 'Another *bloc,* more directly controlled by Great Britain (*sic*), could include Scandinavia, North Germany, Northern France and Switzerland. Spain and Portugal, Southern France and Italy would form a Catholic Southern *bloc.*' To what *bloc* will Russia belong in these typically dictatorial theories about other nations? And how are the divisions to be achieved?

It would be difficult if not impossible to cram into a few words less practical sense and more dangerous propaganda. Millions of men are dying to defend their native soil, yet the authors of the Report blithely declare their determination to divide Europe along their own fanciful lines.

The members of the Union, if they take the trouble to read the Report at all, will draw their own conclusions, but it is in my view the duty of the Union to repudiate these very doubtful declarations.

F. Victor Fisher.

26 Buckland Crescent, Hampstead, N.W.3.
August 11th, 1941.

Sir, 'FOR THE TERM OF HIS NATURAL LIFE.'

With your editorial, 'The Vanishing Country Parson,' in your June issue I am in general agreement, but I disagree strongly with your statement: 'Country parishes need men possessed of no ecclesiastical ambitions who are prepared to remain all their pastoral life in one parish . . .' During the last year I have visited a great many country parishes and made friends with a large number of country clergy in their own homes. I found them all good fellows and the majority hard-working — the house and the garden often took up a large share of their time — but the congregations were for the most part appallingly small. Big churches with a handful of people can be very depressing, and I feel sure many were depressed.

It seemed to me that almost without exception these men had shot their bolt and that there was no more initiative or drive to be expected from them. Some wanted to change, but for the most part they had acquired through amalgamation of benefices a fair stipend and felt disinclined to risk a move.

Now I feel that if the Church is to attract young people to-day, and so not to lose its hold on the future, it needs must show more initiative, and there must be some measure of novelty in its work and services. The one thing we must avoid is the clergy getting stale. The one necessity for this is not to allow them to remain too long in any one place. The uprooting may be disagreeable to the clergyman for all sorts of personal reasons — home, wife, children, expense — but the interests of the Church must come first. All these friends of mine transplanted would, I believe, begin again with fresh vigour: staying where they are, as they probably will, each year finds them more and more disinclined to tackle any new work and becoming

deeper and deeper in the rut. Let us note one thing: the Army now rarely allows a regiment to remain more than a few weeks in one place. Why? They know something. I will not labour the point: Change is the breath of life.

C. H. D. GRIMES.

[We venture to suggest that small congregations in country churches in war-time are no secure indication of the influence of the parish priest on his parishioners. Our military authorities appear to have decreed that the Home Guard shall drill during the time of Morning Service; Summer Time and the impossibility of blacking-out compel the milking of the cows during the Evening Service. Moreover, the soldiers billeted in some country parishes, although given periods of rest on Saturday and Monday, are yet compelled to work on Sunday. Furthermore, the number of men capable of doing the necessary farm work on Sunday having been considerably reduced, more Sunday work naturally falls on the individuals who remain to do it. All these facts militate against Church attendance on Sunday in country parishes.

We also venture to think that our correspondent does not understand the temperament of country parishes. Stunts avail little. Strangers are not welcomed with open arms. 'We summer them and we winter them before we speak to them' is the Yorkshire rustic's practice in dealing with his new parson. A sincere, amiable, dutiful parson grows slowly but surely in influence with his parishioners as the years pass by. Familiarity breeds contempt — in country parishes — only with contemptible persons. Country people are often spoken of as bovine. They are in the sense that they move slowly. It is advisable that their parson should in some ways share their temperament and methods. 'Who drives fat oxen should himself be fat.'

In our Editorial we referred particularly to the planting of middle-aged retired laymen as clergymen in country parishes, and to the desirability of such men making the parish to which they were appointed their permanent sphere. We do not favour the appointment of a young man to a country parish, unless he has a real zest for country people and the country life. Change may be the breath of life for urban and suburban populations, but most country people do not thrive as the result of frequent transplantation, and we believe the same to be true of many country parsons. Compulsory transplantation would, we believe, prove most disadvantageous.

Dr. Henson, when Bishop of Durham, complained that the clergy were not cultivating their gardens, and this to the detriment of their influence. Blessed is the country clergyman who, besides observing the motto *Pasce oves et boves,* follows also the dictum with which Voltaire concludes *Candide: 'Il faut cultiver le jardin.'*

Lastly, our correspondent hardly seems to realise what valuable contributions scholarly clergymen in country parishes can make to the intellectual strength of the Church. Such clergymen will not desire to move frequently, nor do we think their parishioners will desire it either.—ED., *M.C.*]

A SPIRITUAL MOVEMENT FOR CHURCH REFORM.

SIR,

If our Church is sincere in her desire for reform and for the recovery of ground lost through failures in the past, there is certainly much that she can learn from the operations of the Holy Spirit which have been manifest in the Group Movement. There is no denying the fact that the Group Movement has roused the religious spirit of a vast number in this country, and not in England only: in every continent there are countries where the effect of the Movement has been felt, and one must admit that there has been a world-wide religious revival in consequence of its missionary work.

The chief attraction of the Group Movement is perhaps the spirit of Fellowship evident among its members, and to this may be added the joyous experience of self-confidence which follows upon the sympathetic appreciation given to those who by 'sharing' have the courage to confess the 'change' which comes into their lives through the influence of the Group—the Fellowship and Power of the Holy Spirit.

My own personal contact with the Movement has left a permanent impression upon my spiritual life, largely through a book I chanced upon when attending a House Party in Exeter in 1936. I refer to *The God Who Speaks*, by Dr. Streeter.

St. Paul bids us: 'Follow after charity, and desire spiritual gifts, but *rather that ye may prophesy* . . . he that prophesieth edifieth the Church.' Yet our Church to-day has no 'School of Prophets.'

The Church's ministry has been too much restricted to the office of Priesthood, which aims at the perpetuation of ancient rights and ceremonies and the maintenance of tradition. This ancient office is itself one of very high order, and the life of the Church has been sustained through the ages mainly by reason of the humble, conscientious and faithful ministrations of individual priests. But the works of the Spirit are by no means limited to the priesthood, which now can only be maintained at its best in conjunction with prophecy and other divers operations of the Holy Spirit. When writing to the Corinthians 'concerning spiritual gifts,' St. Paul makes no mention of the priesthood. It is not included among the peculiar 'manifestations of the Spirit,' and so, it would appear, comes short of the Christian dispensation.

Disestablishment and disendowment may be inevitable either as a prelude to, or as a consequence of, necessary Church Reform, unless Establishment can allow for a larger comprehensiveness. The use of the 'Revised Prayer Book' is irregular and does not well accord with the solemn Declaration of Assent to use the form in the 'Book prescribed and none other except so far as shall be ordered by *lawful* Authority.' In many churches and cathedrals the *Quicunque vult* is no longer recited in public worship on the occasions directed by the rubrics of the Book of Common Prayer. It had become an offence to the enlightened conscience of the laity. Must further reform await similar demands from the laity? Will our Church authorities never awake to their full responsibility of leadership in matters spiritual? 'Full well do ye reject the commandment of God, that ye may keep your tradition.'

Boscombe, Bournemouth. HERBERT ENGLAND.
August 27th, 1941.

SIR, CAN WE STILL BE CHRISTIAN?

In your Editorial, 'Is our Age Post-Christian?' in the May issue, you write: 'A German Professor, Eucken, in the era before the Great War wrote an essay with the alarming title 'Can we still be Christian?'

Although the essay you refer to runs to 215 pages, I do not think it is as convincing as one or two of his other books, especially *The Meaning and Value of Life* or the one entitled *Life's Basis and Life's Ideal*. I wanted to quote from this last volume (but I seem to have lent it to somebody). However, *ex animo*, Rudolf Eucken said:

> 'If only we could come to regard Christianity as a progressive, historical movement, still in the making, and placed upon a broader foundation, and freed from the numbing influence of ecclesiasticism, Christians not only can, but must, remain Christian.'

3522 Point Grey Road, Vancouver, B.C. F. W. MACCAUD.
June 14th, 1941.

GLASGOW *VERSUS* BIRMINGHAM.

SIR,

A point of pride — not directly theological. My Scottish blood is roused by your claim for Birmingham as the second city of the Empire. Population of Birmingham, 1,002,413; Glasgow, 1,088,417. So there! R.B.H.

July 27th, 1941.

AN ILLUMINATING EXPERIENCE.

SIR,

I have been asked to write a short description of the special course on Divinity held in New College, Oxford, during the week August 5th to 10th. This was the first course of this kind and it may be of interest to others to hear of the impressions of one of the members.

We were a mixed bag, twelve women and thirteen men, most of them engaged in teaching, although there was a fair sprinkling of Methodist ministers whose chief duties were, presumably, pastoral. The 'head of the form' was an old gentleman of 85, who had vivid memories of Garbaldi, and I was, myself, quite properly sent to sit at the bottom of the class.

The course itself was, we all felt, a really masterly summary, compressed into a very short space of time, of the outstanding questions of literary criticism both in the Old and New Testaments, and it was most interesting to observe the reactions of the class as the course proceeded. In the early stages there came, naturally enough, complaints, especially from the clergy, that this was all 'old ground' and much too elementary, but this view faded away fairly rapidly, and there was a unanimous feeling at the end of the week that the whole course had eben very much worth while.

The next important reaction came with the realization, in listening to the lecture by Mr. Griffiths, that the course was set definitely upon modernist lines, and those of us who had not conformed to this particular approach were not slow in expressing our profound disagreement; but we were very careful not to allow such disagreement to violate the bounds of common courtesy and friendliness, with the remarkable result that there grew up a feeling, of which every member was conscious, of a real unity and friendly atmosphere in spite of theological differences. No doubt the kindly, stimulating personality of the lecturer was, to a large extent, responsible for this, but it was, I still feel, a remarkable result.

As far as I am personally concerned, I feel grateful indeed for the opportunity of revising in a far more sympathetic atmosphere my own attitude. Hitherto I have always regarded 'modernism' as a mischievous heresy, but I came away from Oxford strongly impressed by the fact that the centrifugal forces are really far stronger than the centripetal. The Christian is one who is seeking to serve and follow Christ, and upon that basis we can and do, I believe, stand united in spite of divergence of christological opinion. It was not that any attempt was made to change views, but the prevailing harmony was a very real lesson in tolerance and kindly feeling, and it is for this reason that we all agreed that we should like to conclude the course by presenting a testimonial to the lecturer, in the form of a book token, to express something of the gratitude we felt, not only for the critical and literary information he dispensed, but for the enlargement of our sympathy and the stimulus to our vision of the underlying unity of our faith.

A. ROSS WALLACE.

School House, Sherborne, Dorset.

September 6th, 1941.